Titans that Clash and a State that Buffers

• Author: Serhat Doğan,Emin Karagözoğlu,Kerim Keskin,Hüseyin Çağrı Sağlam
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221114868
• Published date: 01 February 2023
• Date: 01 February 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution

2023, Vol. 67(2-3) 210–234

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027221114868

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Titans that Clash and a State

that Buffers

Serhat Do˘

gan

1

, Emin Karag ¨

ozo˘

glu

1,2

, Kerim Keskin

3

, and

Hüseyin Ça˘

grıSa ˘

glam

1

Abstract

We present a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of the emergence or survival of

buffer states. We analyze a two-stage game with three players orderly located on a

linear territory, where the player in the middle is passive, and the players on the two

ends are aggressive with options to declare war against the others. We conduct an

equilibrium analysis and characterize the conditions under which the passive player acts

as a buffer state between the aggressive players. We f‌ind various equilibrium outcomes,

which can be grouped into the following categories: (i) peace with buffer, (ii) peace

without buffer, and (iii) the last man standing. Our comparative static analyses reveal

valuable insights regarding the factors affecting the existence of buffer states.

Keywords

buffer state, dynamic contest, international conf‌lict, territorial conf‌lict, warfare

“States do not choose to become buffers. It is a role thrust upon them by a hostile in-

ternational environment over which they have no control. Buffer states are lesser actors

sandwiched between more powerfully endowed, ambitious, and often aggressive entities.

The purpose of the buffer state is established by these external competitors. They become

sacrif‌icial elements in a larger contest.”Lawrence Ziring, 1987

1

Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey

2

CESifo Munich, Munich, Germany

3

ADA University, Baku, Azerbaijan

Corresponding Author:

Kerim Keskin, School of Business, ADA University, 61 Ahmadbay Aghaoglu Street, Baku AZ1008,

Azerbaijan.

Email: kkeskin@ada.edu.az

Introduction

A buffer state is def‌ined as a “small independent state lying between two larger, usually

rival, states”(see Mathison 1971, 107). Similarly, Menon and Snyder (2017, 966) write

that buffer states lie “between the spheres of inf‌luence of two or more powerful states

but are not allied with or dominated by any of them.”These def‌initions identify three

properties of a buffer state: (i) geography, specifying its location; (ii) capability, also

capturing its inferiority in military power; and (iii) independence, indicating that it does

not act under the inf‌luence of either neighboring state (see Partem 1983, 4). There are a

number of states that have been considered as buffer states for certain time periods.

Some examples are Morocco in the 16th century (between the Ottoman Empire, Spain,

and Portugal) (see Cory 2016); Uruguay in the 19th century (between Argentina and

Brazil) (see Knarr 2012); Afghanistan in the 19th century (between the British and

Russian Empires) (see McLachlan 1997); Bhutan and Sikkim in the 20th century

(between China and India) (see Levi 1959); Poland during World War II (between

Germany and the Soviet Union) (see Suvorov 2013); and Lebanon since the 1990s

(between Israel and Syria) (see Balanche 2017).

1

This paper presents a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of the emergence or

survival of buffer states. To that end, we formulate a two-stage game including three

independent states located on a linear territory. The territory is divided into three

regions such that each region is initially controlled by a different state. The state

controlling the central region is a passive player, whereas the other states are aggressive

with options to declare war against the other players. In each stage, an aggressive state

chooses whether to declare war against another state, but since the passive state is

located between the aggressive states, the latter cannot attack each other while the

former still survives. If the passive state disappears, however, then there is a possible

war between the aggressive states (modeled as a one-shot contest game), which may

end with the destruction of either state. As such, although capturing the territory of the

passive state has a standalone value, it may not be optimal to capture it, since it may

result in the capturing state’s destruction. We label the passive player as a buffer state,

when neither aggressive state f‌inds it optimal to attack (and possibly capture) the central

region in equilibrium.

2

It is worth emphasizing that the assumption that the central

region is controlled by a passive player, with a potential to become a buffer state, is in

line with the buffer state def‌initions found in the literature (see Partem 1983;Ziring

1987). That is, a buffer state is expected to be a lesser actor with relatively lower

ambitions and military power to extend its territory.

We analyze subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Our analysis reveals that there are

various equilibrium outcomes, which can be grouped into three categories: (i) peace

with buffer, (ii) peace without buffer, and (iii) the last man standing. The f‌irst category,

which is the only equilibrium type where the passive player surely survives as a buffer

state, is realized only if the aggressive state that considers capturing the central region

anticipates an attack from the third party in the future and knows that it will be in a

disadvantaged position in the respective war. In the second category, we see that the

Do˘

gan et al. 211