Tiebout goes global: international migration as a tool for voting with your feet.

• Author: Somin, Ilya
• Position: Symposium

1. INTRODUCTION

   Students of federalism have long recognized that citizens in a federal system can "vote with their feet" by moving from one jurisdiction to another. (1) Those oppressed or harmed by the policies of one regional government can improve their lot by moving to another. Such "exit rights" are an important alternative to traditional "voice"-based political participation through voting. (2) In a classic 1956 article, Charles Tiebout pointed out that foot voting can also help citizens find jurisdictions that more closely approximate their preferred mix of taxes and public services. (3) While foot voting cannot work perfectly so long as there are moving costs, (4) it does enable many people to choose which jurisdiction to live in and thereby decide which policies they wish to live under.

   However, scholars have so far failed to systematically consider the implications of foot voting and the Tiebout model for international migration. Although much research addresses the economic and human rights issues raised by movement across international boundaries, there has been very little discussion of its utility as a form of political participation through exit rights. Some scholars have argued for stronger international migration rights on deontological moral grounds. (5) Others advocate such changes because they are likely to greatly increase the well-being of migrants from repressive and underdeveloped societies, and also provide economic benefits to the societies that take them in. (6)

   Two economists have recently considered the implications of the Tiebout model for empirical explanations of international migration induced by fiscal policy differences between nations in the European Union. (7) The existing literature has not, however, addressed the full normative implications of the Tiebout model and foot voting for migration between nation-states more generally.

   In this article, I make a tentative effort to plug this hole in the literature.

   I suggest that the benefits of international foot voting may well be much larger than those of free movement within national borders. Part II briefly summarizes the theory of foot voting and its potential benefits. I focus particularly on the use of exit rights as a form of political participation by which migrants can more effectively choose the public policies under which they live. Crucial benefits of political participation through exit rights include the matching of public policy to diverse preferences, the creation of an outlet for local political minorities and discriminated-against groups, competition between jurisdictions for migrants, and improved incentives for information acquisition relative to traditional ballot box voting.

   In Part III, I show how these benefits are potentially much greater for international migration than for domestic migration within advanced democracies. Public policies differ far more across nations than within national boundaries. Free international migration therefore provides a much greater potential range of options for migrants than domestic movement. In addition, international migration may be the only feasible form of political choice for the hundreds of millions of people who live under undemocratic governments. For these unfortunate individuals, emigration may be the only means they have for choosing the public policies they wish to live under, short of violent revolution.

   Part IV considers some possible implications for migration law. Current international law requires nations to allow their citizens free exit, but does not require free entrance except in extremely limited circumstances. Unfortunately, the frequent denial of entry rights greatly undercuts the value of exit rights. To reap the full benefits of international foot voting, barriers to entry should be reduced. I do, however, suggest one set of situations in which the theory of foot voting may in some instances justify restricting rights of entry: cases where free migration might undermine the very policies that make the nation in question attractive to migrants in the first place.

   The considerations advanced in this paper do not provide a comprehensive theory of international migration rights. They also do not prove that either international or domestic law should require completely open borders. A full analysis would require a comprehensive balancing of the benefits of free migration against its costs. The advantages of foot voting do, however, provide an important consideration in favor of opening borders more than might otherwise be desirable.

2. THE BENEFITS OF FOOT VOTING

   Standard theories of federalism outline several major advantages of foot voting through free migration between jurisdictions. Here, I focus on three that are particularly relevant to international migration: the ability to satisfy diverse public policy preferences, competition between jurisdictions for migrants, and the protection of politically weak local minorities. In my own work, I have also emphasized the advantages of foot voting as a means of political participation that supplements ballot box voting, and is in some ways superior to it.

   1. Satisfying Diverse Public Policy Preferences

      There is great divergence among Americans in their public policy preferences. Some may prefer a combination of extensive government services and high taxes, others prefer low taxes and low spending levels. Still others prefer a middle way. Federalism can help satisfy such diverse preferences even in the absence of interstate migration. (8) If, for example, liberals are concentrated in one region and conservatives in another, states in those respective regions can pursue divergent policies, thereby allowing members of both groups to live under a set of policies more closely approximating their preferences. (9)

      Free migration greatly increases the ability of a federal system to satisfy diverse voter preferences. In the absence of mobility, voters who find themselves in a political minority within their jurisdiction may have to wait for years or decades before they get the opportunity to live under their preferred policies; in the extreme case, their time might never come. With the exit option, they can achieve their policy goals far more quickly.

      Free migration can also ensure that a higher percentage of the population reside in a jurisdiction relatively close to their preferred policies. Absent migration, only local political majorities are likely to have their preferences satisfied, though some minority groups might be able to win concessions on their preferred issues through logrolling within the locally dominant political coalition. With migration, political "losers" in one area could potentially become "winners" by moving elsewhere. Recognition of this kind of policy "sorting" was one of the key insights of Tiebout's classic article, which showed that free migration can enable citizens to move to choose the jurisdiction that most closely fits their level of demand for local public goods. (10) The point can also be extended to the demand for government programs that provide private goods as well, such as education and various social programs.

      Obviously, as Tiebout pointed out in his original article, the efficacy of migration as a tool for satisfying diverse preferences is limited by the existence of moving costs and by constraints imposed by career needs. (11) Nonetheless, the potential for better satisfying diverse public policy preferences is a major advantage of free migration within a federal system.

   2. Competition Between Jurisdictions

      The benefits of free migration are heightened by the possibility of competition between jurisdictions for residents. State and local governments have incentives to attract productive workers and taxpayers to their jurisdictions in order to increase tax revenue and economic growth. This in turn gives them incentives to compete with each other to satisfy potential migrants' policy preferences. (12) Interjurisdictional competition extends the advantages of policy diversity by strengthening subnational governments' incentives to tailor their policies to the specific preferences of citizens. Not only does "voting with your feet" have a demand side generated by the desires of potential migrants, it also has a supply side created by the needs of revenue-seeking governments.

      The mechanism is imperfect. It may not always trump other considerations that may divert the efforts of state governments--such as the need to satisfy the demands of local constituencies. It also may not give states incentives to attract migrants who consume more public services than they add to the state's revenue. Nonetheless, it does provide a strong incentive for states to cater to the needs of at least a large portion of the population, thereby enhancing migrants' ability to effectively vote with their feet. In some cases even migrants who don't "pay for themselves" may be attractive to states if providing for their needs attracts others who do add to revenue. (13) For example, providing for the needs of children (who usually don't pay taxes) may attract taxpaying parents. Despite some limitations, interstate mobility helps promote beneficial competition for migrants.

   3. Protection for Oppressed Local Minorities

      Exit options are particularly valuable for oppressed local minorities. In many parts of the world, regional racial, ethnic, or religious minorities suffer repression and discrimination at the hands of regional governments controlled by other groups. Migration to other parts of the country with less oppressive policies is an important safety valve for minority groups in this predicament.

      In American history, the most important example of this phenomenon was the migration of numerous Southern blacks to the North during the era of Jim Crow segregation. Between 1880 and 1920, some 1 million southern blacks migrated to the North, eventually accounting for more than 10 percent of the...