Two-Way Risk Communication, Public Value Consensus, and Citizens’ Policy Compliance Willingness About COVID-19: Multilevel Analysis Based on a Nudge View

AuthorRaduziner Gary Raymond,Guoxian Bao,Bin Guan,Qingchuan Liu
DOI10.1177/0095399721990332
Date01 August 2021
Published date01 August 2021
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399721990332
Administration & Society
2021, Vol. 53(7) 1106 –1149
© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0095399721990332
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Article
Two-Way Risk
Communication,
Public Value Consensus,
and Citizens’ Policy
Compliance Willingness
About COVID-19:
Multilevel Analysis
Based on a Nudge View
Bin Guan1,2 , Guoxian Bao1,2, Qingchuan Liu1,2,
and Raduziner Gary Raymond3
Abstract
COVID-19 has spawned a surge in the number of public epidemic prevention
policies. More important than active policy-making is how to increase citizens’
policy compliance willingness. Based on public value theory and nudge theory,
this study adopts a multilevel mediation and moderation model to analyze
the relationships among the government’s authoritarian control, two-way
risk communication, public value consensus, nudge, and citizens’ policy
compliance willingness. A sample of 2,616 citizens nested in 86 Chinese
cities was collected. The study found that (a) local governments can improve
citizens’ policy compliance willingness by adopting both “stick” (authoritarian
control) and “sermon” (two-way risk communication) policies, whereas two-
way risk communication demonstrates a uniquely positive effect on public
value consensus; and (b) the effect of two-way risk communication on policy
1School of Management, Lanzhou University, China
2China Research Center for Government Performance Management, Lanzhou University, China
3School of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Lanzhou University, China
Corresponding Author:
Bin Guan, School of Management/ China Research Center for Government Performance
Management, Lanzhou University, 222 South Tianshui Road, Lanzhou 730000, China.
Email: guanb17@lzu.edu.cn
990332AASXXX10.1177/0095399721990332Administration & SocietyGuan et al.
research-article2021
Guan et al. 1107
compliance willingness is mediated by public value consensus. By enhancing
public value consensus, two-way risk communication helps establish consensus
between citizens and the government on “what needs/needs not to be done”
and “what should/should not be done” to slow down the pandemic, thus
coalescing efforts in a cooperative spirit; (c) nudge intervention positively
moderates the effect of two-way risk communication on public value
consensus, but has no effect on the authoritarian control–policy compliance
willingness relationship. In other words, nudge intervention is a better
companion to “sermons,” not “sticks.” Findings of the nuanced relationship
manifested the differentiated effect of authoritarian control and two-way risk
communication on citizens’ policy compliance willingness during a pandemic.
The results provide theoretical implications for scholars to unlock the “black
box” of public values and practical implications for strategies from behavioral
public administration aspects to curb the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
Keywords
authoritarian control, two-way risk communication, policy compliance
willingness, public value consensus, nudge
Introduction
COVID-19 has spawned a surge in the number of public epidemic prevention
policies. Prevention measures, such as social distancing, contact and location
tracing, domestic quarantine, temperature monitoring, and community isola-
tion policies, are taken on national and local scales to curb the spread of
COVID-19 in communities. However, more important than active policy-
making is how to increase citizens’ policy compliance willingness (PCW).
Citizens’ PCW refers to citizens’ willingness to abide by and conform to rel-
evant requirements about specific public policies (Gofen, 2015; Porumbescu,
Bellé, et al., 2017; Porumbescu, Lindeman, et al., 2017; Weaver, 2014). PCW
emphasizes citizens’ willingness to comply voluntarily or their capacity for
self-determined compliance (Porumbescu, Lindeman, et al., 2017). During the
global COVID-19 pandemic, citizen’s PCW determines how effective the
government’s public policies are in curbing the spread of pathogen (Chen
et al., 2020; Fu et al., 2020; Greer et al., 2020; Pedersen & Favero, 2020; T.
Zhao & Wu, 2020), even in authoritarian countries (Greer et al., 2020). The
government’s efforts might be wasted if citizens did not adequately abide by
pandemic controls (T. Zhao & Wu, 2020). Successful pandemic control relies
on efficient government actions and voluntary compliance and cooperation
from the public (Cheng et al., 2020; Yan et al., 2020). Still, many countries’
1108 Administration & Society 53(7)
governments are faced with the challenge of improving PCW among their citi-
zens to comply with COVID-19 prevention policies. For example, R. C.
Moore et al. (2020) found that around 40% of Americans did not follow social
distancing recommendations. Murphy et al. (2020) also found that only 21.2%
of Australian citizens had fully complied with the government’s five restric-
tive policies in curbing the pandemic. In Hong Kong, only 42.9% of people
had kept a 1.5 m social distance from others (S. Z. Zhao et al., 2020). As
global COVID-19 prevention becomes the new norm, examining PCW and its
implications for public health administration serves immediate theoretical and
practical needs.
Generally, governments have the option for “sticks” or “sermons” (or
both) to enhance citizens’ PCW (Vedung, 1998). According to Vedung (1998),
“sticks” represents the government’s regulations and authoritarian control
(AC), whereas “sermons” represents information and communication. In
other words, the government “may either force us, or persuade us” (p. 30). As
one of the oldest and most prevalent policy tools (Schneider & Ingram, 1990),
“sticks” is especially preferred by authoritarian countries and manifested by
AC—coercive rules, orders, directives, norms, standards, and statutory pro-
visions of an obligatory nature. The purpose is to control, constrain, super-
vise, and restrict citizens, corporations, or subgovernments (Vedung, 1998).
AC is utilized as a major strategy to control persons and groups and obligate
them to comply. Supported by negative sanctions, oppression, disciplines,
and hierarchical structures (Jun & Muto, 1995; Sinclair, 1997; Spyridonidis
et al., 2015; Xu, 2021), AC aims to command and control (Sager, 2009;
Vedung, 1998), showcasing the compliance–deterrence logic (Howlett,
2018). It is also equipped to restrict the targets’ behaviors without much room
for negotiations and interpretation, exerting an all-powerful sense of direc-
tion and order in times of crisis (Masters & Thart, 2012). Compared with
other behavioral measures such as incentives, AC is considered more reliable
and effective (Vedung, 1998).
However, in a global pandemic like the COVID-19, even an authoritarian
country cannot merely rely on its AC to enhance citizens’ PCW. First, it is
improbable for the government to achieve 100% compliance among its citi-
zens via a singular policy tool (Howlett, 2018). Besides, AC is often criti-
cized for being costly (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020; Rivera & DeLeon,
2008), destructive to cooperation (John, 2013), rigid in its goals (Kostka,
2016), and ineffective in its implementation (Sinclair, 1997). Most impor-
tantly, curbing COVID-19 is instead a marathon rather than a quick race—a
process that requires citizens’ sustaining and long-lasting acceptance and
compliance (Yan et al., 2020). To compromise, the government may adopt
“sticks” with the assistance of “sermons” to convey its policy rationales via

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