The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of My Lai: A Time to Inculcate the Lessons

• Author: Major Jeffrey F. Addzeott, Major Wdliam A. Hudson, Jr.
• Pages: 04

1. Introduction

The way of the superior man is like that of the archer. When he mmes the center of the target he turns and seeks the cause of hu farlure in himself 1

If history teaches anything about avoiding the mistakes and disasters of the past, it is that humanity first must underatand historical lessons-lessons often understood only after the expenditure of incredible amounts of human blood and treasure--and then must inculcate those lessons in the members of each of its succeeding generations.

As America passes the second anniversary of its metory in the Persian Gulf War,z correctly having heeded the lessons of appeasement from World War 11,s another remmder of critical historical lessons is rapidly approaching. Spring 1993 marks the twentyfifth anniversary of the My La, masSacre-an appropriate time to revisit the event and to reinforce the lessons learned.

Representing the antithesis of the conduct of United States Armed Forces during the Liberation and Defense af Kuwait, the My Lai masmcre was a nightmarish event that most Amencans would like to forget. Nevertheless, My La, never must be forgotten. Its horror and disgrace are precisely why My Lai must never be erased from the individual memories of American citizens, nor must it eyer be lost from the legacy of the United States. To the contrary, nothing promdes a greater vehicle for inculcating the

*Judge Advocate GsnaraPs Corpa, United States Army Currently sssimed

to the International and Operatmnal Law Dinamn. Off~ce of The Judge Advocate

"Judge Advocate Generays Corpa US Army Currently assigned BQInstructor, Intsmafmnsl Law Dmsmn, The Judge Adracafe General's School. U S

-CONFUCIUS, THE AVUECTS

oeners1, us Army

Army

'See Michael Cramer, Kuwart Bark to the Paat, TIYE. Aug 5. 1991, sf 33 The ground phase af the mihfary campaign m the Persian Gulf War lasted only 1oU haura. from 24 TO 28 Febrvarv 1991 For an excellent overmew of the entire ~peratmn. see The Gulf War, Mi REV,

OF Coxruc~cs 69 (Arthur Wales tram, 1939)

Sepf 1991

Sraareor or TEE UK~TED

1992) TXE

SAIIONU M I L I I ~ I

STATES

9 [Jan

necessity for stnct adherence to the law of war than the lessonsfrom the massacre st My Lai From its engagements in Grenada in 1983, to Panama m 1989, to Kuwait in 1991, the Umted States military can take full credit for its commendable record m adhenng to the law of war largely because of its commitment to mstitutmnalzing the lessons learned from My La,. Accordingly, every Amenean soldier must understand the sigmficanee of the My Lai massacre and steadfastly must keep it in the forefront of hls or her conmous

11. The Massacre at My La)

1. An Emblem of Shame

   Every ermy has its own mythology, its symbols of heroism,

   and Its symbols of shame The Army of the United States 18 no exception In the sphere of heroism, the American military has an incredible reservoir of noble and fantastic figures to draw from-men whose mditary proficiency and ethical conduct in combat have maintained an impeccable American reputation for both battlefield excellence and strict adherence to the laws regulating warfare' More than any other army in modern history, the American Army is able to claim proudly as its own some of the greatest soldiers in the history of warfare

   Unfortunately, the United States military also has Its figures of shame, soldiers who have engaged in blatant nolatiom of the most fundamental and civilized rules regulating behavior in eombat.5 While American misconduct is certainly an aberration and not the norm, that does not lessen the severity of the shame Without question, each and every grave breach6 of the law of war represents a horrible scar on the credibility of the American military, as well as the civilized democracy It protects

   In this context, the greatest emblem of American military shame in the twentieth century occurred dunng the Vietnam War--a war few Americana yet ~nderstand.~

   While American tmom were involved in several eases of unlawful hllings of

   'Jeffrey F Addicatt, Opeiabon Desori Storm, R E Lee or WT Sherman* 136 MIL L RE\ 115 119921 largving that General R E Lee let aueh B standard for the United States militarv1

   *Id (pmntmg out the war cnmei of General William T Sherman dunng the

   'See infra note 44 and mmmpanpng text'See. ' 8 , THE VIETVM~ DEBATE (John Korlan Moore ed, 1990). Jo~sNon~oh MOORE. Law AKD T ~ E

   ClVi War,

   Ih-oo-Cnm~

   Wu. (1971) An entire series of myths haa persnied over the Vietnam War These myths commonly hare rovered is~ueb such BQ the lsufulnerr af the hencan mterventian, the nature and p~rpose ai the Communist Party m Norrh Vietnam, and the reasons far the failurs of the Umted States to carry the war into North Vietnam to win B military wetory

   unarmed civilians during the Indo-China War, by far the most violent--and hence the mast infamous-f these incidents has come to be called the My Lai massacre.

