TRAINER RESPONSIBILITY RULES IN THOROUGHBRED RACING.

I. Introduction: What Are Trainer Responsibility Rules?

Trainer responsibility rules in horse racing hold trainers responsible when a horse under their care tests positive for a prohibited drug, medication, or other substance, as well as overages of permitted medications.' The theory behind these rules is that trainers, as a condition of being licensed by a jurisdiction, bear responsibility to ensure that horses under their care race free of prohibited substances. (2) Due to trainers' day-to-day responsibility for their horses, they are in the best position to prevent their charges from competing with prohibited substances in their systems. (3)

Since horse racing in the United States is governed by state administrative agencies (typically racing commissions), every state has adopted its own set of rules. (4) Regulators administer trainer responsibility rules in one of two standards: (1) the absolute insurer standard and (2) the rebuttable presumption standard. (5) The absolute insurer rule is one of strict liability. (6) This standard mandates that the trainer is the absolute insurer for the condition of horses entered in a race and bears the responsibility for a positive drug test regardless of acts of third parties. (7) With a rebuttable presumption rule, a positive test creates a presumption that the trainer is responsible, but the trainer can rebut that presumption using substantial evidence to the contrary. (8) Since the absolute insurer rule is a higher standard to meet, raising more constitutional questions, it is the main focus of this study.

II. History of Trainer Responsibility Rules a. Early History

In early 1934, saliva tests were imported to the United States from France and first used in Florida. (9) With the institution of testing came the first trainer responsibility rules which assigned responsibility of positive tests to the trainer of the horse in question. (10) After trainers were suspended for positive tests under trainer responsibility rules, they challenged those suspensions in court.'' Courts did not make determinations on the constitutionality of trainer responsibility rules in these early cases. (12)

In Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, the California Supreme Court admitted there may be a constitutional due process issue in whether a trainer's license could be suspended without notice and a hearing, but the court did not decide that question, instead focusing on a narrower issue. (13)

In Smith v. Cole, the trainer's horse was seen having something sprayed into its nasal passage before a race, and the trainer challenged his one-year suspension. (14) The spray contained a solution of ephedrine. (15) The court upheld the suspension, concluding that a fair hearing was given and there was substantial evidence to support the finding. (16) Even though the trainer was not present at the time the spray was used, the court thought evidence showing "his responsibility for the treatment could be found." (17) The court did not address any constitutional questions regarding the state's trainer responsibility rule. (18)

Not long after Smith, the question of the constitutionality of trainer responsibility rules began to be answered by the courts, and the first two states determined those jurisdictions' absolute insurer rules were unconstitutional in quick succession. (19)

Maryland was the first state to rule on the constitutionality of an absolute insurer rule. (20) In Mahoney v. Byers, the trainer's horse, Casey, won a steeplechase race at Pimlico on November 14, 1945. (21) The horse tested positive for Benzedrine, (22) and the trainer was suspended by the Maryland Racing Commission for one year under the state's absolute insurer rule. (23) Reversing the suspension, the trial court ordered the commission to restore the trainer to good standing. (24) The court further held that because the rule created an irrebuttable presumption, the rule "was arbitrary and, therefore, void." (25) The commission appealed, arguing the rule should not be applied as an irrebuttable presumption but as a "prima facie presumption." (26) Holding that the rule created an irrebuttable presumption of guilt that was a substitute for facts, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. (27) The court reasoned that "[t]his irrebuttable presumption destroyed the right of appellee to offer evidence to establish his innocence. If this is 'just,' then the term 'unjust' is without meaning." (28) Further, the court discussed that the legislature itself does not have the power to stymie a defense against a charge by substituting facts for an irrebuttable presumption. (29) Since the racing commission is under the legislature's control, the racing commission cannot promulgate a rule that creates an irrebuttable presumption. (30) "Such a law would be arbitrary, illegal, capricious, and hence unconstitutional.... This rule prevents the trial of facts and calls for the revocation of the license without cause shown." (31)

