Turkey in a Changing Security Environment.

• Author: LESSER, IAN O.

"[O]ne can no longer measure Turkey's strategic importance in purely geographic terms.... Those factors remain--but Ankara is also an increasingly capable security actor in its own right, with the resources and the willingness to use military power beyond its borders. This does not necessarily imply a more unilateralist Turkey; in key areas such as the Balkans, Ankara has shown a strong preference for a more cautious, multilateral approach."

Much Western scholarship on Turkey has tended to view Turkish foreign and security policy from one of two perspectives: inside-out or outside-in. The former methodology considers the nature of Turkish society, and its internal organizational and bureaucratic developments, and draws conclusions about their implications for Turkish foreign policy The latter tradition focuses on geo-politics as the prime motivator for the internal policies of Turkey and other states in its security complex. The distinction these traditions make is somewhat artificial. Turkey's internal affairs clearly have a profound influence on the nature and direction of the country's external policy, and developments in the strategic environment affect the evolution of Turkish society and politics. Modern Turkish history is replete with examples of both tendencies, and current developments continue to support this contention.

The following is an overview of leading issues affecting Turkey's perceptions of, and position in, its changing security environment. It suggests that Turkey's role in the 21st century is likely to transcend well-established images and will be increasingly independent and assertive. At the same time, some of Turkey's long-standing spheres of competition, especially in its relationship with Greece, may become less salient. From the Western perspective, Turkey will become a more active, capable and, in some instances, independent ally

Although this analysis concentrates on the country's external, international influences, it is important to note that Turkey's security policy elites consistently place internal challenges, including Islamism and Kurdish separatism, at the top of their agenda. In the Turkish context the discourse over these issues in the security debate interacts with their perceptions of the external security environment, particularly in relation to the Middle East.

A MORE ACTIVE DEBATE, A MORE CAPABLE ACTOR

One of the leading aspects of recent change in Turkish security policy has been the role of public opinion in the evolving concerns of security elites. Whereas during the Cold War Turkey's foreign and security policy outlook was relatively circumscribed and naturally dominated by the country's role in the containment of Soviet power, the last decade has witnessed a sweeping enlargement of the country's external horizons. The notion that Turkey's interests and potential influence stretch from the Balkans to western China has proven quite realistic, even if some of the early assumptions about Ankara's role in the newly independent Turkic republics of Central Asia proved somewhat overblown. Certainly, everyday events in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East are rapidly noted in the Turkish security debate and play a role in public opinion. Large and increasingly vocal lobbies, drawn from communities within Turkey that trace their origins to such places as Bosnia or Azerbaijan, have reinforced this trend.

Turkish policy interests and initiatives mirror this expanded concept of Turkey's security space. Recent examples include defending the welfare of Turkish residents in Germany, and more active diplomacy in the Caucasus. The rise of Turkish nationalism and closer attention to sovereignty questions as political forces within Turkey have led Ankara to vigorously defend its interests in recent years.(2) The most impressive examples in this regard have included the use or the threatened use of force beyond Turkey's borders. Ankara credibly threatened to attack Russian-supplied S-300 surface-to-air missile sites if the system was deployed on Cyprus; the missiles were not deployed. Turkey made clear its willingness to act against Syria if Damascus did not end its cross-border support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and expel the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan; Ocalan left and Syrian support for the PKK essentially ceased. In their counter-insurgency campaign against the PKK, Turkish forces have for some time engaged in extensive cross-border operations in northern Iraq and have established a de facto security zone in the region. With the important exception of the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus, these assertive actions would have been difficult to imagine in previous decades and under Cold War constraints.

The Turkish experience during the Gulf War was a watershed in this respect. Under the leadership of then-President Turgut Ozal, Ankara adopted an assertive stance in the conflict with Baghdad, facilitating the economic blockade, shifting forces to the border with Iraq and allowing the use of Turkish bases for air strikes against Iraqi forces and the strategic bombardment of Iraq itself. The Gulf War experience left an uncomfortable legacy in Ankara. By all accounts, the Turkish General Staff was reluctant to adopt such a forward-leaning strategy, and was disturbed by the technical and structural lack of preparedness of Turkish forces for the sort of modern warfare demonstrated during the conflict. The economic sanctions against Iraq, including the shutdown of most exports of Iraqi oil through Turkish pipelines, continue to impose enormous economic costs on Turkey Many Turks worried that Operation Provide Comfort, an American-led effort that between 1991 and 1996 aimed to safeguard the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, would encourage Kurdish separatism within Turkey.(3) Many well-informed, Western-oriented Turkish observers remain convinced that the West actually sought (and seeks) the establishment of a "Kurdistan" carved, in part, from Turkish territory--a perception that might seem incredible from the perspective of other NATO members. Nevertheless, Ankara provided crucial support to the operation. Many in Turkey have interpreted their country's role in the Gulf War and subsequent experiences as a series of compromises on Turkish interests and sovereignty.

Such efforts serve as both cause and consequence of a clear reality: Turkey is becoming a more capable actor in regional security In the wake of the Gulf War, Turkey embarked on a very significant program of military modernization and restructuring. The most recent procurement plans envision as much as US$90 billion in modernization spending over the next decade, and as much as US$125 billion over the next 20 years. Turkey will be acquiring additional first-line fighters to complement F- 16s already built in Turkey, together with air refueling and airborne warning and control (AWACS) aircraft. It also plans major purchases of main battle tanks (to be co-produced in Turkey) and attack helicopters. Along with efforts to streamline and professionalize key elements of the Turkish force structure, these modern equipment purchases will greatly increase the Turkish military's capacity for power projection into adjacent regions. It will also facilitate Turkish participation in multilateral peacekeeping and other missions on the European periphery and beyond.

As a result of these developments, one can no longer measure Turkey's strategic importance in purely geographic terms that emphasize its location near areas of turmoil and international strategic interest. Those factors remain--but Ankara is also an increasingly capable security actor in its own right, with the resources and the willingness to use military power beyond its borders. Notwithstanding recent activism in Syria and Cyprus, this does not necessarily imply a more unilateralist Turkey; in key areas such as the Balkans, Ankara has shown a strong preference for a more cautious, multilateral approach.(4)

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