United States Aid To Poland, 1957-1964: Concerns, Objectives and Obstacles

• Author: Stephen S. Kaplan
• Published date: 01 March 1975
• Date: 01 March 1975
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591297502800109
• Published By: Sage Publications, Inc.
• Subject Matter: Articles

147

UNITED

STATES

AID

TO

POLAND,

1957-1964:

CONCERNS,

OBJECTIVES

AND

OBSTACLES

STEPHEN S.

KAPLAN

Lakehead

University,

Ontario

N

THE

years

1957-64,

in

the

midst

of

the

cold

war,

the

United

States

I

gave

aid

to

Poland

in

the

form

of

Public

Law

480

sales

and

cheap

ex-

-*-

port

credits.

The

cumulative

value

of

these

sales

and

credits

totaled

$588.3

million.’

In

doing

some

related

research

I

was

surprised

at

not

being

able

to

find

a

serious

account

of

U.S.

concerns,

objectives

and

decision-making

in

re-

gard

to

this aid.’

The

following

is

meant

to

fill

this

gap,

at

least

partially.

PRECEDING

EVENTS,

1953-56

The

Eisenhower

Administration

first

offered

aid

to

Warsaw

in

late

October

1956,

in

response

to

the

climax

of

a

series

of

changes

which

had

taken

place

within

the

Polish

United

Workers

party

(PZTR)

and

in

Warsaw’s

relationship

with

Mcrcow.’

In

the

period

of

1948-53,

which

preceded

this

transition,

Poland

resembled

a

Soviet

colony

more

than

it

did

an

independent

nation.

Soviet

ambassadors

to

Warsaw

acted

as

viceroys;

the

PZPR

Politburo

served

as

a

transmission

belt

for

Soviet

directives;

and

proposed

Central

Com-

mittee

members

had

to

have

the

Kremlin’s

approval.

Soviet

officers

accounted

for

a

significant

portion

of

the

&dquo;Polish&dquo;

officer

corps

and

held

virtually

all

major

command

and

staff

positions.

And

Soviet

advisors

were

omnipresent

in

the

security

police.’

After

Stalin

died

change

began

slowly,

both

in

regard

to

Warsaw’s

rela-

tionship

with

Moscow

and

the

leadership

of

the

PZPR.

Two

critical

turning

points

were

an

attack

on

the

PZPR

Politburo

at

a

Warsaw

party

meeting

in

NOTE:

The

author,

now

on

the

staff

of

The

Brookings

Institution,

gratefully

acknowledges

interviews

and

information

provided

by

officials

of

the

Department

of

State,

and

research

support

provided

by

the

Inter-University

Seminar

on

Armed

Forces

and

Society

and

the

Lakehead

University

Chancellor’s

Fund.

1

U.S.

Overseas

Loans

and

Grants,

and

Assistance

from

International

Organizations:

Obliga-

tions

and

Loan

Authorization,

July

1,

1945-

...

(Washington,

D.C.:

U.S.

Agency

for

International

Development,

annual).

An

additional

$41.3

million

in

agricultural

com-

modities,

given

as

grants

by

the

U.S.

Government,

were

distributed

in

Poland

by

private,

charitable

organizations

during

this

period.

This

aid

is

not

discussed

in

this

paper.

2

Most

notably,

see

Milorad

M.

Drachkovitch,

United

States

Aid

to

Yugoslavia

and

Poland:

Analysis

of

a

Controversy

(Washington,

D.C.:

American

Enterprise

Institute,

1963).

This

short

volume

focuses

on

Yugoslavia

much

more

than

on

Poland

and

concerns

itself

with

public

statements

during

the

early

sixties

and

the

general

arguments

in

support

of

and

in

opposition

to

aid.

Also

see

Bennett

Kovrig,

The

Myth

of

Liberation:

East Central

Europe

in

U.S.

Diplomacy

and

Politics

since

1941

(Baltimore:

Johns

Hopkins

Univer-

sity

Press,

1973),

pp.

233-35

ff.

3

Department

of

State

Bulletin,

35

(November

12,

1957),

743-44;

New

York

Times,

October

22,

1956,

p.

1,

and

November

1,

1956,

p.

1.

4

Adam

Bromke,

Poland’s

Politics:

Idealism

vs.

Realism

(Cambridge:

Harvard

University

Press,

1967),

pp.

67-69;

Zbigniev

Brzezinski,

The

Soviet

Bloc:

Unity

and

Conflict

(New

York:

Praeger,

1961),

pp.

118-20;

Richard

F.

Staar,

Poland

1944-1962:

The

Sovietiza-

tion

of

a

Captive

People

(Baton

Rouge:

Louisiana

State

University

Press,

1962),

pp.

