TRENDS: How Does Partisanship Influence Policy Diffusion?

• DOI: 10.1177/1065912918796314
• Author: Miguel M. Pereira,Daniel M. Butler
• Date: 01 December 2018
• Published date: 01 December 2018
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918796314

Political Research Quarterly

2018, Vol. 71(4) 801 –812

© 2018 University of Utah

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DOI: 10.1177/1065912918796314

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Article

Public officials do not have to start from scratch when

deciding which policies they will implement; they can

learn from the experiences of others (Bohmelt et al. 2016;

Douglas 2012; Gilardi, Füglister, and Luyet 2009;

Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). Evidence suggests

that officials are more likely to implement policies used

by other governments when they share more commonali-

ties with that government (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty,

and Peterson 2004; Simmons and Elkins 2004). Many of

the factors that predict policy diffusion are the same fac-

tors that affect political outcomes in other situations.

Ideology, for example, is a strong predictor of diffusion

(Gilardi 2010; Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson

2004; Martin 2010).

The role of partisanship in diffusion is less clear.

Partisanship is an important predictor of political behav-

ior across numerous domains (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960).

There is evidence that it may also affect policy diffusion

(Butler et al. 2017; Gilardi 2010). However, this effect

may be epiphenomenal because governments that share

the same partisanship also typically share a common ide-

ological perspective that should cause them to use similar

approaches for dealing with issues of the day. This inde-

pendent experimentation, although autonomous, would

lead to patterns consistent with partisan-based diffusion,

with copartisan governments being more likely to imple-

ment the same policies (Volden, Ting, and Carpenter

2008). Furthermore, to the extent that there is a partisan-

ship effect, it is unclear why this exists. Partisanship may

be used as an informative signal that allows time-con-

strained politicians to save resources. However, cues may

lead individuals to make worse decisions (Dancey and

Sheagley 2013; Lau and Redlawsk 2001). If officials are

favoring policies implemented by copartisans simply to

imitate their fellow party members and not because of the

information it provides, then partisanship may make

things worse off.

Although nuanced, this distinction is substantively

meaningful. Partisanship can be used as an informational

shortcut absent more details about a given policy.

However, when partisan imitation occurs, officials make

policy decisions based on the set of officials that previ-

ously implemented it, and not based on characteristics of

the policy (Shipan and Volden 2008). While the former

mechanism may be associated with efficiency in the pol-

icy-making process, the consequences of the latter can be

perverse.

Our survey experiments with local, elected politicians

test whether they exhibit a partisan bias when considering

new policies. We use this experimental approach to focus

796314PRQXXX10.1177/1065912918796314Political Research QuarterlyButler and Pereira

research-article2018

1University of California, San Diego, USA

2Washington University in St. Louis, MO, USA

Corresponding Author:

Daniel M. Butler, Department of Political Science, University of

California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0521,

USA.

Email: daniel.butler@gmail.com

TRENDS: How Does Partisanship

Influence Policy Diffusion?

Daniel M. Butler1 and Miguel M. Pereira2

Abstract

We explore the role of partisanship in policy diffusion. Previous studies suggest that partisanship may influence the

willingness of public officials to learn from the experience of their peers. Officials’ willingness to consider policies

endorsed by copartisans can arise either because party labels are used as informational cues or simply due to

copartisan imitation. In the latter case, knowing more about the policy trade-offs should have no effects on politicians’

preferences. Based on two experiments with local public officials where both the party endorsing a policy and the

type of information provided were manipulated, we find consistent partisan bias. When a policy is endorsed by

copartisans, public officials are more likely to consider pursuing it, and additional policy information does not mitigate

this bias. Exploratory analyses of the information-seeking behavior of officials suggest that the partisan bias is not due

to differential exposure or attention to policy trade-offs.

Keywords

policy diffusion, partisanship, experiments on elites