Tom Nichols, The Death of Expertise: The Campaign Against Established Knowledge and Why It Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017). 252 pp. $24.95 (hardcover), ISBN: 9780190469412.

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12927
• Published date: 01 March 2018
• Author: Terry L. Cooper
• Date: 01 March 2018

318 Public Administration Review • March | April 2018

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 78, Iss. 2, pp. 318–320. © 2018 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.1111/puar.12927.

Tom Nichols , The Death of Expertise: The Campaign Against Established

Knowledge and Why It Matters ( New York : Oxford University Press ,

2017 ). 252 pp. $24.95 (hardcover), ISBN: 9780190469412 .

T he notion of the “death of expertise” can

be understood as fitting within the larger

concept of “postmodern society” in which

foundational truth no longer exists, not even the

modern touchstone of scientific knowledge (Berger,

Berger, and Kellner 1973 ; Jun and Rivera 1997 ).

Tom Nichols does not take that broad, intellectual,

historical perspective in The Death of Expertise since

he believes firmly in the validity of knowledge that has

achieved the imprimatur of science. Unfortunately,

the subtitle of the book, The Campaign Against

Established Knowledge and Why It Matters , suggests

that there is an organized effort to discredit expert

knowledge, while the text simply offers breezy

discussions of examples of expertise being denied

by politicians, pundits, and ordinary citizens. No

evidence is offered for the campaign against expert

knowledge indicated in the subtitle.

Nichols adopts an anecdotal approach with many

current and recent examples of the rejection of

established knowledge. For that reason, The Death of

Expertise is interesting reading and may be persuasive

for a popular audience. However, lacking the

trappings of solid scholarship, it should not be taken

as a serious piece of social science research.

Nevertheless, this volume is provocative and

suggestive of troubling developments in our society.

Just how extensive and deep these changes are remains

to be determined, but the anecdotes the author

treats do have a cumulative weight. Most of them are

readily recognizable by a reasonably well-informed

reader and, taken together, raise concerns about the

apparent trend toward the un-anchoring of claims and

assertions from any demonstrable expertise.

It is ironic, then, that Nichols, while dealing in

anecdotes, begins in the first chapter with a discussion

of how anecdotal knowledge leads citizens to reject

systematic expert knowledge about everything

from raw milk, to vaccines and climate change

under a misguided assumption that “strongly held

opinions are indistinguishable from facts” (28).

How that stubborn, wrongheaded conflation of

immediate experiences in isolated instances, with

reliable knowledge, is to be replaced by adherence

to information produced by experts is never really

addressed. The Death of Expertise is a critical

exposition of the problem without a prescription for

addressing the problem. This approach may leave

the reader unsatisfied, but some problems are not

susceptible to immediate resolution. Exposing the

problem may be all one can do at any given time.

Chapter 2, “How Conversation Became Exhausting,”

focuses on “confirmation bias,” a phenomenon known

well by social scientists. People tend to look for

information that confirms what they already believe

and filter out anything to the contrary. The problem

is not that some of us are just stupid, but rather it

is that the “dumber you are, the more confident

you are that you are not actually dumb”(44). The

skill of “metacognition,” which is the ability to step

back from one’s actions and consider whether what

one is doing is right or wrong, is missing (45). The

Dunning-Krueger Effect does not suggest that there is

a lack of general intelligence, but rather insufficient

education. It is a failure to understand the scientific

method and how it differs from incidental random

experience. Establishing knowledge through the

testing of hypotheses rooted in theories, the nature of

evidence, statistical significance, and the problems of

establishing causality are all replaced with the kind of

common sense that may serve one well in everyday

life, but not with respect to complex problems.

Conspiracy theories and superstitions are offered

by Nichols as classic examples of confirmation bias,

resulting from simplistic ways of understanding

complex events by those lacking an appreciation

of expert knowledge. These are ways people try to

simplify and understand frightening events that are

beyond easy comprehension, such as globalization.

Conspiratorial ideas about the birth of the first

African American president of the United States,

Reviewed by: Terry L. Cooper

University of Southern California

Terry L. Cooper is Maria B. Crutcher

Professor in Citizenship and Democratic

Values in the Sol Price School of Public

Policy at the University of Southern

California, where he researches citizen

participation and ethics in government.

He is author of The Responsible

Administrator: An Approach to Ethics

for the Administrative Role (6th ed.,

Jossey-Boss, 2012) and An Ethic of

Citizenship for Public Administration

(Prentice Hall, 1991). He is coeditor of

Achieving Ethical Competence for

Public Service Leadership

(M.E. Sharpe, 2013), Exemplary

Public Administrators: Character

and Leadership in Government

(Jossey-Bass, 1992) and the editor of

Handbook of Administrative Ethics

(2nd ed., Marcel Dekker, 2001). He is a

member of the National Academy of Public

Administration (NAPA) and, currently, one

of the co-principal investigators in the USC

Neighborhood Participation Project.

E-mail: tlcooper@usc.edu

Book Reviews

Galia Cohen, Editor