Trial by combat: delivering technology to troops requires learning 'in real time'.

• Author: Erwin, Sandra I.
• Position: Government procurement

Buyers and developers of military equipment readily admit that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have thrown into question many of the traditional assumptions about the way the Defense Department acquires new technology.

For the past two years, the defense research and development community has adjusted its focus on the fly, as events unfolded on the ground.

The wide-ranging nature of the conflict--requiring troops to fight guerillas, while they rebuild the infrastructure and train the local military forces--has resulted in a most eclectic mix of equipment requests coming from the front lines.

Among those who stay attuned to equipment calls from the battle-field is James B. Engle, deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for science, technology and engineering.

The portfolio of technologies he is overseeing these days is more diverse than ever, he tells National Defense. He also candidly admits that the only procurement strategy in place has been the absence of one.

"There is no grand strategy over there that says: Here's how we are going to fight this war, and this is how we'll win the global war on terrorism," Engle says. The assortment of technology needed to satisfy every need does not allow for those "dedicated science projects," to which military labs are accustomed.

"In war, we learn in real time," says Engle.

As long as the money flows, equipment needs can be fulfilled relatively quickly, he adds. "The key is to have an investment avenue that allows you to respond to those requests when they come in."

The U.S. Army also learned that lesson the hard way. Funding decisions made years ago, in many ways, resulted in severe equipment shortages, including body armor and armored Humvees. Once money started flowing in, by the fall of 2003, the Army was able to ramp up production and meet the demand.

"Because of the shortage of investment dollars in the previous 10 years, the Army had to make some tough decisions," says Gen. Richard A. Cody, Army vice chief of staff. "We couldn't afford to outfit all the divisions" with the latest technology, he says. The Army opted to take a risk, so it could allocate more funds for the next-generation technology, under the Future Combat Systems program.

"When this fight came, we had to buy back an awful lot of that risk," Cody adds. Just two years ago, the Army found it lacked equipment that would prove to be essential for the war in Iraq.

"I think we are doing a lot better," he says. "But we also are...