TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND JERUSALEM: TOWARD A SOCIETAL CONSTRUCTION OF FOREIGN POLICY.

• Author: Aras, Bulent

Stones, figs and Mount Olive And the ever-betrayed al-Quds hold their breath and listen to the sound of David reciting the psalms of intifada (Berdal Aral)

THERE ARE A FAIRLY LIMITED NUMBER of studies dealing with Turkish Foreign Policy from a theoretical and historical background. [1] Analyses of Turkish Foreign Policy in the last decade have ranged from bold, new-activist daring to extremely cautious. Many of these new perspectives could be loosely described as some form of neo-Ottomanism. [2] These numerous points of view generally share a common denominator, however, in their focus on disputes over national and/or group identity in domestic politics, which has also begun to play an increasingly influential role in Turkish foreign policy. In the 1990s, Turkey found itself in the midst of an entirely new international political configuration. More so than at any other time in the more than 70-year history of the republic, it has felt the burdens of history bearing down heavily on its shoulders. With the end of the Cold War, Turkey's borders have become increasingly blurred, and its national identity thrown into profound crisis.

Strategically located amidst the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey has been asked to respond to crises in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Palestine, often floundering in a contradictory cycle of expectations, promises, and performance. Turkey's new openness to the outside world following the end of Cold War tensions have allowed Turkish citizens to better acquaint themselves with people beyond national borders with whom they have religious, linguistic, and racial ties. As a result, new fault lines and contradictions have emerged in domestic politics, and the military elite has struggled mightily to maintain its characteristic iron-clad control over the course of events. The National Security Council, dominated by members of the military, has continued to exert a great deal of influence over politicians, continuing to be the major voice or decision maker in the development of both domestic and foreign policy.

The official elite, headed by the military, reached its peak of power in the aftermath of the watershed decisions made on 28 February 1997. Mammoth efforts on the part of the elite in economic and politic spheres as well as the media, to radically decrease Islamic influence in the public arena, have signaled certain cues as to where Turkish politics, including its foreign policy, will be headed in the future. The major contribution of this paper is intended to suggest that the key element in understanding Turkish politics today lies in the clashes between "globalists" and "nationalists" and in certain courses of action adopted by the major political actors who have been forced to redefine their agendas in the face of ever-increasing domestic tensions. This tension is, of course, reflected in debates over Turkish foreign policy. Matters are made still worse as a result of friction and conflict among the elite themselves, those who determine the course of foreign policy.

In what follows, I offer a framework for understanding the contemporary shape of domestic politics and some reflections concerning foreign policy development with a special focus on Turkey's foreign policy with respect to the Jerusalem question. Most importantly, I argue that Turkish foreign policy with regard to Jerusalem represents an especially clear example of the way in which the pressures of societal demands are reflected in Turkish foreign policy. This is of critical importance insofar as the contribution of domestic impulses, expectations, norms, and values to the development of Turkish foreign policy represents a major deviation from the bureaucratic-authoritarian model that has long dominated the development of Turkish foreign policy. First, I deal with identity disputes, since they represent the principal driving force of the changing landscape of Turkish foreign policy, especially with respect to the question of Jerusalem. I then proceed with a historical overview of policies concerning Jerusalem in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic, followed by my own critical perspective of Turkish foreign policy in this regard.

IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN TURKEY

Theoretical Background

Numerous theoretical works have dealt with the impact of civic identities on political perceptions and interests, and how they serve to influence the development of a nation's foreign policy. Disputes over identity existed long before the pioneering theories of Hegel. In the post-Cold-War era, new theoretical frameworks are being developed that provide analysts of international relations with new tools to understand the increasingly complex nature of today's international political scenario. The growing interest in the theoretical political analysis of our post-Cold-War era has given rise to new schools of thought and the development of new theoretical paradigms in the field. [3] Constructivism and developments in critical theory are the two most important theoretical trends in this regard, although it is difficult to depict them as well-defined schools of thought due to their diverse patterns of ongoing development and the numerous theoretical foundations from the social sciences upon which they rely.

Constructivism, or more accurately 'constructivisms', have resulted in new and promising criteria for analyzing actors in international politics. Many constructivist arguments stand in sharp contrast to the assumptions of traditional international relations theories. According to the constructivist-culturalist perspective, for example, state interests are not the result of self-interested, rational actors. Rather, these interests are seen as constructed through processes of social interaction; political/cultural identity, therefore, comes to be seen as a relational and controversial attribute of the collective distinctiveness of state/nationhood. [4] In contrast to the rationalistic epistemology of traditional international relations theories, constructivism depends on an intersubjectivist epistemology, emphasizing the importance of process and interaction, rather than material structure, on actor preferences. Referring to variations in the meaning of statehood under the same structural conditions, construct ivists take the social embeddedness of states into consideration. In the constructivist conception of international relations, contested constructions of actor identities are major determinants of interest-formation. [5] In this line of thought, societal constructivism claims that the values, norms, and principles of the society constitute main inputs in foreign policy formulation process.

The problem of Jerusalem's status and its future constitutes an important case study for constructivist research in international relations. It is not a simple part of the occupied territories that became a subject of struggle between Israel and the Palestinians. For example it cannot be compared with Eriha [Jericho], which was subject to same diplomacy before, and it did not evolve to such a complicated position. The extraordinary symbolic importance attached to the city and the existence of holy places for three monotheistic religions makes the Jerusalem issue a global problem with the possible involvement of many sides at different levels. In this sense, the different cultures, worldviews and ideologies, mainly inscribed from religious positions, have different positions regarding the status and future of Jerusalem with strong objection to hegemony of one side, in particular Jewish domination. The reason behind this staunch objection to hegemony is the fear that others' symbolic and material existence may be destroyed. Here the collective memory produces a societal norm that is very resistant to change and influential in foreign policy making process. Turkish foreign policy is no exception in this regard.

The tradition of constructivist/culturalist criticism has provided us with many enlightening ideas concerning the nature of international relations. Its emphasis on the relevance and theoretical/practical validity of analyses of the foreign policy making process, with a special focus on culture, identity and norms, has been a valuable contribution to the discipline. In some ways, these new perspectives can be understood, at least in part, as a projection of recent political thought developed in the West into the wider arena of international politics. Just as the contemporary western political thought transformed its conception of the individual from a homogeneous, unitary and undifferentiated category of the public sphere to an ambivalent and heterogeneous mode of publicity, recent developments in international relations theory have paved the way for alternative conceptualizations of states as socially contingent, intersubjectively constructed agents, rather than unitary and homogeneous actors. Just as in ce rtain strands of recent political thought we observe a heightened interest in normative content and socio-moral dimension of society, the possibility of a certain kind of normative base for the conduct of international affairs has often been explored by the proponents of these new perspectives. [6]

When we proceed from the theoretical discussion laying out the relationship between identity and foreign policy specifically in regard to the particulars of Turkey, it is clear that Turkish foreign policy is guided by the governing elite or the identity/world-view Weltanschauung of the establishment. Distinct foreign policy perceptions, resulting from the hybridization created by individual perceptions of identity, guide Turkish foreign policy makers as well as a variety of other identities within the establishment, those groups which have a voice in the development of Turkey's foreign relations. Turkish foreign policy is largely dominated by the Kemalist elite and conducted via co-operation...