Ukraine Serves as Lesson in the Value of Training.

• Author: Robb, James

This article builds on the tremendous content of the November issue of National Defense magazine, which focused on training and simulation, especially the "Editor's Notes" column written by Editor in Chief Stew Magnuson that you need to go back and read.

As president of the National Training and Simulation Association, or NTSA, I spend most of my time advocating for training and training systems within an acquisition bureaucracy very much consumed with what I call "shiny objects"--that is airplanes, missiles and guns and the like.

Not that new capabilities are not important, but my military experience has been that humans are the centerpiece of an effective fighting force whose leaders are responsible to "organize, train and equip" their units. This month we celebrate training and simulation at the Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) in Orlando where the community gathers to explore and debate the latest ways we can transform education and training and provide the best systems for the fighting force and first responders.

This year's conference of more than 17,000 was developed with the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which is in its ninth month. Without any prospects of peace in the near term, one thing has become clear--the Ukraine army is holding its own against a much bigger adversary. This was supposed to be a four-day war. What happened? Certainly, the allies have come to Ukraine's aid with the United States providing nearly $20 billion in security assistance since the conflict began, and the list of weapons has filled some key shortfalls in Ukraine's capability.

What are the most important factors that are allowing Ukraine to succeed? Why are they doing so well today compared with their dreadful performance in 2014? Let's take a deeper look.

We start with a bit of history related to the 2014 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Following the loss of Crimea on March 18, the Ukrainian leadership was ousted, and the country was in complete disarray. The military was faced with a force depleted over the years by a lack of support, poor logistics, corrupt leadership and little confidence along with a doctrine that was the legacy of the Soviet Union.

A force that had numbered more than 800,0000 in 1991 had been reduced to around 130,000 on paper in 2014 due to dramatic cuts in Ukraine's GDP and the expense related to sustaining a large army.

In reality, the combat-ready force was really only around...