A Turn to Violence: The Escalation of Nonviolent Movements

• Date: 01 February 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002719861707
• Published date: 01 February 2020
• Author: Kirssa Cline Ryckman
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

A Turn to Violence: The

Escalation of Nonviolent

Movements

Kirssa Cline Ryckman

1

Abstract

Nonviolent resistance can be a powerful tool for ordinary civilians to transform their

governments; however, not all nonviolent movements end in success and many

ultimately escalate into violent conflicts. To understand this escalatory process, I

begin with the premise that social movements are not unitary actors but a collection

of groups with varied preferences on goals and tactics. I argue that escalation is likely

when movements have violence-wielding groups among their varied factions, as

these groups deal in violence, believe in its utility, and can make the strategic decision

to engage in violence as needed. I argue this is particularly likely when the campaign

fails to make progress using nonviolent channels, suggesting that nonviolent tactics

will not be successful to achieve the group’s goals. Expectations are tested using the

Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes data and the case of Algeria’s

escalation from a nonviolent movement to brutal civil war, and results are generally

supportive.

Keywords

domestic politics, internal armed conflict, nonviolent campaigns, escalation, protest,

repression

1

School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

Corresponding Author:

Kirssa Cline Ryckman, School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona, 315 Social

Sciences, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA.

Email: klcline@email.arizona.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(2-3) 318-343

ªThe Author(s) 2019

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002719861707

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Nonviolent resistance can be a powerful tool for ordinary civilians to achieve

political change, and indeed, nonviolent campaigns are more likely to achieve max-

imalist goals than their violent counterparts (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Despite

the greater chances of success, some movements fail to achieve progress, whi le

many ultimately escalate into violent conflicts. According to the Nonviolent and

Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) project, nearly 20 percent of nonvio-

lent movements escalate to using violence as their primary tactic at some point

during the campaign. While there is a large literature in sociology to explain move-

ment emergence (e.g., Tarrow 2011), as well as a growing literature in political

science to explain nonviolent success (e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), rela-

tively less work has focused on movement dynamics or campaign outcomes other

than success. I draw on existing work on protest cycles and the breakdown of

nonviolent discipline to explore why political campaigns may fail and transform

from nonviolence to violence.

To understand the escalatory process, I examine the interaction between the

organizational capacity for violence and the lack of movement progress. Nonvio-

lence succeeds because of lower barriers to participation that encourage high turnout

as well as diversity among participants, pulling together different ethnic groups,

classes, ages, political parties, and ideological groups. There are no requirements

that individuals are able or willing to carry out violence, which contributes to gen-

erating the high quantity and quality of protesters that is needed for a movement to

be successful. As a result, however, an average protester is not well equipped to

become a rebel combatant. Escalating to violence as the movement’s primary tactic

requires that the movement can engage the government militarily, and campaigns

that lack the organizational capacity to engage in violence will be disadvantaged

when attempting to escalate.

Movements are not unitary actors but are made up of varied factions and groups

that may have different preferences over strategies and tactics, some of which are

organized to engage in violence (Cunningham 2011; Pearlman 2011). I argue that

the presence of violence-wielding groups within a nonviolent movement, including

radical flanks and parallel movement armies, increases the chance that a movement

will escalate to violence, as these groups are better equipped to withstand repression

and even engage in military exchanges with the state’s army. Beyond having the

capacity to engage in violence, leaders of these groups are distinct from other

factions in the larger campaign. They deal in violence, believe in its utility, and can

unilaterally decide to escalate if they perceive the need to do so.

I also argue that slow or no progress can increase the likelihood of escalation. The

lack of progress can encourage the use of violence by convincing demonstrators that

nonviolence will fail to achieve meaningful concessions, thus losing its appeal as a

strategy. Similarly, the literature on cycles of protest generally finds that violence

becomes more likely in a cycle’s downturn, when enthusiasm, participation, and the

likelihood of making progress decline (Tarrow 2011). Put together, violence-

wielding groups have the option to pursue change through organized violence, which

Ryckman 319