To Know It Is to Loath It: Perceptions of Campaign Finance and Attitudes About Congress
| Date | 01 September 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1532673X18820860 |
| Author | Shaun Bowler,Todd Donovan |
| Published date | 01 September 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
research-article2018
Article
American Politics Research
2019, Vol. 47(5) 951 –969
To Know It Is to Loath It:
© The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X18820860
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Finance and Attitudes
About Congress
Todd Donovan1 and Shaun Bowler2
Abstract
We model attitudes about Congress as structured by perceptions of
campaign finance. Attitudes about unlimited corporate and union spending
are modeled as structured by knowledge about Congress. We find people
with more factual knowledge of Congress were more likely to view unlimited
independent corporate and union spending as having improper influence. We
also found that people made some distinctions about sources of campaign
finance. Knowledgeable people viewed unlimited independent expenditures
as improper influence, but were less likely to perceive direct contributions
from individuals to candidates as corrupt. When attitudes about Congress
are estimated as a function of perceptions about financier influence, we find
that perceptions about unlimited independent spending predicted negative
views of representation and Congress, whereas perceptions of limited
individual donations did not. People who knew the most about Congress
were substantially more likely to find unlimited independent spending—the
sort allowed by Citizens United—to be troubling.
Keywords
Congress, campaign finance, public opinion, corruption
1Western Washington University, Bellingham, WA, USA
2University of California, Riverside, CA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Todd Donovan, Western Washington University, MS 9082, Bellingham, WA 98225, USA.
Email: Todd.Donovan@wwu.edu
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American Politics Research 47(5)
Introduction
We propose that attitudes about the U.S. Congress are shaped by perceptions
about campaign finance. The idea that assessments of Congress are adversely
affected by interest group influence is not new. A body of scholarship sug-
gests the American public’s perceptions of Congress are shaped by a sense
that interest groups have unwarranted influence over representatives, and
research also notes that perceptions of Congress suffer further because the
public has an adverse reaction to partisan and interest group conflict that is
inevitable in a democratic arena (e.g., Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995, 2002).
Yet investigations of attitudes about Congress have given less attention to the
consequences of perceptions of campaign financiers.
As we note below, many people see Congress as corrupt. Previous work
discusses how public perceptions of corruption differ from what is illegal,
and examine how various modes of financing congressional campaigns may
be seen by the public as corrupt or not (e.g., Bowler & Donovan, 2016). This
work extends on that by examining how attitudes about campaign finance
affect how people view representation and Congress. We present a model of
attitudes about Congress where public perceptions of it are grounded in
knowledge of Congress and attitudes about the influence of campaign money.
We find that those who knew more about Congress were most likely to
believe that unlimited campaign funds amounted to improper influence, and
those who viewed such funds as improper had dim views of representation
and of Congress.
Campaign Finance and Perceptions of Congress as
Corrupt
Opinion polls report widespread perceptions that Congress is somehow cor-
rupt. A 2011 Rasmussen Poll found that 48% of likely voters believed that
most members of Congress were “corrupt.” A 2015 Gallup poll found 52%
saying most members were corrupt, including 32% holding this attitude about
their own member.1 What is the mechanism by which so many Americans
come to perceive Congress as corrupt? Reviews of American public opinion
polls on campaign finance (Mayer, 2001; Persily & Lammie, 2004) illustrate
broad dissatisfaction with the process of financing congressional campaigns—
regardless of the sources of funds, what they were spent on, or the amounts
that were raised and spent (Bowler & Donovan, 2016). Polls illustrate a public
that is “woefully misinformed about campaign finance law” (Dowling &
Miller, 2014; Milyo & Primo, 2017, p. 2), and one that wildly overestimates
the amounts of money in House races (Ansolabehere, Snowberg, & Snyder,
Donovan and Bowler
953
2005; Shaw, Roberts, & Blass, 2012). Furthermore, most Americans assume
campaign contributions constitute quid pro quo arrangements. Nearly four in
five survey respondents perceived that contributions to a political party, inde-
pendent spending on behalf of a member of Congress, or direct contributions,
were likely to earn the contributor special consideration by the member of
Congress (Mayer, 2001; Persily & Lammie, 2004).
Academic surveys rarely ask respondents if they view the nexus of cam-
paign finance and representation as honest or corrupt. However, items placed
on the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) asked about
campaign finance and corruption directly. A study of these data found most
respondents perceived large, legal, independent expenditures, as being cor-
rupt. Most also viewed direct contributions from “someone” to a candidate as
being corrupt, regardless of the amount being US$50 or US$5,000, and a bare
majority found that an individual giving US$5,000 directly to a candidate as
corrupt. Although there was some evidence that people made distinctions
about different sources and uses of campaign money (Bowler & Donovan,
2016), the literature documents high levels of skepticism and misinformation
about money in politics.
All of this suggests a mechanism where perceptions of campaign finance
act as factor that erodes public regard for representation and erodes public
acceptance of Congress as a whole. Campaigns have been found to generate
increased media focus on politics, increase information flows, and increase
voter attention (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Coleman & Manna, 2000). But
media attention to fundraising and campaign expenditures may also prime
people to consider their preconceptions of campaign expenditures as quid pro
quo arrangements that cause representatives to be beholden to the actors who
finance their campaigns.
Media coverage of U.S. elections, furthermore, is dominated by attention
to the strategy, tactics, and horse race aspects of campaigns (Gulati, Just, &
Crigler, 2004). Much of this coverage involves emphasis on the costs of cam-
paigns, the sources of funds, and amounts spent. Modern investigative report-
ing likewise assesses the veracity of claims in, and the funding sources of,
campaign ads. Journalists also track campaign finance records to handicap
which candidates may be frontrunners (Redlawsk, Tolbert, & Donovan, 2011).
Coverage of elections thus highlights information about sources of fund-
ing and may be biased toward reporting that campaign contributions influ-
ence elected officials (Sorauf, 1987). Stories on campaign finance, moreover,
have been found to be biased in the direction of overstating the actual amounts
spent (by as much as eightfold). These biases in reporting, in turn, may be
reflected in public attitudes about campaign finance, with those attentive to
media being significantly more likely to believe that U.S. House campaign
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American Politics Research 47(5)
expenditures were higher than they actually were (Ansolabehere et al., 2005;
see also VanHeerde-Hudson, 2011 on Britain). All of this considered, then,
attitudes about financing congressional elections may prime a sense that
something about Congress is “corrupt.”
Knowledge and Perceptions of Donors and
Congress
We model attitudes about representation and Congress as being the conse-
quence of perceptions of the influence that donors2 have over members of
Congress. Our logic here is based on two primary assumptions. First, we
assume that citizens have perceptions of donor influence over Congress that
are affected by greater knowledge about Congress because knowledge may
highlight that members depend on money from politically motivated actors.
Second, we expect that evaluations of Congress are affected by perceptions of
donor influence. Our first point deserves more elaboration as it implies that the
more knowledgeable are likely to be more critical of donors and of Congress.
Previous studies have identified that higher levels of education or knowledge
were associated with lower regard for Congress (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse,
1995; Kimball & Patterson 1997; Mondak, Carmines, Huckfeldt, Mitchell, &
Schraufnagel, 2007). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) suggested the effect
may reflect that educated people could see Congress through a partisan lens,
and Kimball (2005) presents evidence consistent with this.
Kimball and Patterson (1997), likewise, noted the potential effects of edu-
cation and awareness on approval, suggesting that education, media expo-
sure, and political knowledge may provide greater...
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