Transnational Corporations and Urban Development

AuthorFranklin Obeng‐Odoom
Date01 March 2018
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/ajes.12213
Published date01 March 2018
Transnational Corporations and Urban
Development
By FRANKLIN OBENG-ODOOM*
ABSTRACT. Transnational corporations (TNCs) in Africa play significant
roles in controlling utilities, privately appropriating common resources,
and planning urban space. On the one hand, the extralegal powers of
TNCs are legitimized with patronizing discourses about the
incompetence of African nations in managing their own affairs and
with the specter of a “resource curse” that supposedly immobilizes the
self-governing capacities of Africans. On the other hand, TNCs arrogate
to themselves statutory municipal power, ignore or manipulate various
channels of accountability, and privately appropriate sociallycreated
rents. Some critics of TNCs propose a withdrawal from globalization or
greater regulation to limit the power of TNCs. But protectionist or
isolationist approaches are entirely mistaken and further undermine the
social management of the commons in Africa. Instead, Africans should
seek directly to break the chains of monopoly and oligopoly, especially
over natural resources. They should also strive to use land for the
common good and to systematically build social states in Africa to
overcome subservience to TNCs. While previous attempts at
autonomous development in Africa have sometimes led to military
action by former colonizers and current neo-colonial imperialists,
recent evidence from Africa suggests that such a strategy might succeed
now. This article proposes to extend the politics of urban reform in the
Gilded Age and Progressive Era in the United States to contemporary
Africa. In doing so, it shows how African cities today are working to
*Franklin Obeng-Odoom is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Technology
Sydney in Australia where he teaches Urban Economics and Property and Political
Economy in the School of Built Environment. He is the author of Oiling the Urban
Economy: Land, Labour, Capital and the State in Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana (Routledge,
2014) and Reconstructing Urban Economics: Towards a Political Economy of the Built
Environment (Zed, 2016). He is an Elected Fellow of the Ghana Academy of Arts and
Sciences. He can be contacted at Franklin.Obeng-Odoom@uts.edu.au. Thanks to
Raphael Edem Fiave for very helpful suggestions.
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, No. 2 (March, 2018).
DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12213
V
C2018 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.
create local capacity by municipalizing services that have been
privatized, such as distribution of water. Despite many obstacles posed
by TNCs and their home governments, Africans are making great
strides to overcome theenduring legacies of colonialism.
Introduction
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are increasingly taking power from
the hands of resource-rich urban authorities in Africa. As this trend has
major implications for the distribution of the urban commons and the
sovereignty of African peoples and their territory, it warrants careful
study. Research on urban governance has grown, but the growing
uneven relationship between transnational corporations and urban
authorities has received little empirical attention (Obeng-Odoom
2013b, 2016a; Resnick 2014a, 2014b; Fuseini 2016). Obeng-Odoom
(2015c: 52–53) has identified “the growing sphere of influence of trans-
national corporations” as the least understood issue in researchon cities
that are affiliated with the development of natural resources, which we
shall henceforth refer to as “resource cities.”
TNCs that engage in extraction and production of fuel and minerals
receive some attention, but TNCs involved in the storage and transfer of
fuels as well as the governance of urban retailers of gasoline or petrol
receive very little study. In the global urban economics literature, the
“stages of growth” concept centers around increasing agglomeration
economies, declining transaction costs, and technological advance-
ment. Being the dominant framework of mainstream economists, its
key claim is that firms become transnational through their own autono-
mous strategies (Stilwell 1995: 114–117;Obeng-Odoom 2016b: 83–93).
Oliver Williamson is a leading proponent of the idea that TNCs arise
out of endogenous factors. He won the Nobel Prize in economics in
2009 for introducing such ideas. Williamson (1981, 2002, 2009) claims
that TNCs arise because of their own internal strategies or innovations
that economize on transaction costs. To reduce transaction costs, it is
more efficient for a single firm to subsume activities under its ownman-
agerial control rather than exchanging services among many smaller
entities.TNCsexistnotonlytoseekto makeaprot,Williamson
The American Journal of Economics and Sociology448
argues, but also to govern. For Williamson, TNCs offer an alternative
mode of governance that is superior to both the market and the state in
terms of what he calls “affirmative economic purposes” that are under-
pinned by efficiency (Williamson 1981: 1538; 2002; 2009). While Wil-
liamson recognizes that TNCs may sometimes falter, he contends that
they are inherently a better mode of governance and hence should nei-
ther be regulated nor be treated “inhospitably.”
Although highlyinfluential, these claims have received limited empir-
ical attention. There is a vast empirical literature on TNCs, of course,
but it is heavily centered on debates about their relationship with
national governments. Representative work in these debates includes
Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004) and Korten (1995, 1999). These books
have received much praise, but also significant criticism. In his exten-
sive review of Hardt and Negri’s first book, Samir Amin (2005) argued
that the authors downplay the power of imperial states in advancing
seemingly new forces of transnationalism. Critics of Korten’s work
show that Korten does not sufficiently analyze the relationship between
TNCs and the nation-state. As Susan George (1996) explains, Korten’s
attempt to resolve unbalanced state-TNC relationships assigns too
much power to the TNCs and no role to the state. Kuecker (2006), by
contrast, complains that Korten attributes too much power to the state,
to the point that it becomes intrusive. So, both proponents and oppo-
nents focus on the nation-state or central state, and their solutions can
be arranged according to whether they favor more or less intervention
by the nation-state.
A major problem with this debate over the role of TNCs vis-
a-vis the
state is that, much like the ongoing debate over globalization, it ignores
key analytical distinctions. Existing research and policy analysis ends
up recommending a wholesale, one-size-fits-all solution (either social-
ism or improved capitalism) to every social probleminstead of applying
different solutions to different conditions. In this case, the missing ele-
ment is the distinction between TNCs that engage in manufacturing or
production of services, on the one hand, and TNCs that control natural
resources and public utilities, on the other hand. Yet, different types of
TNCs generate quite distinct social relations(UNCTAD 2007).
In addition to ignoring different categories of TNC activity, there has
been a tendency to ignore the level of government involved in the
TNCs and Urban Development 449

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