Understanding the General Will

• Author: Richard Dagger
• Published date: 01 September 1981
• Date: 01 September 1981
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/106591298103400304
• Subject Matter: Articles

UNDERSTANDING

THE

GENERAL

WILL

RICHARD

DAGGER

Arizona

State

University

EW

CONCEPTS

in

the

history

of

political

thought

have

proved

so

troublesome

as

Rousseau’s

notion of

the

general

will.

Rousseau

must

-JL-

bear

much

of

the

blame

for

this,

of

course,

for

the

discussion

of

the

general

will

in

his

Social

Contract

is

uncharacteristically

terse

and

abstract.

Troublesome

as

it

has

been,

though,

there

is

reason

to

believe

that

we

are

now

approaching

an

adequate

understanding

of

the

general

will.

I

say

this

because

there

seems

to

be

growing

agreement

among

Rousseau’s

commen-

tators

that

the

general

will

not

only

can

be

understood,

but

that

it

can

best

be

understood - in

rationalistic

terms.’

Indeed,

where

explications

once

were

couched

in

terms

of

&dquo;real&dquo;

and

&dquo;higher&dquo;

wills,

one

is

now

more

likely

to

find

the

general

will

explained

in

terms

of

the

prisoners’

dilemma

and

Pareto-

optimality.2

While

I

do

not

accept

all

of

these

rationalistic

readings

of

the

general

will,

I

do

share

the

general

conviction

that

we

can

make

sense

of

Rousseau’s

concept,

and-

his

argument,

without

resorting

to

metaphysics

or

psychology.

What

I

shall

offer

here,

accordingly,

is

in

some

respects

only

a

variation

on

a

theme

now

well

known

to

students

of

Rousseau’s

political

philosophy.

It

is

an

important

variation

nonetheless,

for

it

enables

us

to

reconcile

passages

in

the

Social

Contract

which

otherwise

appear

to

be

contradictory.

That,

at

least,

is

what

I

shall

argue

in

this

essay.

I

proceed

in

the

following

manner.

First

I

set

out

a

general

account

of

what

Rousseau

means

by

&dquo;the

general

will&dquo;

-

an

account

which

resembles

in

its

main

lines,

if

not

all

its

details,

Brian

Barry’s

analysis

of

the

general

Will.3

This

account

is

defended

in

the

second

part

of

the

essay,

where

I

show

how

it

helps

us

to

understand

two

of the

more

controversial

aspects

of

Rousseau’s

argument

in

the

Social

Contract.

In

part

three

I

extend

this

account

(and

provide

the

variation

mentioned

in

the

last

paragraph)

by

drawing

a

distinc-

tion,

implicit

and

almost

unmarked

in

Rousseau’s

writings,

between

the

gen-

eral

will

and

a

general

will.

With

the

aid

of

this

distinction,

I

argue,

we

can

make

sense

of

Rousseau’s

baffling

and

apparently

contradictory

remarks

about

voting.

Once

this

is

demonstrated,

I

conclude

by

raising

some

ques-

tions

about

the

utility

of

the

concept

of

the

general

will.

NOTE:

I

wish

to

thank

Terence

Ball,

Peter

Fuss,

C.

B.

Macpherson,

and

this

journal’s

anony-

mous

referees

for

their

valuable

comments

on

earlier

drafts

of

this

paper.

1

I include

the

following,

inter

alia,

in

this

category:

Glen

Allen,

"La

Volonté

de

tous

and

La

Volonté

géneralé:

A

Distinction

and

Its

Significance,"

Ethics

71

(July

1961):

263-75;

George

Kateb,

"Aspects

of

Rousseau’s

Political

Thought,"

Political

Science

Quarterly

76

(December

1961):

519-43;

James

McAdam,

"What

Rousseau

Meant

by

the

General

Will,"

Dialogue

5

(1967):

498-515;

Roger

Masters,

The

Political

Philosophy

of

Rousseau

(Princeton:

Princeton

Univer-

sity

Press,

1968),

esp.

pp.

323-35;

and

Judith

Shklar,

Men

and

Citizens:

A

Study

of Rousseau’s

Social

Theory

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

Press,

1969),

esp.

pp.

184-97.

Further

examples

of

rationalistic

readings

of

the

general

will

are

cited

in

the

next

two

footnotes.

2 For

an

explanation

of

the

general

will

in

terms

of

the

prisoners’

dilemma,

see

W.

G.

Runciman

and

A.

K.

Sen,

"Games,

Justice

and

the

General

Will,"

Mind

74

(1965):

554-62;

for

an

explanation

in

terms

of

Pareto-optimality,

see

Virginia

Held,

The

Public

Interest

and

Indi-

vidual

Interests

(New

York:

Basic

Books,

1970),

pp.

99-107.

3 Brian

Barry,

"The

Public

Interest,"

in

Political

Philosophy,

ed.

Anthony

Quinton

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press,

1967),

esp.

pp.

119-26.

For

similar

interpretations,

see

Andrew

Levine,

The

Politics

of

Autonomy:

A

Kantian

Reading

of

Rousseau’s

Social

Contract

(Amherst,

Mass.:

University

of

Massachusetts

Press,

1976),

pp.

40-43,

and

John

Charvet,

The

Social

Problem

in the

Philosophy

of

Rousseau

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

Press,

1974),

chapter

4.