Turkey and Israel: Reciprocal and Mutual Imagery in the Media, 1994-1999.

• Author: LEWIN, ANAT

"Situated at the crossroad between East and West, Turkey and Israel think of themselves as possessing a partially European identity in the `rough neighborhood' of the Middle East. Geographic proximity and historical interactions with Europe shaped Turkey's European identify, while Israel's European identity stems from a shared demographic composition due to the influx of European immigrants."

In the Middle East, as in other regions of the world, the media is an important mechanism for understanding public perceptions. Whether transmitted by government-controlled, self-censored or independent media sources, imagery used to portray a "self" and an "other" as being distinct, in opposition or in cooperation, reflects, reinforces and changes opinions about neighboring countries.

This paper conducts a study of Turkish media coverage of Israel and of Israeli media coverage of Turkey. Since 1993, Turkey and Israel have embarked on a path of advancing and deepening their relations. The attentive media coverage of these developments reflects the multitude of interests, fears and biases communicated by journalists on behalf of their audiences. The articles used for this study were collected from the World News Connection, more commonly known by its pre-1994 name, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. This CIA-sponsored news service monitors and translates media articles and television and radio broadcasts across the globe. Over 500 newspaper articles and news transcripts published between 1994 and 1999 by primary news providers in Ankara, Istanbul, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv were considered for this survey.

The coverage is analyzed in several ways. The first section provides preliminary observations and contextual analysis about the media coverage from 1994 to 1999. Its chief conclusion is that Turkish coverage was primarily concerned with the depth and scope of relations with Israel, while Israeli coverage conducted a cost-benefit analysis of the relationship. The second section analyzes the imagery used by Turkey and Israel to portray one another. It discusses the two states' common identities and mutual interests as they are emphasized in the media. Elements, such as combating terrorism, alliances with the West, the separation of religion and state and living as non-Arab entities in the Middle East, are at the core of Turkey's and Israel's commonality. This section also discusses Israel's image of Turkey and Turkey's image of Israel and identifies the media's attempts to positively portray the other state to their respective publics. The last section examines the limits of the Turkish-Israeli relationship. These differences are revealed as one side repudiates an important identity held by the other. For example, Israel has exhibited skepticism about the nature of Turkey's democracy. The strains in the Turkish-Israeli relationship is also visible when one side fails to act in accordance with common interests.

The study concludes that the media's portrayal of Turkish-Israeli relations reveals that the two countries are operating in separate and seemingly isolated environments. The issues and themes evoked by Turkish reporters are often substantially different from those addressed by their Israeli counterparts. Rarely is there insight into the context within which the other country is operating. Where similar images of the two countries exist--such as the familiar notion that Turkey and Israel are the only two democracies in the Middle East--the countries' definition and understanding of that image is not necessarily the same. Thus, Turkish-Israeli cooperation does not rely on genuine understanding of the other side's frame of reference, but on a mutually beneficial relationship derived from a number of self-interests. These interests are military-, security- or power-driven, and are the forces that sustains amicable Turkish-Israeli relations.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

In both countries, the coverage focuses on the development of the Turkish-Israeli relationship. Each political or military event--a joint naval exercise, a newly signed contract for Popeye missiles or a visit to Ankara by the head of a Middle Eastern state--causes a renewed cycle of assessing Turkish-Israeli relations and their impact on the regional balance of power. Several points can be made about Turkish and Israeli media coverage.

Turkish Coverage

Since 1994, Turkish articles on Turkish-Israeli relations are approximately double in number and often twice the length of Israeli articles on the same topic. They occasionally utilize a reporting style that, for lack of a political science term, could be called "defensive egoism." Positive aspects of Turkey are described in superlative terms, achievements are lauded with great embellishments and shortcomings are presented as obstacles to Turkey's assumption of its rightful leadership role. When the idea of relations with Israel was first "pitched" to the Turkish public or when relations are warmest between the countries, a similar laudatory tone is adopted for Israel. For example, Israeli defense technology becomes the best in its field, the Mosad is referred to as the most feared counter-terrorism intelligence service in the world and the Israeli Defense Forces are cited as the best-equipped army Such coverage transmits the implied message that Turkey has much to gain from befriending this state. The message becomes more pronounced and explicit when Israel's extensive network of contacts--its lobbies on Capitol Hill, its relations with Europe and the powerful connections of the "global Jewish network"--are evoked, generally without regard for the dubious nature of such statements.

