Toward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies: Comparative Evidence and Possible Remedies

• Date: 01 January 2019
• Published date: 01 January 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0002716218818782
• Subject Matter: Conclusions

234 ANNALS, AAPSS, 681, January 2019

DOI: 10.1177/0002716218818782

Toward a

Theory of

Pernicious

Polarization and

How It Harms

Democracies:

Comparative

Evidence and

Possible

Remedies

By

JENNIFER McCOY

and

MURAT SOMER

818782ANN The Annals of The American AcademyToward a Theory of Pernicious Polarization and How It Harms Democracies

research-article2018

This article compares the dynamics of polarization in

the eleven case studies analyzed in this special issue to

draw conclusions about antecedents of severe political

and societal polarization, the characteristics and mech-

anisms of such polarization, and consequences of

severe polarization for democracy. We find that the

emergence of pernicious polarization (when a society is

split into mutually distrustful “Us vs. Them” camps) is

not attributable to any specific underlying social or

political cleavage nor any particular institutional make-

up. Instead, pernicious polarization arises when politi-

cal entrepreneurs pursue their political objectives by

using polarizing strategies, such as mobilizing voters

with divisive, demonizing discourse and exploiting

existing grievances, and opposing political elites then

reciprocate with similarly polarizing tactics or fail to

develop effective nonpolarizing responses. We explain

how the political construction of polarization around

“formative rifts” (social or political rifts that arise dur-

ing the fundamental formation/reformation of a nation-

state), the relative capacity of opposing political blocs to

mobilize voters versus relying on mechanisms such as

courts or the military to constrain the executive, and

the strategic and ideological aims of the polarizing

actors contribute to the emergence of its pernicious

form. We analyze the consequences for democracy and

conclude with reflections on how to combat pernicious

polarization.

Keywords: polarization; democracy; democratic ero-

sion; populism; opposition strategies

Polarized polities around the world are suf-

fering democratic erosion. The articles in

this volume analyze eleven case studies, show-

ing how pernicious polarization—polarization

Correspondence: jmccoy@gsu.edu

Jennifer McCoy is a distinguished university professor

of political science at Georgia State University. She is a

specialist in comparative politics and democratization

and Latin American politics; she coordinates the inter-

national research group on political polarization and

democratic consequences. She is the author or editor of

six books, the most recent being International Mediation

in Venezuela (with Francisco Diez; United States

Institute of Peace 2011).

TOWARD A THEORY OF PERNICIOUS POLARIZATION AND HOW IT HARMS DEMOCRACIES 235

that divides societies into “Us vs. Them” camps based on a single dimension of

difference that overshadows all others—can occur in very diverse settings and

produce harmful effects for democracy.

We recognize that political polarization is associated with both democratic

strengthening and democratic erosion (Somer and McCoy 2018). Polarization can

help to strengthen political parties and institutionalize party systems because it

enables them to mobilize voters around identifiable differences. Offering voters

clear choices and serving as heuristic cues can be helpful to democracy.

Polarization is also potentially transformative in its capacity to address an imbal-

ance in the popular vs. oligarchic versions of democracy (Slater 2013 and

Stavrakakis 2018), or to open up a strong state as discussed by Somer in this vol-

ume. Democratic reform to enhance inclusion can be the goal when polarizing

challengers organize to represent previously underrepresented groups. Polarization

can thus serve democratization when used by political actors equipped with an

inclusive agenda to contain polarization before it turns pernicious.

Even then, however, polarizing politics always carries the risk of taking on a

life of its own, eviscerating cross-cutting ties and nonpartisan channels for com-

promise, and becoming pernicious. Polarizing challengers often provoke an elite

backlash and counter-mobilization to stymie their transformative attempts, rather

than a recognition of their reformist and inclusionary potential in building a con-

structively agonistic and pluralist democracy (Stavrakakis 2018). This elite back-

lash, in turn, can motivate the polarizing challengers to double down and strive

to protect themselves by changing the rules and creating hegemonic power.

