UKRAINE'S BOMBED WAY TO EU MEMBERSHIP.

• Author: Wolczuk, Kataryna

INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the Second World War, hard power has been transcended by economic, social, and political integration to ensure security on the European continent. (1) Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shaken the very foundations of the European integration project. This is not only because Russia seeks to destabilize EU member states both economically and politically and not only because Russia is also defying the EU as an international actor, seeking to nullify its influence in Ukraine. Above all, it is because of Russia's denial of Ukraine's very right to exist as a sovereign nation. In essence, the Russian authorities have waged war against the values upon which the EU has developed over the past seven decades in order to overcome wars, hostilities, and rivalries in Europe. (2)

As a result, Russia's aggression against Ukraine represents an abrupt end to the post-modern, post-geopolitical period of European security, where the Union focused on economic and political integration as a way to overcome wars and rivalry. The EU was so effective in doing this that it developed a post-geopolitical identity. It eschews projecting power through classic military means; (i) instead, it relies on "civilian rather than military means, and to pursue the spread of particular values, norms and rules." (3) Indeed, the European project has been designed to avoid using geopolitics as a lens through which to view relations between European states. (4) The end of the Cold War and the geopolitical contest between the West and the communist bloc in 1991 further reinforced this post-geopolitical self-identification.

This post-geopolitical identity allowed the EU to focus on economic and functional integration with non-member states while neglecting the more sensitive issue of security in the wider Europe, including relations with Ukraine since 1991. Russia's aggression forced the EU to rectify this. Ukraine has aspired to join the EU for over 20 years, yet Kyiv's membership aspirations were politely but firmly put to one side. Instead, the EU focused on technocratic aspects of relations with Ukraine. This approach "relegated" relations to the neighbourhood portfolio--a low-politics, low-risk substitute for membership with its focus on market access, economic, and functional integration but conspicuously excluding full membership. (5)

Russia's invasion of Ukraine showed the limits of this approach. Ukraine has gone from being marginal to a pivotal country for the EU. Following the invasion, the EU took an unprecedented step: after opposing Ukraine's membership aspirations for the last 20 years, within four months of Russia's invasion Ukraine was granted candidate status in an accelerated procedure. EU member states showed exceptional unity in delivering symbolic support to Ukraine by immediately granting candidate status in the landmark decision of June 2022. (ii)

As the EU comes to terms with the regional and global ramifications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it is clear that Ukraine's inclusion will have consequences for the EU itself: accession of such a large state entails strategic trade-offs and complex interlinkages between different political objectives, priorities, and policy areas. (6) The key challenge is how to balance the geopolitical imperative of Ukraine's membership against its readiness for membership and the EU's merit-driven demands of applicant states against the (lingering) reluctance of many member states to Ukraine's accession. Despite the massive symbolism of the decision, there is actually no consensus on Ukraine's membership nor on the changes needed to bring it about.

WHY UKRAINE'S MEMBERSHIP IS A CHALLENGE FOR THE EU

In many ways, Ukraine follows in the footsteps of the Western Balkans, which were granted the prospect of membership in the aftermath of the Balkan wars in the 1990s. This was another example where European integration was perceived as a panacea to war. The result hardly qualifies as a success story, however. Out of a cohort of eight countries--each much smaller than Ukraine--only Croatia joined in 2014, after a ten-year accession process. This strongly suggests that accession would present a major challenge to a country the size of Ukraine.

This is because size matters: the bigger the country, the greater the impact its admission has on the functioning, policies, and finances of the Union. During the 2004-7 enlargement to ten new member states, Poland was the single most important accession country, owing to its 36 million-strong population. Romania, the next biggest, had a population of 20 million. The pre-war population of Ukraine was around 46 million.

Despite the wishes of Kyiv, immediate accession was ruled out. A fasttrack approach for Ukraine was not feasible for legal, political, and economic reasons. This is because European integration is focused on the single market, meaning that the EU is more integrated in regulatory terms than is the U.S. EU membership entails alignment with thousands of mandatory regulations and standards, ranging from food safety standards to energy efficiency to environmental protection. During the accession process, the EU ensures the thorough compliance with its standards in a complex and lengthy negotiation process, consisting of 35 negotiating chapters. Membership is premised on reaching comprehensive compliance (with very few temporary derogations allowed).

Ukraine has been harmonizing with EU rules and standards as part of the Association Agreement with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which fully came into force in 2016. But Kyiv has a long way to go to meet all the necessary requirements, something made considerably more difficult when fighting a war, so Ukraine has joined a large waiting room with aspiring candidates and will be ensconced there for some time to come. (7) This would not be a problem if the accession process was working well--but it is not.

In this way, the offer of candidate status glosses over a number of challenges: above all, the fact that EU member states remain profoundly divided over Ukraine's potential accession, with the sceptical ones using the timeline of accession as a delaying tactic. According to French President Emmanuel Macron, it will take decades for Ukraine to join. (8) For many member states, the offer of membership is a symbolic gesture of solidarity rather than a meaningful commitment to admit Ukraine within a foreseeable future.

Therefore, the momentous decision will not be of any consequence if it is not accompanied by a major overhaul of the enlargement strategy Working out EU policy on enlargement is a strategic matter which needs more leadership from the large EU member states, such as Germany, than has so far been forthcoming. (9)

DIAGNOSING THE ENLARGEMENT STALEMATE

The 2004-7 enlargement was proclaimed the "most successful foreign policy." Yet, the EU's enlargement strategy has hardly worked efficiently since then. The process has become so stalled and dysfunctional that some regard it as "a showcase of duplicity and double talk." (10)

As it is, owing to a number of structural problems with the EU's enlargement strategy...