Uncle Sam in the Arab street: Mideast democracy and American interests.

AuthorTakeyh, Ray

IT IS established U.S. policy that the promotion of democracy in the Middle East is vitally necessary to secure America's strategic interests. Washington policymakers and pundits routinely proclaim the virtues of a democratic order and the seamless compatibility of America's interests and ideals. In light of the tragedies of September 11, Washington's long-standing approach that saw authoritarian rulers as the most suitable custodians of America's strategic imperatives seems naive, even reckless. President Bush's disdain for such realpolitik calculations was all too evident when he proclaimed that "sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long-run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty."

While historically empires have relied on local autocracies to curb popular passions, the Bush Administration's strategic planners have come to the paradoxical conclusion that the durability of America's hegemony in the region is contingent on the spread of democratic polities.

It is a compelling argument, since the existing Arab political order has succeeded only in producing unpalatable dictatorships, stagnant economies and militant ideologies. There are many indications that the rise of democracies in the Middle East is likely to lessen inter-state conflicts, diminish the zeal of radical Islam and its violent outbursts and even promote long-delayed economic reforms. However, the partisans of the "democratic thesis" must realize that there are tradeoffs. Prospective Arab democracies will not behave as compliant agents of the American empire.

On issues ranging from the Arab-Israeli peace process to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Washington may find a more democratic Middle East less prone to adhere to its mandates. Freed from the restraints of authoritarianism, the nationalistic Arab masses are unlikely to acclaim the merits of the liberal American imperium and eagerly embrace its priorities. In the end, while the spread of democratic rule in the Middle East is likely to stabilize one of the most volatile regions of the world, it will extract its costs in terms of key U.S. preferences. (1)

Voodoo Economics

THE MIDDLE East is not just a region of dysfunctional politics but also of broken economies. In the post-independence period, the generation of Middle Eastern leaders who defeated European imperialism insisted on monopolizing both political and economic power to advance their development agendas. Given their centralizing predilections, the ruling elites soon crafted command economies, resulting in cumbersome regulation, maldistribution of resources, bloated bureaucracies and rampant corruption. A decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall discredited the notion of socialist planning, Arab rulers maintain their fidelity to the God that failed. Such mismanagement has imposed a crushing burden on the region's populace, as high inflation and unemployment rates not only diminish the living standards of an enfeebled middle class, but confront already politically disenfranchised youth with a dim economic future. (There is no East Asian-style bargain where people forego political rights in return for guaranteed prosperity.) Because the region's governing regimes lack legitimacy, they are unwilling to institute the structural economic reforms that will initially cause an adverse popular reaction, especially since "initially" can be quite a long time. The Middle East today is immured in a debilitating cycle, as the ruling regimes are unwilling or unable to undertake the reforms necessary to prevent serious social problems and perhaps eventually a social implosion.

The peculiar tragedy of the Middle East is that the economic malaise sweeping the region impacts not just resource-poor states but also those with an abundance of subterranean wealth. An examination of key indicators of three leading states crystallizes the region's dire economic circumstances. Despite having the fifth-largest gas reserves in the world, Algeria continues to register a 31 percent unemployment rate. It is hard to see how Algeria can recover from its civil war and rehabilitate its social fabric while continuously suffering from double-digit unemployment rates. The case of the region's most populous state, Egypt, is no better. The Mubarak regime has largely abandoned its previous attempts to privatize the economy and has persisted with investment in unproductive heavy industries. As a result, in the past year Egypt attracted a mere $600 million in foreign investment. By the regime's own admission, 22 percent of its citizens live below the poverty line. Finally, the case of Saudi Arabia is especially troubling. A nation with a small population base of 24 million and the largest reserves of petroleum in the world (26 percent of proven reserves) is suffering from a 25 percent unemployment rate and a persistent economic recession. At a time when 42 percent of Saudi citizens are under the age of 14, such inefficiency and mismanagement may soon confront the regime with an explosive revolutionary problem. The region's future is...

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