Throughout the period from January 1994 to April 1999, Turkish media focused on the phenomenon of the Turkish-Israeli relationship itself. Articles repeated the debate over Turkey's vested interests in cooperating with Israel and described the difficulty of defending this policy to other governments in the region. The Turkish media responded to the Middle East's opposition with several different arguments. These ranged from outrage at the meddling of these countries in Turkey's national interests,(1) to calls for a more balanced Turkish policy toward its regional neighbors, to the less common appeals for a return to the Muslim world,(2) and to, in the Islamist press, the rare Jewish conspiracy theory.(3)

Turkish-Israeli relations reached their low point in the period from 1996 to 1997, while Necmettin Erbakan was prime minister. His goal of abrogating agreements with Israel and bringing Turkey back into the fold of regional Islamic countries took him on a tour of Tehran, Cairo, Tripoli and other regional capitals, where he hoped to mend damaged ties. However, Erbakan, who envisioned a leadership role for Turkey, was humiliated during his trip and the Turkish media was outraged at the treatment displayed by his fellow Muslim leaders. Erbakan continued to undermine Turkish-Israeli relations until he was eventually supplanted by the Turkish army, which had geostrategic interests in securing Israel as a reliable defense technology supplier.(4) Erbakan's Welfare-True Path coalition leadership was overpowered by the army, and he had to acquiesce to deepening ties with Israel. This led to considerable Arab and Iranian bewilderment at Turkey's two-sided policy toward the Jewish state.

This political incoherence manifested itself in a number of policy swings, such as Erbakan's May 1997 announcement that naval exercises with Israel were being cancelled, followed by his coalition partner's repudiation of that cancellation,(5) and his uneasy defense of Turkish-Israeli ties while on a visit to Tehran.(6) Another important instance of such inconsistency was Erbakan's announcement after a meeting with Iranian leaders that Turkey would be entering into defense agreements with Tehran. The Turkish media wondered how it was possible to cooperate in defense with both Israel and Iran. The army answered by stating that cooperation with Iran was not appropriate and that the agreement would not be implemented. To drive this point home, the military coordinated various gestures toward Israel, such as port visits by Turkish warships in Haifa, which were celebrated in the Israeli media,(7) the army's signing of far-reaching agreements with Israel without government involvement,(8) or the correction of rebukes of Israel following a meeting with Arab or Iranian officials by the army or Erbakan's coalition partners. In time, the military establishment was so upset by Erbakan's violation of Kemal Ataturk's state secularism, that, in 1997, he found himself banned from politics by the Turkish Constitutional Court. Thereafter, relations with Israel improved.

An article about Erbakan's delayed acquiescence to meet Israeli Foreign Minister David Levi during the signing of the Turkish-Israeli free trade agreement demonstrates how the Turkish media depicted the foreign policy ambiguity during Erbakan's term:

Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan maintained a stubborn approach but he later agreed to meet with Foreign Minister David Levi. Why did he maintain such an approach since he would agree to hold talks with him in the end? Obviously someone informed him as follows: `You are not the Welfare Party's Prime Minister. You are the Prime Minister of Turkey, So, you have to meet with him for the sake of Turkey's interests.' This is essential. This is how the meeting took place. Erbakan's meeting with Levi has again brought to light the fact that Turkey's interests have priority over everything else. This has proved us to be right again. Had he avoided meeting Levi, Turkey would have lost a very strategic opportunity.(9) During the entirety of the Erbakan term, the Turkish media coverage echoed this argument. The most common phrases from Turkey's media were: "Turkey has every right to act in accordance with its national interest," and, referring to the Arab...