The Untted Nations Security Councd Veto In the New World Orde

• Author: Major Keith L. Sellen
• Pages: 04

A new world order is not a fact; It is an aspiration-and an opportunity. We have within our grasp an extraardinary possibility that few generations have enjoyed-ta build a new international system in accordance with OUT own values and ideals, as old patterns and certainties crumble around us 1

The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which 1s done is that which shall be done. and there 1s no new thing under the sun

I Introduction

World event8 over the past two years--such as the fall of the Berlin wall, the demise of communism, the victory against Saddam Hussein, and the withering away of the Soviet state-have provided the international community with an unprecedented opportunity to structure a new world order. The Cold War and the era of the bipolar international security System are over The international political climate has changed, 88 the 1991

coalition victory against Iraq illustrated 3 The orchestration of diplomacy leading up to the coalition victory, in particular, clearly demonstrated that nations involved in planning the new world order must consider the role of the United Nations Security Council.4 Although Cold War polities hindered the effectiveness of

'Judge Advocate Generala Corps U S Army Cvrrently assigned as C Cnminal Lsx Dii?smn. Offlie ai the Staff Judge Advocate, Fort Cordon, GearB S, 1978 United Stater Militsry Academy. J D 1984 Umrers~ty oi Wircan LL M , 1992. The Judge Aduomte General's School Farmar aesignrnsnts included Insfructar, Department of LBK, United States Military Academy 1988.1991, Command Judge Advocate 6Olst Military Intallrgence Brigade Korea, 1987-1988 This artde 1s based on a wrllten theme dmertatmn that the author submnted to aancfy, in pert. the Master of Lsra degree requirements for the 40th Judge Advocate Offker Gradurnre Courie

IThe iVh~te House hstlonal Secunfy Strategy of rhe Unned Stares V (Aug 19911 [heremairor .Vntsec Strate#,,

'Eccfesioshs 1 9 (fing Jamear

Natiec Strategy supra note 1. st 2 me ~ S D

Carl E Cuono, .Vahonaf

Strotem and the A i m of Lha 2990'6 Pmrimns Svmmer 1991. at 2

the Security Council, that body now has a mandate to become involved m the maintenance of international peace and security Accordingly the member states of the United Nations should seize this opportunity to make the Security Council an even more effective body for international deliberation and legitimate deemon-making In particular, one of the most important changes that the members could make is to elmmate the veto power wielded by each permanent member of the Security Council.

Improving the effectiveness of the Secunty Council now not only 18 Important, but also 18 essential. The Cold War victory celebration has passed, but security problems persmt.5 The common enemy, against whom the free worlds alliances were united, 1s gone.6 The tremendous threats to security that once dominated international affairs have diminished Iromeally, the disappearance of these threats to stability, which for years had compelled the nations of the Rest to align in the interests of assunng the very survival of the free wrld, now may lead United Nations member state8 to become complacent about the oppor. tunity to build peace in this new era

History. however, should be enough to admonish the world community that, in time, new conflicts Inevitably will develop and will hinder efforts to improve the Security Council-just as they did after World War I1 Additionally, diminishing United States influence will chanee the international security wstem These

. .

>See e 8 , Burmi M Carnahan. Chemical Arms Cantmi Tiode Secrets. and the Consfifulion Faring the Cnmprolord isrues. 25 1x1~

LAW 167. 168 ,Spring 19911 largumg that chernieal arms eunfrd IS a global problem,, The Honorable H Lawrence Garrett 111 et a1 The !la) Ahead Peoc~~nivcs

Apr 1991, at 3i'krmmg that conflict w~ll came from natmnahsm, ~ e h ~ o u s n~sIr~e8, drug

traffickme, terranrm, and mowme raps between neh and POO~~.

Holbraoke, sums

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Yo~lrr D1x8rilx. WAR, A O Y ~ E S J ~ O ~

AVD SELF DEFEzCE 231 ,1988 satree strategy supra note 1 81 1

-See IYE

L C ~ ~ u o r , JR. Sxanos INTO P~oasiiia~s-Tn~

Piosmhra _D

Yoich] Funahashi. Japan ond the Seii World Order F'aarloz Ari~ms V~nfer 1991 sf 58 oroilable LEXIS. IATLAW library, FORAFR Rle 8ar%uingthat the United States ~ 1 1 be under financial limitatinns that will render II unable to meet Intemsfmsl aeruriti challenges aloner. Eduarda Lachica. tis Shvuld Alter iir Policus on Tiode io Halt Canipelzii~e

Declinr Stud, Soia Z?LL S r J , No, 14, 1991, st A18 Int~nga report indicating fhsf the United States 13

falling behind international cumpentori ~n manufactunngl, \lark Alan Stamaty An Actiie Europe Y Pnssiii United Statan W~ash POST Sou 25, 1991 at A21 'argumg that United States poser 18 less than assumed and that the Amencan role ~n defining the ne= world order is berng rhallenged.

