TRENDS: Creating Parties in Congress: The Emergence of a Social Network

• Published date: 01 December 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912920933004
• Date: 01 December 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

933004PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920933004Political Research QuarterlyDougherty
research-article2020
Article
Political Research Quarterly
2020, Vol. 73(4) 759 –773
TRENDS: Creating Parties in Congress:
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The Emergence of a Social Network
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920933004
DOI: 10.1177/1065912920933004
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Keith L. Dougherty1
Abstract
This article examines the creation of political parties in Congress with a focus on ties between emerging party leaders
and members, 1789–1802. Using an egocentric selection model, we examine who John Adams, Alexander Hamilton,
Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison tied with as a function of the characteristics of the emerging leader, a member
of Congress, and dyadic relationships between the two. We also examine whether ties affected the party chosen by
members of Congress. Everything else equal, we find leaders were more likely to form ties with ideologically similar
members, but find no evidence of them tieing with more pivotal voters. In response, members were more likely to
join the Federalist party if they received a Federalist tie, but they were not more likely to join the Republican party if
they received a Republican tie. Understanding such relationships is an important step for understanding the creation
of parties in the United States.
Keywords
parties, Congress, United States.
Introduction
Schneer 2015; Eguia 2013), few have studied with whom
party leaders made connections as they created the first
Almost every major episode in American political his-
coalitions in Congress nor whether those connections
tory has been associated with a key personality coming
affected which party a legislator chose to join. This article
to power committed to change. No account of the New
fills that gap. It focuses on the formation of parties in the
Deal would leave out Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and no
U.S. Congress 1789–1802, using a new data set of 1,640
account of the first American political parties would
leader–legislator dyads. Our data end in 1802 because the
leave out Alexander Hamilton or Thomas Jefferson. But
Republicans overwhelmingly controlled Congress from
if energetic leaders are so important, how do they rise to
1802 forward.2 It tests three conjectures: (1) party leaders
power and what types of people do they associate with as
interpersonally tied with ideologically similar individu-
they ascend?
als, (2) they were more likely to tie with pivotal members
This article examines the coalitions formed by John
of Congress, and (3) ties affected the party which legisla-
Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, and
tors chose to join.
James Madison as they attempted to create the first par-
We test these conjectures using two sets of regres-
ties in Congress. The United States provides fertile
sions, both of which use letters as a measure of a directed
ground for studying the origin of parties because formal
tie. The first tests whether future party leaders (John
parties did not exist when the federal government began
Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, or James
in 1789 and many early Americans openly opposed par-
Madison) were more likely to have a tie with an ideologi-
ties. Hamilton thought a “spirit of faction, which is apt to
cally similar legislator (a past, present, or future member
mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of
of Congress). It also tests whether leaders were more
men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are com-
likely to tie with legislators that were more likely to pivot
posed into improprieties and excesses” (Rossiter 1961,
a chamber.
111). Jefferson wrote, “If I could not go to heaven but by
a party, I would not go there at all.”1 Other early Americans
1University of Georgia, Athens, USA
took similar stances. If parties were so unwelcome, how
Corresponding Author:
did they form so quickly?
Keith L. Dougherty, Department of Political Science, University of
While a number of scholars have studied the incentive
Georgia, 180 Baldwin Hall, Athens, GA 30602, USA.
to create parties (Aldrich 1995, 2011; Carpenter and
Email: dougherk@uga.edu

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Political Research Quarterly 73(4)
The second set of regressions tests whether members
great detail (Cunningham 1957; Elkins and McKitrick
of Congress who entered after 1794 were more likely to
1994; Hofstadter 1972). For example, Hofstadter (1972)
become a Federalist if they received a tie from a Federalist
describes the conditions for party development in the
leader 1791–1794, and whether they were more likely
new republic, with emphasis on why Americans were
to become Republican if they received a tie from a
slow to accept parties. More data-driven approaches
Republican leader during the same period.
have chronicled the clustering of congressional ideal
We find evidence for two of our three hypotheses.
points over time (Hoadley 1980; Jillson and Wilson
Everything else equal, emerging leaders were more
1994), argued that the Constitution facilitated vote trad-
likely to tie with ideologically similar legislators. We
ing (Aldrich, Jillson, and Wilson 2002), claimed that the
find no evidence that they were more likely to tie with
antifederalists filled most of the Republican ranks
members more likely to be pivotal. More interestingly,
(Aldrich and Grant 1993), or examined the effect of
the effects varied by leader. Jefferson was the most
Jefferson’s dinner parties on Congressional roll call
likely to tie with ideologically similar legislators. Yet,
votes (Massengill, Caldeira, and Minozzi 2017). None of
members of Congress were more likely to join the
these studies have examined with whom party leaders
Federalist party if they received a tie from Hamilton.
created interpersonal ties as they built their emergent
They were not more likely to join the Republican party if
party, nor why.
they received a Republican tie.
Studies of contemporary politics examine whether ties
Political scientists regularly study parties and inter-
between political organizations are partisan (Koger,
est groups as networks (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2013;
Masket, and Noel 2009), the effect of ideology on ties
Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009; Massengill, Caldeira,
between lobbyists (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 2004),
and Minozzi 2017; Noel 2013; Siegel 2009, 2011).
and the network centrality of members of Congress
They have only begun, however, to study the formation
(Victor and Ringe 2009).
of those networks.3 This article adds to the party net-
The rational choice literature largely focuses on the
work literature by expanding the theoretical and empir-
incentive to join coalitions (Aldrich 1995; Eguia 2013;
ical work on the formation of parties in the United
Riker 1962). In a seminal work, Aldrich (1995, 2011)
States.
argues that parties developed in two stages. In the first
stage, coalitions formed to overcome social choice prob-
Literature
lems in Congress. In the second stage, political leaders
such as Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren attempted
Although many scholars disagree about the exact date
to overcome collective action problems in the electorate
that parties formed in the United States, many argue that
to win more congressional seats. Aldrich claims that
congressional parties had formed by the end of the
Jackson purposefully targeted swing states to help win
Fourth Congress. They also agree that Adams, Hamilton,
elections, but he does not apply the same logic to swing
Jefferson, and Madison were the leaders at the forefront
voters in Congress. Nor does he describe with whom
of the emerging parties (Cunningham 1957; Elkins and
leaders connected as they created congressional coali-
McKitrick 1994; Hofstadter 1972). The rifts between
tions and why.
Hamilton (an emerging Federalist) and Madison (an
emerging Republican) became apparent when Hamilton
Theory
introduced his financial plan in 1791. The plan attempted
to address the nation’s liabilities by assuming state
To understand Aldrich’s (1995, 2011) theory, and how
debts, paying off bond holders at face value, and issuing
our theory can be viewed as an extension, consider a
new securities. Hamilton also proposed the First
stylized example of the incentives to form parties pre-
National Bank of the United States, which Madison
sented in Table 1.4 Aldrich uses examples like this to
and others found unconstitutional. Coalitions slowly
explain the formation of parties in the first three con-
formed around these differences, as well as competing
gresses. The example contains three legislators, {A,
views about the proper trading partner in Europe. The
B,C}, and three bills, {X, Y,Z}. The table lists the car-
Federalists favored trade with Great Britain; the dinal utility that each legislator receives from each of
Republicans preferred trade with France. Conflict con-
the three bills. For example, legislator A receives three
tinued until the presidential election of 1800, when the
units of utility from bill X, because it provides benefits
Republicans took control of both branches of Congress
to his or her district, but A loses one unit of utility from
and the Presidency.
bills Y and Z, because those bills spend money on
Historical studies of the origin of parties in the United
other districts using tax revenues from all three
States have...