Understanding Pope Francis: Argentina, economic failure, and The Teologia del Pueblo.

AuthorGregg, Samuel

Since the election of Jorge Bergoglio to the Chair of St. Peter in 2013, much has been written about the views of economic life expressed in many of his speeches as well as in his apostolic exhortation Evangelli gaudium (2013) and his encyclical Laudato si' (2015b). Although many have applauded the evident skepticism of free markets and economic globalization that pervades these texts, others, including many practicing Catholics, such as myself (see, e.g., Gregg 2013, 2015), have taken issue with aspects of Pope Francis's critiques of the market economy. These aspects range from significant omissions in his analyses, such as the connection between economic globalization and widespread reductions in poverty, to the manner in which he characterizes the arguments of those who favor economic liberty and its associated institutional supports as the optimal way for realizing worthy Christian goals such as substantially reducing absolute poverty.

Pope Francis's views on these questions did not emerge in a vacuum. Like all those elected to the papacy before him, Jorge Mario Bergoglio brought a range of ideas, convictions, and experiences to the exercise of the teaching office of the papacy, or what the Catholic Church calls its magisterium. It would be difficult to understand particular emphases of Saint John Paul II's teaching documents, for example, if readers did not know that Karol Wojtyla lived through the agony of Poland during World War II and experienced the denial of freedom that was part and parcel of two totalitarian systems: National Socialism and Marxism-Leninism. Likewise, it is possible to draw connections between Wojtyla's particular interests as an academic philosopher who had a strong interest in natural-law theory and the way in which particular ideas are expressed in magisterial documents promulgated during his pontificate, especially some of the early encyclicals.

In the case of Jorge Bergoglio, there is less material to survey in this regard. Bergoglio was not and has never claimed to be a theologian, philosopher, or any other form of academic practitioner. Nevertheless, he has brought a distinct set of experiences and ideas to his role as bishop of Rome and universal pastor of the Catholic Church. The purpose of this paper is to identify and briefly elaborate upon the most pertinent of these experiences and ideas inasmuch as they help to explain some of his comments and observations about the economy. The first concerns the particular political and economic experiences of Argentina from World War II on. The second is the influence of what is known as the teologia del pueblo, "theology of the people."

From Riches to Rags

There is a saying that is often attributed to Peru's Nobel Prize-winning author Mario Vargas Llosa:

There are countries that are rich and countries that are poor. And there are poor countries that are growing rich. And then there is Argentina. In the annals of economic decline, Argentina is invariably cited as the twentieth century's textbook case of how a once wealthy, relatively politically stable country moved over a series of decades to being a nation characterized by profound political instability and a steady march toward economic decrepitude. Born in 1936, Jorge Bergoglio lived virtually all his life until his election as pope through this transformation. It is reasonable to suggest that witnessing the effects of this change would affect some of Pope Francis's thinking about economic questions. This is not to claim that there is an immediate and traceable cause-and-effect relationship. Nor am I implying that Pope Francis reflects on economic matters solely through the lens of Argentina's twentieth-century economic ups and downs. To claim that these experiences had no impact whatsoever on the pope's outlook would, however, be a dubious proposition.

The sad economic history of twentieth-century Argentina is well documented. A particularly comprehensive and succinct survey is outlined in Mauricio Rojas's short book The Sorrows of Carmencita: Argentina's Crisis in a Historical Perspective (2002). For our purposes, two dimensions of this decline are especially significant. The first is the phenomena of Peronism and its economic expressions. The second is the failure of the economic liberalization program upon which Argentina embarked in the early 1990s: this program resulted in the financial crisis of 1998-2001, from which, it is arguable, Argentina is still recovering.

Peron, Peronism, and the Path of Economic Nationalism

Pope Francis is often described as a Peronist when it comes to his political and economic views. This label, however, is not immediately helpful in understanding him inasmuch as Peronism is not a simple movement to interpret. There are, for instance, left-wing and right-wing forms of Peronism, a division that erupted into open and violent conflict in the 1970s in the lead-up to the outbreak of the leftist Montonero insurgency (which combined Marxist and left-wing Peronist elements), a military coup d'etat that overthrew President Isabel Peron in 1976, and the Dirty War as the army moved to eliminate an extremely violent and widespread insurgency and deployed extremely brutal methods in doing so. Another complicating factor is that Juan Peron himself adopted a range of positions at different points of his political career.

Despite these complications, broad features of Peronism are relatively simple to identify. (1) In the first place, Peronism has always been reliant on charismatic leaders. All Peronist presidents of Argentina, whether Peron himself or, more recently, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, have invested considerable resources in developing a cult of personality. This emphasis on "the leader" reflects a second dimension of Peronism, which is populism and the type of populist rhetoric that goes along with populist movements. Peronist movements have typically sought to appeal to "the people," especially those from working-class and lower-middle-class backgrounds, against the interests of the elite. In Argentina, this orientation meant a hostile view of, among others, employers, the financial sector, and those perceived as adhering to liberal and conservative constitutional principles. To this extent, Peronism relies heavily on an us-versus-them rationale: workers against the middle class, Argentines against foreigners, trade unions against employers, and so on.

Part of this logic plays out in a third feature of Peronism: nationalism of the political and economic type. By the early 1950s, Peron had implemented economic nationalist policies such as intense state-directed industrialization and import-substitution programs, which were accompanied by efforts to minimize foreign investment. The latter goal was realized primarily through the nationalization of British-owned infrastructure and banks. This nationalization is associated with Peronists' tendency to see foreign investment and companies as exploiters and extractors rather than as sources of income and capital for the host nation (see Rojas 2002, 49-97).

Peronism is also characterized by what might be called the economics and policies of clientelism, underlain and often justified by reference to corporatist theory. From its beginning, Peronism has involved creating large constituencies of supporters through disbursement of state largesse, whether in the form of direct welfare payments or government jobs. At the same time, Peronism relies on corporatist organizational theory in which people are corralled into groups recognized by the government, which then seeks to coordinate "capital" and "labor" in ways that promote the common good.

In 1949, Juan Peron oversaw Argentina's adoption of a new corporatist-inclined constitution. He then proceeded to push the policies articulated in this constitution even deeper into the economy. His government forced trade unions, businesses, universities, journalists, and even high school students into state-controlled associations. The associated doubling of public-sector employees, Rojas stresses, "triggered a development that was to lead to one of Argentina's severest problems, namely growing corruption and a contest for privilege" (2002, 74). Not surprisingly, much business activity ceased being directed by consumer demand and was instead focused on pursuing political favors.

Argentine society became deeply...

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