ULYSSES S. GRANT AND THE LOST OPPORTUNITY FOR RACIAL JUSTICE.

• Author: Pushaw, Robert J., Jr.
• Position: Book review

GRANT. By Ron Chernow. (1) New York: Penguin Press. 2017. Pp. xvii + 1074. $40.00.

Every law student, legal academic, and attorney would benefit from reading Ron Chernow's exhaustive biography of Ulysses S. Grant. At first glance, that recommendation sounds counterintuitive, because Grant was not a lawyer--much less one like Alexander Hamilton (the subject of Chernow's most celebrated study) (3) who articulated and applied influential ideas about the role of law in shaping political, economic, and social forces. (4) Nor was Grant a distinguished intellectual like Woodrow Wilson, whose novel vision of the Constitution reshaped America in ways that reverberate to this day. (5) Rather, Grant was a failed businessman, a ruthlessly effective but not especially brilliant general, and a mediocre President. (6)

Chernow attempts to rehabilitate Grant's military and political reputation. He does so primarily by highlighting Grant's one indispensable contribution to American law and government: spearheading the implementation of Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation and the various constitutional amendments and statutes that sought to guarantee former slaves not merely their liberty but also their civil and political rights.

As Chernow details, nothing in Grant's background suggested that he would play this leading role. Grant was ambivalent about slavery--opposed to it in theory, yet fearful (with good reason) that abolition would lead to bloody sectional strife (pp. 68, 99-108, 118-121). Moreover, he married Julia Dent, whose father was a wealthy Missouri slaveowner who disliked Grant and became an unrepentant Confederate sympathizer both during and after the Civil War (pp. 31-40, 93-106, 119-120, 125-128, 133-134, 185, 451, 548, 601-602, 639, 768). Nonetheless, Grant's experience during that war gradually brought about a profound change in his views on race (pp. 132, 228-229, 242-243, 280-285, 440-441, 874-875). Grant's transformation reflects the evolution of the very aims of the Civil War, which began as a fight to save the Union but eventually added the goal of ending slavery (pp. 242-243, 440-441, 874-875).

Chernow explains how Grant worked with Lincoln to achieve both objectives, as the unassuming West Point graduate--who had quit the Army in 1854 largely because of drinking problems (pp. 84-87) (7)- improbably rose from heading a small Illinois regiment in 1861 to commanding the entire Union Army a few years later (pp. 123-518). Chernow debunks the notion, popularized by Grant's contemporaneous detractors (including Lincoln's wife Mary) and many later historians (often Southern defenders of the Confederacy), that Grant was a "butcher" who ultimately won only because he acted on his cold-blooded calculation that the North, with its overwhelming advantages in manpower and resources, would eventually win a war of attrition (pp. xxi, 207-211, 266-267, 288-290, 295, 325-326, 344, 353-356, 367-370, 395, 405-409, 421, 424, 426, 431, 433, 436, 439, 497, 452, 464, 467, 469, 477, 481, 497, 516-518, 554, 578-579, 839, 866). (8) Rather, Chernow argues that Grant was a master grand strategist whose experiences as a general throughout the Midwest and South gave him an overall perspective that the Virginia-centric Robert E. Lee lacked (pp. xxi, 152, 226-227, 231, 294, 313, 343-344, 348, 355-356, 369-370, 372-376, 396-397, 410-411, 417-418, 443, 447, 457, 459, 462, 472-474, 487-490, 517-518, 671, 958). Similarly, Chernow portrays Grant as an excellent tactician who could improvise in battle and determine the psychological state of the enemy's leaders and troops, which proved invaluable in knowing when to pursue them relentlessly after the first day of hostilities had ended in a draw--or even a seeming defeat (pp. xxi, 152, 160, 179-181, 187-188, 193, 203-207, 214, 216, 224, 294, 316-317, 324-325, 380-384, 389-406).

Chernow further contends that, contrary to the "butcher" myth, Grant always had genuine concern for the well-being of his troops (pp. xxi, 264-270, 278, 280-285, 325-326, 373, 429). For example, Grant drew on his experience as a quartermaster in the Mexican War and other conflicts to ensure that his men had adequate food, clothing, shelter, and weapons--an especially difficult task when he had to stretch his supply lines deep into Confederate territory to capture Southern strongholds in Mississippi and Tennessee (pp. 46-47, 57, 65, 73, 76-77, 131, 195-288, 313-316, 330-331, 375, 408, 417-418). Moreover, although Grant could compartmentalize by shutting down his feelings during the carnage of battle--a trait shared by all successful generals and soldiers--afterwards he experienced considerable emotional pain upon witnessing the death, injuries, and destruction wrought, and he sought to alleviate the suffering (pp. xxi, 73-74, 158-160, 184, 200-207, 215-216, 246, 264-270, 278, 290, 314-315, 331, 446). Grant's empathy and compassion extended to Southern soldiers, officers, and citizens, who were always treated humanely (pp. xxi, 48-49, 174, 181-184, 221-222, 288-291, 298, 325-326, 399, 464-468, 475, 485, 495, 508-511, 575, 533, 536, 548-554, 565,590, 746-747,951).

Most importantly for present purposes, Chernow documents Grant's insistence that "Negroes" (as they were then called) be allowed--indeed, encouraged--to serve in the military, often in the face of vehement opposition from other officers, soldiers, and politicians (pp. xxii, 142, 184, 222-223, 243-244, 247, 280-285, 293, 298-299, 303-304, 332, 352, 373, 398, 415-416, 428-430, 441, 450-451, 475-476, 495, 530). Admittedly, Grant's policy reflected military considerations as well as morality, since he realized that adding over 100,000 ex-slaves would increase the Union's already huge advantage in manpower (pp. 228, 243, 280-284, 298-299, 332, 450). Nonetheless, Chernow shows that Grant was genuinely impressed by the skill and bravery of African American troops, who were often subjected to unspeakable savagery when captured (pp. 280-284, 293, 298-299, 332, 373, 398, 429-430).

Chernow further maintains that Grant viscerally understood that this military service would eventually prove to be blacks' strongest argument for freedom and legal equality, particularly if the political and legal rights of white Southern traitors were restored (pp. 228-230, 244, 282-285, 293, 298-299, 352, 441, 467-468, 473, 475-476, 530, 561, 564-565, 584-585). (9) Grant also grasped fairly quickly...