   Any discussion of the American violations of the law of war during Vietnam ~n general, and at My La1 in particular, must be wewed against the background of the enemy's activities. In this context, American violations absolutely pale in comparison to the many thousands of command-directed slaughters that were committed by the communist reome of North Vietnam. Aceordmgiy, though the Incident wa6 not atypical of the war in general, the My Lai massacre certainly can be characterized as an aberration with respect ta the Amencan presence in Vietnam.

   The American record in Vietnam wth regard to observance of the law of war is not a succe~s~onof war

   crimes and does not support charges of a systematic and willful nolation of existing agreements for standards of human decency in time of WIT, aa many critics of the American involvement have alleged. Such charges were based on a distorted picture of the actual battlefield situation, on ignorance of exmtmg rules of engagement, and on a tendency to construe every mis. take of judgement as a wanton breach of the law of

   W.T.6

   In contrast, blatant violations of numerous provisions of the of war-including murder. torture. and intimidation-were the modus operondr for the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army.g In one scholar's estimate, North Vietnam sponsored the slaughter of over one and a quarter million of its own people from 1946 to 1987.'0 Included in this figure, s u m the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, are over 250,000 Vietnamese "boat people" as well as 250,000 other civilians who either were slaughtered ruthiessly outright UT perished in communist death camps created to "re-educate" noncommunists.11 These massive crimes never have been punished, much less acknowledged forcefully by human rights groups. "In eum, re-education was a label for revenge, punishment, and soma1 prophylaxes But unlike the Khmer Rouge who were too public about their ma88 killing, the Vietnamese regime cleverly and at first hid It from the outside world"'2

   The enemy's barbane conduct should offer little solace to the American con~cience in the wake of My L a The record of misconduct amassed by the communists in no way justifies what occurred at My Lai; nevertheless, it helps to place the American violations in a real.world perspective. For Korth Vietnam, the strategy for a communist victory intentionally was predicated onterror and propaganda, for the United States. the massacre at My La) was an unfortunate contradiction

2. The Facts of My La[The hard facts relating to the My La, massacre are now

   fairly certain, thanks to a thorough criminal investigation aimed at the perpetrators of the crime and a collateral administrative investigation ordered by the Secretary of the Army and headed by Lieutenant General W. R. Peers.13 Despite an initial cover-up by some of those associated with the crime, the enormity of the atrocity diminished the likelihood that it long could be kept secret Nevertheless, for well over a year, the general public knew nothing of the 1nc1dent.14

   On March 16, 1968, an Amencan combat task force of the 23d Infantry Division (the Amend Divmon)'~ launched anairmobile assault into the village complex of Son My in the province of Quang Ngai, South Vietnam Like all such operations, the attack was executed only after the commander of the task force, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Barker, had assembled his key junior commanders for a final rev~ewof the details of the combat operation. This briefing, which took place on March 15, 1968, involved discudsians on the positioning of helicopters. the conduct of artillery preparation, and the specific assignments of the three companies that comprised what became known a8 Task Force "Barkei " While the other two companies provided blocking and support functions, Charlie Company, commanded by Captain

   l . W ~ ~ ~ v ~

   R PEERS. THE Mu La1 lxpuini '1979 'heremafter Pmas Rrsoar! The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, United States hmy. iswed a joint directive far Lieutenant General William R Pier9 ta explore the ~ngmal

   Army mvestigatmnr of what had occurred on March 16. 1966. ~n Son My Ydlage, Qvang Ngai Provmce. Republic of Vietnam This ~nuerfigafm beeame known a i the Peer3 Repart Specifirally, General Piers wad tasked to determine the followng 81) the adequacy of rvch invertigatiann 01 ~nqu~rieaand subsequentF ~ Y ~ D W P and report8 within rhe chain of command and 121 Khether m y ~uppremon or withholdmg of mfarmsfion by persons mvolved in rho incident had taken place See also JOZEPY Go~osimx

   ET AL, THE Mu Lar M ~ a s ~ c n ~

   AX Ira

   Feb

   Brrov~ THE Rmca OF Las? 29 11976

   "For en excellent discusam of the initial breaking ofthe story see U'illiam U'iisan. I Played 10 God Thai This Thing Was Fiction A\rm H ~ n i r i c ~

   COVER-UP

   1990, Pr 44

   "Id The troops making up the task force aere from the lit Barfahon 20th Infantry 11th Light Infantr) Brigade

   Ernest Medina, would take the primary responsibility far battling any enemy resistance encountered in the village

   At the briefing, Lieutenant Colonel Barker reminded his commanders that intelligence reports had...