Who Guards the Turkish Press? A Perspective on Press Corruption in Turkey.

• Author: FINKEL, ANDREW

"The press becomes corrupt when it tolerates what it knows to be false and becomes an apologist for what it itself has condemned as wrong."

Quis custodiet custodiens or "who guards the guardians" is a conundrum which open societies claim to have resolved. Although the press may be an imperfect, excitable and at times incompetent watchdog, its commitment to editorial independence and to the integrity of the public realm remains in theory one of the safeguards of liberal democracies. In theory again, it is market forces which help guard the press from abusing its own powers. It is the competition between the variety of published and broadcast media that serves as protection against the abuses of any individual press organ. To surrender credibility undermines commercial viability. Thus, a newspaper jealously guards its good name not simply for altruistic motives, but to survive in a crowded marketplace.

The substance of that good name--journalistic standards--varies from country to country. Ethics and their, violation are concepts tinged with the problems of relativism: one society's backhander is another's cargo cult. Yet, as a journalist, my own prejudice is that the issue of corruption in the media contains the key to its own complexity. Newspapers and television stations can be judged by the standards that they use to judge others. A common axiom for journalists is that to engage in half-truths, even in pursuit of the common good or national interest, is to risk peril.

The starting point for my discussion about the press in Turkey is that the public realm, like public land or public contracts, is a common resource. That resource can be put to good use if market forces are allowed to compete openly and fairly under reliable and transparent public supervision; it can be abused if those same forces can engage in under-the-table collusion with officialdom.

There is also a larger issue pertaining not just to Turkey, but to the entire world concerning the reliance on the market as the ultimate regulatory authority and the increasing commercialization of the media. There is a tendency for news to slip down-market or simply reflect the concerns of the most prosperous communities. Most correspondents brush up against the problem of cognitive dissonance. Whatever the declared premium on "scoops" and sensational revelation, it is hard to report in way that surprises the reader, let alone in a way that offends the prejudices of one's editors. In the case of Turkey, reporting on Kurdish issues has been circumscribed as much by conservative public opinion--which simply does not want to confront certain issues--as by official pressure.

However, my concern in this article is much simpler and has less to do with the market than the dictates of a distorted market that operates sub rosa. Contrary to what was stated above, market forces do not always keep the press in line. An alliance between proprietors--who pursue their own non-press interests--and the state--which controls the flow of information--is an unholy one. The resulting distortions create a vicious circle that mitigates against organizations competing solely on the quality of the news. The profusion of newspapers and recent proliferation of private television channels is often cited as proof of the underlying vigor of Turkish democracy. This would be less questionable if these organizations were profitable in their own right, rather than because of the economic clout press ownership bestows.

The quality of the public realm, as patrolled by the nation's media, is an issue at the very heart of the criticism proffered by Turkey's Western allies--that a neglect of individual liberties and rights of expression acts as a drag on the growth of civil institutions and on Ankara's ambitions to exercise regional leadership. Within Turkey, there is a sense that the country must now engage with a set of structural reforms that will improve the responsiveness of its democratic institutions and deal with serious problems. Not least of these problems is removing the accumulated residue of patronage politics from the state's own finances--practices which have led to an average annual inflation rate of 72 percent over the last decade.

There is an awareness as well that Turkey now has an impetus for change. Acceptance as a candidate for the European Union at the Helsinki summit in December 1999, coupled with the IMF's endorsement of a disinflationary package, has provided politicians with both the yardstick and the incentive for reform. For Turkey not to respond to this challenge would be to lose its way at home and set itself adrift internationally--a message which the press and broadcast media itself declaims. Like the politicians they criticize, these press institutions are slow to acknowledge that their own standards of integrity and commitment to independence must change if reform is to become a reality

I make no secret of my belief that the press in Turkey often fails the tests it sets for others and that this failure is heavily subsidized by the society it purports to serve. My observations are unashamedly those of a participant-observer--both as a foreign correspondent in Turkey for over a decade and as someone who has worked inside the newsroom of a large Turkish-language daily Later, for over two years, I had a bi-weekly column in one of the country's largest papers--an experience which involved undergoing a rite of passage still all too common among my Turkish colleagues. As a result of my article, I found myself on trial for defaming an institution of the state (in this case the military)--an offense that carried a potential sentence of six years. My career in the Turkish media came to an abrupt halt after another article, this time about Abdullah Ocalan's November 1998 flight to Rome. In this case, I stood back from the unmitigated outrage that was expected from commentators at the time.(1) This, along with my coverage in international media about the Ocalan affair, prompted a series of attacks against myself in a rival newspaper, including defamatory accusations against my wife.(2)

These experiences led me to take a somewhat different view from NGOs concerned with freedom of press issues and other human rights bodies, many of whom rallied to my defense. Organizations like the Committee to Protect Journalists and Journalistes sans Frontiers illuminate the very real difficulties Turkish journalists have in doing their job. My court case appeared in these organizations' annual country reports, alongside other far more grievous instances of intimidation against media organizations and their journalists. The overall impression left by those reports is that other self-appointed guardians impede the press in its role as guardian of the public realm. The assumption is that if the press does not speak out more openly, it is because it is confronted by an antediluvian statute book and the deep-seated illiberality of the Turkish establishment.

At the end of my ordeal, I came to the conclusion that newspapers were failing to protect their own professional standards and, as a result, were exposing journalists to unacceptable risks. I was less disenchanted with the legal system, which tried me fairly under a bad law, than with my own newspaper, which did not cover the case at all.(3) A civil court awarded my wife damages for the sort of libel that would have made the rounds of a Stalinist broadsheet. Her good name was cleared. Yet, I am not confident that the decision in her case will in any way instill a greater sense of professional responsibility.

Faith in the Turkish courts is not universal and the legal system is much criticized--even by its most senior jurists.(4) In a series of publicized trials involving torture, organized crime and gross corruption,(5) justice was often perceived as not being done. Public prosecutors appeared to act from a sense of divine right to protect the ideological purity of the state. It is highly questionable whether such institutions have the ability to carry out the sort of Italian "clean hands" operation necessary to raise the ethical standards of public life.

But, my concern here is with the court of public opinion. For this to function badly--and confuse its priorities--is every bit as demoralizing as a breakdown of the legal system. The common colloquialism "this is Turkey" ("burasi Turkiye") used to explain the failure of basic standards is the cry of a society in which priorities are too complex to unravel and private interests too deeply entrenched.

PARADOXES IN THE TURKISH MEDIA

The media in Turkey embody a number of paradoxes. It is both the victim of rights abuse, the clarion of reform and, yet, an industry that understands well the methods of a lax business environment. Historically, Turkish newspapers looked for their profits not just from ad revenues or the cover price, but to the covert resale of heavily subsidized newsprint from the state paper factory--a practice in which governments until the late 1980s colluded.(6) As the years progressed, press owners became experts at acquiring cheap state land, indemnities on imported machinery and inexpensive credit from state banks. As guardians of the public realm, the press has acquired a "crooked cop" instinct of when to behave and when to bend the rules.

Of course, the notion of a perfect public realm in which claims to truth resound with equal clarity is just a notion. Like anthropologists, journalists understand the practical limits of moral indignation. Societies tolerate--even thrive on--moral ambiguities. The gap between formal legitimation and actual practice--public ethics and private rationale--is an accepted starting point not just for investigative reporting but for much social scientific enquiry.

I accept the social scientific distinction between patronage politics and interest politics, between the political machine and political associations. In the first...