130-31.

148

December

195~

and

Khrushchev’s

secret

speech

to

the

Twentieth

Party

Con-

gress

in

February

1956.

Following

Boleslaw

Bierut’s

death

in

March

1956,

Moscow

was

simply

unable

to

name

a

new

First

Secretary

for

the

rubber-stamp

approval

of

the

PZPR

Central

Committee.’

Two

monhs

later

Jakub

Berman

was

forced

to

resign

from

the

Politburo,

and

after

the

Poznan

demonstrations

in

June,

Warsaw

ignored

Moscow’s

line

that

it

was

the

work

of

imperialist

agents.

In

August

and

September

major

economic

shifts

were

made,

and

in

early

October

Hilary

Minc,

another

important

Stalinist,

was

forced

to

resign

from

the

Politburo

Finally,

on

the

weekend

of

October

18-21

a

dramatic

climax

took

place.7

A

Soviet

Politburo

delegation

that

included

Khrushchev,

Molotov,

Mikoyan,

and

Kaganovich

suddenly

arrived,

but

was

unable

to

intimidate

the

Poles

into

making

no

further

shifts;

and

WIadyslaw

Gomulka

was

elected

to

a

new

Polit-

buro

and

as

the

First

Secretary

of

the

PZPR.

Not

elected

to

the

new

Politburo

were

the

Stalinist

faction

leaders,

Z.

Nowak,

K.

K.

Rokossovsky,

and

F.

Mazur.

Rokossovsky,

who

was

a

Soviet

Army

Marshal,

was

also

removed

quickly

from

his

other

positions

of

Defense

Minister

and

Commander-in-Chief

of

the

Polish

Armed

Forces.

EXPECTATIONS

IN

WASHINGTON

In

Washington,

at

this

time,

there

were

no

serious

expectations

that

further

developments

would

include

a

diplomatic

break

between

Warsaw

and

Moscow,

a

decline

in

the

PZPR’s

role in

the

Polish

political

system,

or

a

with-

drawal

by

Poland

from

the

Warsaw

Treaty

Organization

(WTO ) .8

Such

developments

were

considered

to

be

neither

the

new

Politburo’s

goals

nor

at

all

tolerable

to

Moscow.

Gomulka

was

able

to

stand

up

to

the

Kremlin

delegates

on

matters

of

party

organization

and

Soviet

involvement

in

what

were

con-

sidered

to

be

Polish

domestic

affairs,

but

this

was

only

in

the

light

of

reassurances

given

on

these

other,

more

fundamental,

matters.&dquo;

Nevertheless,

Gomulka

presented

the

image

of

a

potential

Tito

in

a

coun-

try

strategically

much

more

important

than

Yugoslavia.&dquo;

Among

senior

officials

5

Joseph

W.

Zurawski,

Poland,

The

Captive

Satellite:

A

Study

in

National

Psychology

(Detroit:

Endurance,

1962),

p.

60.

6

On

this

period

of

the

"thaw,"

as

it

has

often

been

termed,

see

Brzezinski,

op.

cit.,

pp.

236-51;

Richard

Hiscocks,

Poland:

Bridge

for

the

Abyss

(New

York:

Oxford,

1963),

pp.

170-

209;

Paul

E.

Zinner,

ed.,

National

Communism

and

Popular

Revolt

in

East

Europe:

A

Selection

of

Documents

on

Events

in

Poland

and

Hungary,

February-November,

1956

(New

York:

Columbia

University

Press,

1956),

pp.

37-195.

7

Konrad

Syrop,

Spring

in

October:

The

Polish

Revolution

of

1956

(London:

Weidenfeld

and

Nicolson,

1957),

pp.

81-131;

Zurawski,

op.

cit.,

pp.

87-94;

Brzezinski,

op.

cit.,

pp.

252-60.

8

Where

appropriate,

the

term

"Washington"

is

used

in

this

paper

as

a

summary

concept

in

place

of

the

more

unwieldly

expression,

"in the

White

House

and

among

senior

officials

in

the

State

Department...."

It

will

be

noted

that the

Defense

Department

played

only

a

small

role

in

regard

to

the

subject

matter

of

this

paper.

9

See

Zinner,

op.

cit.,

pp.

233,

255-57, 283;

Brzezinski,

op.

cit.,

p.

258.

10

E.g.,

see

Dwight

D.

Eisenhower,

Waging

Peace,

1956-1961

(New

York:

Doubleday,

1965),

p.

59.

For

political

profiles

of

Gomulka

in

the

years

prior

to

October

1956,

see

Nicholas

Bethell,

Gomulka,

His

Poland

and

His

Communism

(London:

Longmans,

1969);

M.