Trader networks and options risk management

AuthorPeter Locke,Li Sun,Naomi Boyd
Date01 July 2020
Published date01 July 2020
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1002/fut.22117
J Futures Markets. 2020;40:10311048. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/fut © 2020 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
|
1031
Received: 24 October 2016
|
Accepted: 20 March 2020
DOI: 10.1002/fut.22117
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Trader networks and options risk management
Naomi Boyd
1
|Peter Locke
2,
|Li Sun
3
1
Department of Finance, West Virginia
University, Morgantown, West Virginia
2
Texas Christian University, Fort Worth,
Texas
3
Department of Finance, Shanghai
Business School, Shanghai, China
Correspondence
Naomi Boyd, Department of Finance,
West Virginia University, Morgantown,
WV 26506.
Email: Naomi.Boyd@mail.wvu.edu
In Memoriam June, 2016.
Abstract
We examine the effect of trading partner concentration and a matrix of
variables which dictate the relative importance of a trader to the network on
a set of large member proprietary tradersrisk. An increased closeness
centrality and concentration of trading among network partners are found
to reduce price, volatility and rebalancing risk. We further explore the
nature of trading concentration established through tradersrecurring
trading relationships to find that trading with an established and small
network has a positive, yet costly, effect on inventory management.
Relationships among market makers are important to managing their
portfolio of risk.
KEYWORDS
networks, options, risk management
1|INTRODUCTION
Market makers provide liquidity and price discovery. The provision of liquidity requires short term
inventory holdings, which exposes the market maker to inventory holding risk. In options markets, inventory
risk can be characterized as a portfolio which includes price, volatility, and rebalancing risk to
examine the compound impact of each of these types of risks on the overall position. While futures option
market makers may use the underlying futures market to manage their delta risk, this appears to be
incomplete (Boyd, 2015). Another risk reducing measure is to execute proprietary trades with other
traders through interdealer trading, for example as examined for futures markets in Locke and Sarajoti (2004)
(Figure 1).
In this paper, we study how an interdealer network can facilitate efficient and effective risk management
practices of market makers in the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) natural gas options markets.
AsshowninBloch,Genicot,andRay(
2008), network links are shown to play two distinct roles: first, they
actasconduitsfortransfer (provide insurance); and second, they act a s conduits for information (facilitate
monitoring). Both of these outcomes are particularly important for market makers in financial markets as
they seek avenues to unwind unwanted inventory holdings, especially at the end of the trading day or
during periods of increased volatility. Stanton, Walden, and Wallace (2018) provides evidence that network
parameters can help to better predict liquidity and information measures than traditional market microstructure
variables. Therefore, we seek to utilize network parameters to better understand the risk management practices
oftradersinthisarticle.
While most of the trading in financial markets has moved to electronic platforms, physical trading does still
occur. For instance, while all futures market trading has moved to GLOBEX, a viable and active open outcry
trading pit still remains for many futures options markets.
1
Other markets also maintain personal interactions for
trading, which becomes especially valuable when there is informational asymmetry. For example, although an-
ecdotal, a recent trip to the floor of the NYSE during an IPO revealed that the interconnectedness of specialists on
the trading floor dictates price discovery and transactions functions. Brokers physically discover the appropriate
price for all IPOs and relationships among traders provide important information to one another that cannot be
garnered from electronic transactions.
This study provides unique insight into the importance of facetoface interactions for certain types of asset
classes, even as electronic trading becomes the predominant mechanism for facilitating trade in financial markets.
It also helps to explain why we see such high levels of OTC participation in markets whose trading pits have closed,
as proprietary traders seek out mechanisms to reduce their risk and improve their profitability through network
connections(Babus&Kondor,2018;Neklyudov;2019). In short, we choose to focus on trader risk management
because it dictates market frictions such as transactions costs, which ultimately have a direct impact on the
efficiency of pricing and liquidity in financial markets. We study whether relationships matter to the management
of tradersrisk portfolio by employing network theoretical principles to empirically test the validity and importance
of these relationships in creating a wellfunctioning market.
Reiss and Werner (1998) find that traders on the London Stock Exchange often choose to use interdealer trading
to unwind extremeinventories. Though futures options traders are not obligated to provide liquidity and
maintain price continuity (Boyd, 2015), inventory risk still exists and the trading with a small group of core traders
may help manage this risk, especially when there is large liquidity shock or price shock in the market. As studied in
Ambrus, Mobius, and Szeidl (2014), the effectiveness of a risk sharing network can depend on the size of the shock.
Asthesizeoftheshockincreases,asmallercircleoffriends offers better risk sharing compared with a large group
of loosely connected friends.
FIGURE 1 Universe of option market makers of entire network. The network of all 140 active market makers in the natural gas option
market. Node size is proportional to the number of links it has. Red nodes are 20 large traders. Yellow nodes are large traderstop five
partners. Many large traderstop five partners are also large traders [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
1
Here we focus on traders in futures options markets to better understand how they utilize relationships to manage their market exposure to risk.
1032
|
BOYD ET AL.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT