Urban Concentration and Civil War

• Author: Megan Stewart,Michael Weintraub,Dani Nedal
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002719892054
• Published date: 01 July 2020
• Date: 01 July 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Urban Concentration

and Civil War

Dani Nedal

1

, Megan Stewart

2

,

and Michael Weintraub

3

Abstract

The explosion of cities and megacities has increased scholars’ and policy markers’

attention to the effects such changes might have on conflict: increasingly, urban

environments may alter the nature of warfare but not necessarily the incidence of

intrastate war. We argue that high levels of urban concentration—the concentration

of populations in one or relatively few urban centers—increases both the likelihood

of civil wars and their intensity. Urban concentration limits the ability of the state to

project power across space, exacerbating grievances in rural areas, easing rebel

control of territory, and enhancing their military strength. At the same time, cities

become high-value loci of contestation even as urban warfare constrains conven-

tional state military strength. The result is more symmetrical fighting producing

more battle deaths. Cross-national regressions show that urban concentration

exerts a crucial effect on the likelihood, nature, and intensity of intrastate warfare.

Keywords

urban concentration, civil wars, cities, violence

The global rise of cities has not only heightened skylines but also fears of future

instability and turmoil (§2-3 Fie 2007; Kilcullen 2013). The future of warfare,

1

Institute for Politics and Strategy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA

2

School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC, USA

3

Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo, Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Colombia

Corresponding Author:

Michael Weintraub, Escuela de Gobierno Alberto Lleras Camargo, Universidad de los Andes, Cr. 1 No.

19-27, Bloque Aulas AU, Bogota, Colombia.

Email: ml.weintraub@uniandes.edu.co

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(6) 1146-1171

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002719892054

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scholars and analysts argue, can be found in cities (Peters 1996; Hahn and Jezior

1999; S. Graham 2004; Adamson 2015; Gentile et al. 2017; Konaev and Spencer

2018). To prepare, the US military has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in

Military Operations in Urban Terrain, including the construction and expansion of

state-of-the-art training facilities and the development of new training systems (Loc

2011; Watson 2011).

1

Ongoing and protracted interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan

have particularly predisposed the armed forces of the United States and its allies to

assume that future challenges for counterinsurgents will be closely tied to the

dynamics of fighting in tight physical spaces, in densely populated areas, and among

enemies connected both physically and informatically to one another.

While urbancenters may play an increasinglyimportant role in the natureof warfare

(Brathwaiteand Konaev 2017), we argue thatthe relationship betweencities and high-

intensity civil war is profoundly conditioned by urban geography, most notably the

degree of concentration (or, conversely, dispersion) of urban populations across a

country’scities. We contend that higherlevels of Urban Concentration—meaningthat

a majorityof a country’s populationreside in few major urban centersor even just one—

increasesthe probability of experiencing high-intensitycivil war. When a countryhas a

high level of urban concentration, the central government typically retains complete

control of only thecapital and perhaps a few other key cities,leaving peripheral com-

munitieslargely untouchedby state institutions.The lack of statecontrol over villagesin

the periphery, andits failure to deliver resources tosuch areas, exacerbates local grie-

vances amongrural communities and allowsrebels to harness this resentment to mobi-

lize (Bates 1981; Wallace 2013; Thomson 2016). Not only can rebels mobilize more

easilyin countries with high levelsof urban concentration,but the lack of state presence

in theserural spaces allows rebelsto more easily gaincontrol of territory wherethey can

train, prepare,stock weapons, and seek foreign aid without hindrance (McColl 1969),

resulting in better tr ained and better equip ped rebels. Urban conce ntration, in short,

enhances rebels’military strength.

Yet unlike urbanization—which c ould mean urban population growth spre ad

across numerous cities—high urban concentration means that rebels need only cap-

ture one or a few high-value cities to gain complete control of the vast majority of the

country’s urban population and wealth, as well as state power and resources.

Because the control of one or a few cities is essential to both rebel success and state

perseverance, the two forces frequently confront each other in urban centers

(Brathwaite and Konaev 2017; Konaev and Spencer 2018; Landau-Wells 2018).

Warfare in urban areas, however, is a hindrance to the state’s conventional

military forces, which must abandon heavy artillery, heavy armored infantry, and

other technological advantages in favor of the lighter and more mobile units more

suited to the complex and multidimensional landscape of urban warfare (Vautravers

2010; Brathwaite and Konaev 2017; Desch 2001; US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013).

Moreover, access to medical care is frequently limited, and heavy-h anded state

responses to rebel attacks may drive urban civilians to support rebel groups (Vau-

travers 2010; US Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013). These tactical and operational

Nedal et al. 1147