U.S. and International Merger Litigation: Let Us Count the Ways

• DOI: 10.1177/0003603X1305800201
• Author: Robert S. Schlossberg,Karen Alderman
• Date: 01 June 2013
• Published date: 01 June 2013
• Subject Matter: Article

* Partner, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer US LLP.

** International antitrust attorney admittedin New York and as a solictor

in England and Wales..

AUTHORS’ NOTE: We thank Diane Tuomala of Freshfields, not only for her assis-

tance on this article, but also for her invaluable help with the entire symposium,

which is measurably better because of it.

© 2013 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.

THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN:Vol. 58 , Nos. 2 & 3/Su mmer-Fal l 2013 :195

U.S. and International Merger

Litigation: Let Us Count the Ways

BY ROBERT S. SCHLOSS BERG*A ND KAREN ALD ERMAN**

At their economic best, mergers and acquisitions generate efficiencies

and promote growth. At their worst, they harm competition and lead

to a reduction in quality and innovat ion and an increase in prices.

Sorting out those mergers that enhance competition or are at least

competitively neutral from those that are likely to harm competition

is not an easy job; it is by definition a prediction, often with less than

complete information and often in an environment in which time to

decision is of the essence.

It has never been a more importa nt—or more worldwide—job .

Global deal volume now exceeds $2.5 trillion annually. There is an

enormous amount at stake in antitrust merger review, for consumers,

for shareholders, and for other stakeholders. It is not unusual for

multinational transactions to be reviewed by a dozen or more jurisdic-

tions, and there are over100 jurisdictions with merger control regimes.

From a U.S. perspective, it is natural for us to embrace the view that

agency merger decisions should be susceptible to being tested in the