Pnacnras OF I z r m r ~ n o \ ~ ~

~Sae

Oic~cn~rlo\

48-9 (4th ed 1971.

factors make the old international security structure obsolete and a new structure necessary 9 Wiule the Security Council can be an effective secunty argamzation today,lO it8 effectiveness m the future depends upon its facility to reflect political realities and engender respect

While we must seek to improve the Secunty Council, the task will not be easy Improvmg the effectiveness of the body will require permanent members to commit themselves to future Secunty Coun. eil decisions This presents a classic prisoners' dilemma.11 Spemfi. eally, each member nation not only recogmzes that collective secunty requires a commitment to abide by the collective will, but also faces the need to protect its a m savereignty.lz Because these interests may conflict, the membera of the organization naturally ulll remain waryls

Tius dilemma arises whenever states consider a collective secu- nty organization. For example, the Hague Conference of 1899 tried to reduce armaments but, aRer meeting far over ten weeks, the members refused to cammt to any reductions.14 The Hague Conference did estabhsh the Permanent Court of Arbitration, but ex-cepted from its junsdietmn all sig-mficant cases.15 Simdarly, Ln 1918, Nicaragua would not r e n e ~ the Central American Court of Justice Treaty '%because two decisions . were adverse to her."'S Decisions m the League of Nations required ~animity,'~whch protected each member from the collective wll. Likewise, the United Nations Charter obligates all states M follow Secwity Council deciBions, but the veto power effectively excuses permanent members from that obligation.18

Eliminating the veto, of course, would reintroduce this classic dilemma. The permanent members-that is, the United States, Great Britain, China, France, and the Soviet Union-sWilean A Shaffner. SASO to FMSO Assrasing the New World Order, MIL REP, Doc 1991, prefacewaflec strategy mpia note 1 st 3See Caaa R Sunrtem, Consfifulianoiisrn ond Srcesston. 58 U CHI L REV 633. 640 !m911

independence and corerelgnty) "MMIRES S McDouo~~h F~oamriho

P Frirciiuo, Lax AKD M~xihmhi Woelo Pua~ic ORDER 366 (1961)

. d S ~ ~ ~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ Jaxr Hnama~v. PLAYS FOR %'ORLO PEACE

TAROL'CI SIX

128 (1943:

I'Id !"Sot a mgle poaer was willmg to bmd itsels by a hard and Ssaf ink t o submit ,911 quemons IO arbitration and leait of all the United Ststen'',

.#Id at 137

"US Cnu;r~a an 24, 26, 27

C~xrcnr~s

LEACU CUE OF 6*T,OS3 CorErAYT art 6, par' 1

reserved the veto to preserve their own interests The United States government, for Instance, feared that the Senate would not consent to membership without the veto 20 The Soviets. on the other hand. insisted on the veto because they feared that the Western powers would outvote them At the United Nations conference in San Francisco, delegates strongly cntiemd the ieto.22 Nevertheless, the permanent members defended It. and demanded its acceptance 23

Because se1Einterest persists, the veto will be both difficult to live with and difficult to change Despite recent international cooperation, "[tlhere 1s no reason to suppose that the present period of global harmony will continue mdefimtely, when the harmony ceases, the political machinery, unchanged, will prove to be just as inadequate as during the Cold War "24 Because the veto protects their self.mterests, the permanent members w111 be reluctant to give It up

Consequently, today the community of nations facer new and old-new opportunities ansing from the Cold War's end, as well as old, familiar choices between self-interest and collective interest. The members of that community should take this opportumty to consider critically whether the world has entered an era in which each nation comfortably can sacrifice considerable self-interest to promote collective interest The world certainly will "miss the boat" if It does not use the end of the Cold Tar to create a global system far the new millenmum-one that preeerves peace, fosters economic eowth, and prevents the deterioration of the human physical and environmental condi. tion 2s If the world truly has entered an era marked by a new international order, nations should consider. in particular,

l8ld art 27 pera 3 , 'Damsion8 of the Secunr) Council on sll afher matters shall be made hi ~n aff~irmafwe vote of nine members including the concurring roles of the pirmnninf mrmbms memphasi. added) The phrase "all other matters' means nonprocedural matiera a clause subject to varied interpretation Sei id art 2i. para 2 LELAXD hl Goo~iicn

& Eor~no Horaeo, C a ~ n n ~ or

LAUDE. supra note 7. at 61-62

OODRKX & Havsan supra note 19 at 216d at 219 The permanent members 'suggested that the pmpased fexi and ifatemem a i ~nierpretatmwere BJ far BI them Governments rere prspared to go, and called atrention to the iennui coniequences thsr *auld follol 30 far as th' work of the Conference U ~ J concerned from m y rejection ai the pmpozed text id, CUUDE note 7 at 143 (quormg Secretary of State Cordell Hull ad ea)mg that the United Stater supported...