Transferring sovereignty.

• Author: Schlesinger, James R.
• Position: Returning authority to Iraqis

SINCE NOVEMBER of last year the United States has been committed to transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis after June 30, 2004. Even though Iraqis themselves will be making their own decisions regarding the civil order the critical issue of security for Iraq will remain in American hands--and under the control of a selected four-star general Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511, Iraqi armed forces will be "a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command", in accordance with the Transitional Administrative Law. Thus even after the transfer of sovereignty, in the crucial area of security (which remain the largest challenge in Iraq) there will be little change from the current situation Contrary to widespread public impressions, the transfer of authority on June 30 does not mean that the American role in Iraq is ending or that the United States is somehow washing its hands of Iraq.

In other words, June 30 is not a magic date after which unrest in Iraq will cease. Nor does it mean that significant numbers of U.S. troops can be swiftly withdrawn. Iraqis and Americans both must be prepared for the United States to continue to play a major role in Iraq.

Withdrawal before we have successfully stabilized Iraq is not an option. But the statement, "We will stay the course", while perhaps being a necessary exhortation, is not a strategy. "We will stay the course until we have an Iraqi force capable of providing reasonable security for the people of Iraq"--this is a strategy. But it means that there must be a viable plan to create such a force.

And this is why it is important to review the record of the past year, to understand where mistakes may have been made and to determine what needs to be done to ensure that we are successful in our mission in Iraq.

Only by embracing certain fundamental realities can the United States be successful in bringing order and sustaining stability in Iraq. First and foremost, establishing reasonable security is the prerequisite to achieve the goals of political stability. This implies that we should not expect Iraq to rise to the level of security in, say, Denmark or Japan.

Second, neither the American nor other coalition forces can, by themselves, impose security on Iraq. Iraqis themselves must provide indispensable support. Only Iraqis can gather the intelligence to identify the remnants of the old regime, other homegrown radicals and foreign terrorists that must...