Turkey at a Crossroad.

• Author: KASABA, RESAT

"As the country faces a new century, the ideological, cultural, political and economic debates that are flourishing in all sections of society directly question the centrality of state institutions and practices and promise to take Turkey in a different direction."

Beginning in the fall of 1999, many of the institutions, policies and practices that characterized Turkey during the 20th century started to unravel, paving the way for a future that is full of uncertainty for the country and its people. In the closing years of the 20th century, the slow transformation that had been going on for some time culminated in a period of accelerated change that is likely to affect all aspects of life in the country This period of uncertainty, which causes many people to be apprehensive and downright fearful, also inspires hope and optimism among some. Rahmi Koc, one of the most influential industrialists in Turkey put it this way: "We are surfing on the crest of a terrific wave ... a series of events have [sic] cleared our way to the future. We have passed a highly significant turning point."(1) While the particular interpretation of these changes depends on the vantage point from which they are observed or experienced, few people would disagree that over the past year Turkey has moved to a new phase in its history.

There are at least three areas in which the Turkey of the 21st century is likely to be profoundly different from that of the 20th. The first of these areas pertains to Turkish identity. When the modern Republic of Turkey was established, it was assumed that ethnic and linguistic differences would eventually disappear and a homogenous community of Turks would form the core of the new state. Today; it is no longer possible to ignore or minimize the ethnic fault lines that divide the people of Turkey and assume that these are residual divisions that are bound to disappear over time. The second area of change relates to the growing power and assertiveness of Islamist groups in Turkish politics. This also constitutes a significant departure from the early years of the Republic, when Islam was considered the most significant threat to the new state. Today; the Islamist Virtue Party is one of the five largest political parties in the Turkish parliament and is accepted as one of the key players in mainstream Turkish politics. The third area relates to the changes that have accompanied Turkey's growing participation in the new international economy and post-Cold War diplomacy As the world economy becomes integrated with unprecedented speed and intensity, countries such as Turkey are finding that they have little choice but to adapt their economies and policies based on the imperatives of this new global system. After years of hesitation, Turkey has finally started to take steps in this direction. It has eliminated some of its state-centered economic policies, taken steps to bring its domestic political structure in line with international norms and started to practice a more active and effective foreign policy, both in the Middle East and beyond.

In this essay, we first examine the changes that are taking place in these three areas. We then identify the earthquake of 1999 as the factor that jolted not only the physical terrain of Turkey but also the institutions of society and pushed the changes in these three areas beyond their respective points of no return. We end with descriptions of how these changes have combined with the legacies of Ottoman and Turkish history to create a hybrid, diverse and dynamic cultural environment.

ETHNIC IDENTITY

The first way in which the Turkey of the 21st century is likely to be substantially different is how it perceives and presents its ethnic identity. When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the other leaders of the new regime embarked on a comprehensive program of creating an ethnically homogeneous community and turning it into the foundation of the new state. To a large extent, this policy was formulated to break with the Ottoman past that had provided a framework, albeit hierarchical and inegalitarian, for the coexistence of a vast range of religious and ethnic groups in a region spanning the Near East and the Balkans. The new state, on the other hand, was founded on the assumption that it would be for the Turks and by the Turks. But, obviously, to state something is not to make it so.

With the departure and elimination of the two largest non-Turkish groups, Armenians and Greeks, the Kurds, the largest remaining minority in Turkey, took up arms against the new state within a year of the establishment of the Republic. The Kurdish fight for recognition and representation in Turkey has continued, with greater or lesser intensity, ever since. Today; it is estimated that, of the 25 million Kurds living in the Middle East, about 12 million are in Turkey. Most but not all of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims, and they speak a multiplicity of dialects that are not always mutually comprehensible. Even though a large number of Kurds have moved to urban centers in the West of Turkey and assimilated into the Turkish mainstream, about two-thirds of Turkey's Kurds remain in their ancestral homeland, a large swath of territory that extends from Turkey's southeastern provinces into Iraq, Syria and Iran. The 14 provinces in Turkey that are claimed as part of Kurdistan are among the poorest in the country; the per capita income is as low as one-tenth that of the wealthier western provinces.(2)

Given this background of poverty, religious schism and linguistic divisions, it is not surprising that the Kurdish movement has remained disjointed and incoherent for most of its history and that the Kurdish and the Turkish sides have grown increasingly farther away from the possibility of reconciliation and mutual compromise.

In the first months of 1999, this already bleak situation took a turn for the worse. In February; after years of insurgency and armed struggle against the Turkish army; Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), was captured in Kenya. Forcing Ocalan out of his sanctuary in Syria and making it impossible for him to find a safe haven anywhere in Europe was clearly a success for Turkey's foreign policy, but it soon appeared that having Ocalan in custody might also become a liability for Turkey After years of demonizing him as a violent murderer, and whipping up a nationalist frenzy around the Kurdish War, the government had little choice but to press the harshest charges of treason and mass murder against Ocalan. It was certain that he would be tried, sentenced to death and executed quickly, in accordance with Turkish laws. But this would achieve little more than invite retaliatory revenge attacks by the Kurdish militants and the almost certain deterioration of relations between Turkey and the European Union.

Even more troubling were the anticipated consequences of the role some private Greek citizens had played in trying to find a safe haven for Ocalan and the initial reluctance of the Greek government to disassociate itself from these individuals. This helped fuel anti-Greek sentiment in Turkey, while providing ample support for those who had always held that the Kurdish insurgency was rooted not in the discontent of an oppressed national minority but in the meddling of external enemies bent on destroying the Turkish state and nation.

Yet when the trial started, Ocalan, who had been the undisputed symbol of Kurdish nationalism, adopted a surprisingly conciliatory line and volunteered to help end the Kardish War and work to build peace between Kurds and Turks. The government did not take him up on this offer, but it did not use the trial as an excuse for fanning the flames of Turkish nationalism either. As expected, Ocalan was convicted and sentenced to die, but his death sentence was postponed indefinitely while his lawyers launched a lengthy process of appeal.

The capture, trial and conviction of Ocalan are generally interpreted as the crowning achievement of the Turkish army in its fight against Kurdish nationalists. But the removal of this symbol of intransigency from the scene has also revealed that, against all odds, the Kurds have been successful in laying bare the fundamental weakness of the official ideology of ethnic homogeneity.(3) In fact, it is a testimony to the enduring diversity of Turkish society that, as soon as the specter of armed struggle dissipated in the late 1990s, the Turkish majority and the political establishment became more willing to accept cultural and ethnic plurality and has begun to relax the discourse and policies of the government.

The following three statements, from individuals at the highest levels of the government, constitute the best proof that discussions of Turkish identity have become much more nuanced than the old discourses of ethnic and national homogeneity. On 6 September 1999, Sami Selcuk, the President of the Supreme Court of Appeals, roundly condemned the current constitution as an anti-democratic document written and imposed by the military rulers in power from 1980 to 1983. He said, "at the threshold of the millennium, during the age of information, we seek not to have a Republic united around a cowardly philosophy ... Turkey's Constitution should not make any differences in thought, culture, faith, identity and origin. It should be pluralist, and participatory and grant equal rights."(4) On 14 December 1999, Turkey's Foreign Minister Ismail Cem spoke in favor of lifting the ban on Kurdish language broadcasts. He said, "every citizen in Turkey; in every television broadcast, should be able to speak in his own mother tongue."(5) Two days later, Mesut Yilmaz, who is the leader of one of the three coalition partners in government, argued, in strong terms, that the Turkish state and its official organs would have to respect the basic human rights of the Kurds if Turkey...