Time to Think in Other Terms: A Response to Powell and the Median Mandate School

• Author: Paul V. Warwick
• Published date: 01 February 2018
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/lsq.12172
• Date: 01 February 2018

PAUL V. WARWICK

Simon Fraser University

Time to Think in Other Terms: A

Response to Powell and the

Median Mandate School

In response to my characterization of ideological congruence as an “illusion,”

Powell (this issue) demonstrates that incongruence, while common, tends to be only

moderate in most cases, a conclusion with which I agree. Nevertheless, I argue that the

concept of ideological congruence is misleading when applied as Powell does, and prob-

lematic, if not meaningless, when applied in the alternative ways proposed by Best,

Budge, and McDonald. For these reasons, the term continues to obscure more than it

reveals.

In 2016, I published an article entitled “The Ideological Congru-

ence Illusion” in this journal (Warwick 2016). The title was purposefully

provocative; it was intended to stimulate further debate on a key issue in

the study of liberal democracy, one that still f‌lies, to some extent, under

the radar. I am very pleased that Bingham Powell and, by extension,

Robin Best, Ian Budge, and Michael McDonald have chosen to take up

the challenge.

The issue in question is the degree to which government policy in

democratic systems aligns with median citizen or voter preferences on

the left-right dimension. No one claims that alignment or congruence is

typical; rather, as Best, Budge, and McDonald put it, “government inten-

tions [are] unreliably matched up with changes in median voter

preferences, ...consistently going further to one extreme or to the other”

(2012, 7). Powell’s contribution (this issue) is principally to show that

this incongruence, while common, tends to be only moderate in most

cases. Best et al. (this issue) suggest that congruence can still be found,

provided it is understood and sought in other ways.

Does this mean that we are in basic agreement on the congruence

issue, barring only differences of nuance, emphasis, or elaboration?

Absolutely not. In this short note, I argue that our agreement on this one

empirical fact masks a much more fundamental disagreement about the

nature of liberal democracy itself. More specif‌ically, I argue that the

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, 43, 1, February 2018 3

DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12172

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