U.S. foreign policy after September 11.

• Author: Eisendrath, Craig
• Position: National Affairs

WHEN THE U.S. answered the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks with unilateral military force, it appeared at the time to be the only option America had. Critics suggested that multilateral action might have made more sense, but the timeline for its possible crafting through the United Nations seemed to stretch out indefinitely, and the American public would brook little delay.

Declaring a state of war in response to what seemed clearly to be an international criminal action also seemed off the mark, but was there an alternative? Declaring that, if Osama bin Laden, his lieutenants, or Muhammad Omar were caught alive, they would be tried by a U.S. military tribunal ran the risk of further alienating the Islamic world and violating due process, but here again, was there an alternative?

Pres. Bush and his administration have repeatedly stated that the war on terrorism will last decades and that Americans are possibly entering into a period of international chaos. At the same time, his administration is doing nothing to change this world, so that, if 9/11 occurred again, the U.S. would be limited to the same options.

Is there an alternative? Could America help build a world in which the threat of terrorism was significantly reduced, and, if such an act occurred, could be handled better? Such an option would necessitate a radical change in U.S. foreign policy, one based on cooperative multilateral relations, not erratic and unilateral displays of power with only passing nods to international cooperation.

To support such a policy, the U.S.'s intelligence system and foreign policy establishment would need to be far more aware of the desperate needs and discontents of other nations and peoples than they have been. With this awareness, the events of Sept. 11 might have been anticipated and possibly prevented, and American foreign policy transformed to reconstruct a world in which terrorism would be far less likely.

Such a foreign policy would contain a number of key elements: a ready UN deployment force, a standing criminal court, a comprehensive arms control regime, a responsible program for world economic and social development, and an enforced minimum international standard of human rights.

This was the vision of the world that the U.S. held briefly at the end of World War II. This is the vision to which it needs to return if it is to do better than frantically respond to a future of almost predictable provocation.

At the end of World War II, America took the lead in establishing the UN. The League of Nations and the collective security arrangements prior to the war had proven inadequate, and there were those in its final days who felt the world had been washed clean by its suffering and might just possibly be ready to embrace a new collective order.

A ready UN deployment force. With the wartime alliance still intact, the UN Charter, under Chapter VII, outlined how the world organization could mobilize a force based on contributions from member states acting on decisions of the Security Council. The Charter, while not directly outlining a ready deployment force, looked in this direction. Air force contingents were to be held "immediately available," a standing Military Staff Committee was envisaged, and other provisions suggested the creation of ready units. However, by the end of 1947, with the Cold War already a reality and the wartime alliance in pieces, cooperation through the Security Council was no longer possible, at least on issues affecting East-West conflicts.

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, with Western Europe and the Latin American republics firmly in the U.S.'s camp, and United Nations membership less than a quarter of what it is today, the U.S. enjoyed what American diplomats called the "automatic majority." If the U.S. were blocked by veto in the Security Council, it could organize effective UN action through the General Assembly, as it did under the "United for Peace" Resolution during the Korean War. In the 1950s, the U.S. also backed UN peacekeeping, particularly in the Middle East, with operations like the 1956 United Nations Emergency Force.

The advantages of working through the United Nations were clear. The aim of U.S. policy to diffuse international tensions, such as in the Middle East or Congo, could be effected without the direct use of American troops or, indeed, those from any of the major powers. The troops on the ground could come from countries that, in the dispute in question, would be neutral and nonthreatening. The logistical and financial support could come from powers, like the U.S., able to provide it, without the political consequences of great-power involvement.

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