Not long after the decision of Maryland's highest court, the issue of the constitutionality of Florida's absolute insurer rule reached that state's highest court. (32) In State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin, the trainer's horse, James Acker, tested positive for Benzedrine (33) after winning a race at Sunshine Park on January 30, 1947. (34) The trainer was suspended by the commission for one year under the state's absolute insurer rule. (35) Initially, the state supreme court held that the absolute insurer rule was not arbitrary or capricious. (36) The rule reasonably promoted a lawful purpose, and the trainer's complaint was without merit. (37) However, on consideration for rehearing, the court vacated its previous judgment. (38) The court reasoned that by making the trainer the absolute insurer of the horse's condition regardless of the acts of third parties, the suspension of his license--a valuable property right--deprived him of due process. (39) A statute violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when it "creat[es] a presumption that is arbitrary or operates to deny a fair opportunity to repel it.... Legislative fiat may not take the place of fact in the determination of issues involving life, liberty or property." (40) The court cited Mahoney, stating that the absolute insurer rule created an irrebuttable presumption that violated the due process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. (41)

b. The Precedent: Sandstrom

Sandstrom v. California Horse Racing Board is the pivotal case in the battle over the constitutionality of trainer responsibility rules. (42) In this case, the trainer's license was suspended for six months under California's absolute insurer rule when his horse, Cover Up, tested positive for "a caffeine type alkaloid" (43) after running in a race at Del Mar on August 12, 1946. (44) The trainer challenged his suspension and the Los Angeles County Superior Court overruled the suspension, holding the state's absolute insurer rule was unconstitutional because it was arbitrary, unreasonable, and capricious. (45) The California Horse Racing Board appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of California. (46)

Justice Shenk, writing for the majority, examined the California rule and determined that the rule "impose[d] strict responsibility upon the trainer for the condition of the horse," rather than creating an irrebuttable presumption. (47) The court focused on whether the rule could constitutionally impose strict liability upon trainers for the condition of racehorses under their care. (48) Citing multiple cases, the court noted that imposing strict liability does not violate the due process clauses of the federal or state constitutions. (49) The court also noted the state may regulate public race tracks using its police power as the state sees fit and that courts can only review the regulation to determine whether it is reasonable. (50) By having trainers ensure the condition of their horses, the state's trainer responsibility rule was meant to protect the wagering public against horses running in a race while stimulated or depressed. (51) The rule "imposes strict liability for the condition of the horse." (52) It did not create an irrebuttable presumption that "the presence of a drug in a horse is proof that the trainer drugged the horse." (53)

The court examined previous cases where trainers challenged the legitimacy of the suspension of their licenses. (54) Distinguishing the Sandstrom case from Smith v. Cole, the court noted there was no evidence in this case that the trainer was "knowingly responsible," unlike in Smith. (55) The Sandstrom court distinguished Mahoney v. Byers because Mahoney based liability upon intentionally administering the drug or negligently allowing the administration to happen. (56) Because the rule imposes strict liability, intent and negligence are not implicated. (57) The court noted Mahoney's irrebuttable presumption standard overly influenced State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin, and also that the Baldwin court did not consider a state's power to impose strict liability. (58) Reversing the decision of the lower court, the court held the state's absolute insurer rule was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious to impose a strict liability standard upon the trainer to guarantee the condition of a horse running in a race in which the public can wager. (59)

Justice Schauer, in his concurrence, agreed with the judgment, stating that trainers are not "defenselessly liable" for the acts of third parties. Trainers are liable for their "own act[s] or omission[s]" of allowing a horse to run in a race with drugs in its system. (60)

In his dissent, Justice Edmonds wrote that he believed there was no connection between the defendant and the prohibited act. (61) He also contended that public interest was not a valid reason to uphold the rule, because in due process claims, individual rights are generally determinative instead of the...