Thus, whether polarization serves a constructive or destructive purpose for

democracy depends on the behavior of both incumbents and oppositions, new

political actors and traditionally dominant groups.

This collaborative project is focused on severe political and societal polariza-

tion, and moves beyond the conventional conceptualization of polarization as

ideological distance between political parties and candidates. Instead, we are

interested in situations in which people’s identities and interests line up along a

single divide, one in which people form into political groups that are seen in a

competitive, “either-or” relationship with each other, overshadowing people’s

other, normally cross-cutting, identities. This pernicious state results from polari-

zation’s tendency—if not contained—to make the “normal multiplicity of differ-

ences in a society increasingly align along a single dimension (where) cross-cutting

differences become instead reinforcing, and people increasingly perceive and

describe politics and society in terms of “Us” vs. “Them” (McCoy, Rahman and

Somer 2018).

Murat Somer is a professor of political science and international relations at Koç University,

Istanbul. He specializes in comparative politics and democratization, and his research on

polarization, religious and secular politics, ethnic conflict, and authoritarianism has appeared

in books, book volumes, and journals, such as Comparative Political Studies, American

Behavioral Scientist and Democratization.

NOTE: The authors appreciate the research assistance provided by Sara Ali, Tahmina

Rahman, and I

˙lker Kocael.

236 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

In this relational conceptualization, polarization has the tendency to extend

from the partisan world to the realm of everyday social relations. In extreme

cases, political identity can become all-encompassing as people view those in the

“other” camp with distrust, suspicion, or fear, and cease to interact with them—

even segregating themselves in their neighborhoods, social relationships, and

news-feeds with like-minded people.

The dividing line between the camps may be simply support of, or opposition

to, a personalistic political leader, such as pro- and anti-Trump in the United

States, chavistas and anti-chavistas (for and against former president Hugo

Chávez) in Venezuela, or pro- and anti-Erdog˘an people in Turkey. But that divid-

ing line may also reflect competing value systems (such as religious vs. secular),

different visions of democracy (such as representative vs. participatory), or differ-

ent definitions of citizenship and what rights should be afforded to immigrants.

Group identity, which may act as a proxy or marker for the other aggregated

divisions, is the key, linking citizens to a particular leader or partisan identity.

In this article, we compare our case studies in light of four basic questions.

First, we examine how pernicious polarization emerges. Are there common ante-

cedents of polarizing episodes in each country’s history, such as social cleavages,

economic crises, or democratic experiences? Second, we explore the characteris-

tics and dynamics of pernicious polarization in action.

Third, we ask how pernicious polarization impacts democratic institutions and

norms. Here polarization shifts from the outcome we are trying to explain, and

becomes the explanatory factor itself—the independent variable. In McCoy,

Rahman, and Somer (2018), we envisioned four possible outcomes for democ-

racy, three of them negative and one positive: i) government gridlock and govern-

mental control that careen between the parties representing the two camps; ii)

democratic erosion or backsliding under the new elites who have to come to

power, as they gradually concentrate power and exclude prior dominant groups

or dissenters; iii) democratic erosion or even collapse as old power groups reas-

sert control; and iv) a more positive outcome of democratizing reform in response

to democratic crises of careening or backsliding.

Finally, we compare our cases to see if any patterns emerge in the structural or

institutional factors or even the specific nature of the polarization that might help

us to predict which of these democratic outcomes could result in a given country.

Emergence of Pernicious Polarization

How do democracies move from normal competitive politics among adversaries

with plural identities to pernicious polarization? Social scientists do not agree on

the structural, institutional, agentic, and elite vs. mass-based causes of severe

polarization (Bermeo 2003; Abramowitz 2010; Druckman, Peterson, and

Slothuus 2013; Campbell 2018). Armed with our relational and political concep-

tualization of polarization and response, we first focus on the interaction of

underlying social cleavages and grievances (that is, structural factors), and the