'They aren't friendly, Mr. Vice President': the Eisenhower administration's response to Communist-inspired attacks during Vice President Nixon's 1958 tour of Latin America.

AuthorCox, Jeff
PositionDwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon - Essay

As United States Vice President Richard Nixon's motorcade approached the third blockade on his route through Caracas, Venezuela in May 1958, it was evident that he and his retinue were in trouble. They could not push through or go around as a mob several hundred strong materialized out of the side streets and began attacking the cars. Rocks, pipes, sticks, fists and spit slammed into the motorcade. A rock struck the shatterproof window of Nixon's car, sticking there and spraying glass into the car, striking the eyes and face of the Venezuelan Foreign Minister in the seat next to him. As the Venezuelan security forces stood by, the Secret Service men jumped out and began pushing the mob back. The Secret Service was greatly outnumbered, and Nixon's car began to rock as the attackers attempted to overturn it. Finally, a news truck was able to block oncoming traffic in the opposite lane long enough for the motorcade to drive around the barrier and escape. (1)

Caracas was the last stop on what was to have been a routine tour of Latin America by Vice President Nixon and other United States officials. Nixon undertook the trip to strengthen United States relations with the region, and to congratulate the Latin Americans on their social and political achievements. The trip nearly ended with his death at their hands. Throughout, Nixon believed that those taking part in the demonstrations and attacks against him to be predominately Communists. Upon returning to the United States, the Vice President and the rest of the Eisenhower administration attempted to discern the causes of what happened during the trip, and many agreed with Nixon's assessment that the events were part of a larger Communist plot.

This assessment raises the question of whether the Eisenhower administration reflexively blamed Communists without giving due weight to the problems with US-Latin American relations generating ill will toward the US that could have led to the attacks. The answer to this question is not simple, and requires a look at several issues, including the details of the administration's reaction; the actual level of Communist involvement throughout Latin America at the time; issues other than Communism that may have contributed to the demonstrations; the anticommunist policies of the Eisenhower administration, both foreign and domestic; US Latin-American relations leading up to the trip; and the effects of the events of May 1958 on United States policy with Latin America. Once all of these issues have been addressed, it is clear that there was relatively little Communist involvement in Latin America, and that communists were only the leaders of the demonstrations against Vice President Nixon. In spite of this, and contrary to the dominant interpretation, the administration's focus on Communism was not only in keeping with its policies, but was also tempered by an understanding of the complex social issues in Latin America and the numerous legitimate reasons for Anti-United States sentiments among Latin Americans, and in light of this understanding, the United States responded appropriately.

The Historiography

The Nixon trip of 1958 was one of the most important United States foreign policy events in post-WWII Latin America, and many historians have examined it from a variety of perspectives. Few, however, have undertaken an in depth analysis of the Eisenhower administration's response to the crisis One who has is Stephen G. Rabe, in his book Eisenhower and Latin America: The Politics of Anticommunism. Rabe criticizes the administration for focusing too heavily on Communism and ignoring the effects of United States foreign policies that may have been unfavorable to the Latin American, giving them reasons beyond Communist plots to protest as they did. While Rabe is partially accurate, he does not take into account the effects that the Eisenhower administration's anticommunist policies had on its assessment of the demonstrations. He also plays down how quickly the administration addressed Latin Americans' feelings about United States foreign policy, and suggests that when the administration did begin discussing possible changes in foreign policy, they did not go far enough. (2)

Another work that examined these issues was Alan McPherson's Yankee No!: Anti-Americanism in U.S.--Latin American Relations. McPherson looks at the Nixon trip through the perspective of anti-United States sentiments. He too criticizes the government in the United States for giving too much attention to the Communists, and not enough to other causes of 'anti-American' sentiments. McPherson writes, "They preferred to see anti-Americanism as a subset of Communism, and not the other way around." (3) McPherson clearly believes that emphasis placed on the role of Communism was disproportionate to reality.

The Goals of the Nixon Trip

Postwar relations between the United States and Latin American nations were not what either party had hoped for. The United States recognized and understood the importance of Latin America, but found it difficult to fit the region into a foreign policy centered around the conflict between the East and the West, Communism and Capitalism. (4) The Nixon trip was a recognition of this flaw, and an attempt to begin to correct it. While there, Nixon hoped to address both political and economic issues in Latin America.

The official reason for undertaking the trip to South America was to attend the inauguration of Argentina's new President, Arturo Frondizi. Frondizi was the winner of the first free election held in Argentina after the overthrow of Juan Peron. (5) The Eisenhower administration wished to send the highest ranking United States official available to attend the inauguration to dispel impressions that the United States supported and sympathized with Peron, and to demonstrate support of freely elected officials. (6) Peron was not the only Latin American dictator to be recently overthrown though, and the State Department recognized this trip as an opportunity to visit other nations that had recently elected or strengthened a democratic government, to show the approval of the United States. (7)

Another important reason for a high-ranking member of the United States government to visit Latin America was the economic crisis that struck worldwide in the months before the Vice President's trip. Latin American nations in particular were hard hit by the drops in commodity prices. (8) Many governments in the region were feeling pressure to open up trade relations with Soviet satellites because the recession in the United States had such an impact on their trade with their great northern neighbor. (9) Inflation was also a serious problem in several nations. Bolivia was particularly hard hit. At the time of the Vice President's trip, the standard currency in Bolivia, the boliviano, was worth 1/1000 of a United States penny. (10) The Eisenhower administration wanted the Latin Americans to know they had not been forgotten in the midst of the economic troubles.

In his Six Crises, Nixon described himself as having absolutely no interest in taking part in a diplomatic mission to South America. He had no premonitions about the difficulties he would face. On the contrary, he did not want to take part because he thought the trip would be boring. He wrote, "of all the trips I made abroad as Vice President the one I least wanted to take was my visit to South America in 1958--not because I thought it would be difficult but because I thought it would be relatively unimportant and uninteresting compared to the assignments I had in Washington at the time." (11) It was an election year, and Nixon felt that his work on campaigns would be more important for the nation. His trip turned out to be more important than he could have imagined.

The Tour of Latin America

While the original plan was to attend the inauguration in Argentina, more countries were added, one or two at a time, until the list included every country in South America with the exception of Brazil, because Nixon had visited recently, and Chile, because high ranking members of its government would be in Washington at the time of Nixon's visit. The first stop on the trip was Montevideo, Uruguay. (12)

In Montevideo, Nixon decided to make an unscheduled stop at the University of the Republic, the center of the Communist movement in the small country. He hoped to catch the Communists off guard, and have positive interactions with the pro-United States students, believed to be the vast majority. He would then leave before the Communists could react. He wanted to demonstrate that even in the center of the country's Communist movement, by far the stronger sentiment was pro-United States. As the Vice President spoke with students at the University, the Communists began to react. They attempted to organize, heckling Nixon and distributing pamphlets, but their efforts were thwarted by their fellow students, who Nixon described as caught up in a pro-United States spirit. (13)

After his victory in Montevideo, Nixon continued his tour without incident until he reached Peru. He planned to make another university visit in Lima, at San Marcos University. This time, the visit was scheduled and announced. Those with anti-US sentiments, labeled Communists by Nixon, knew he was coming, and planned demonstrations. Nixon decided to go ahead with the visit, against the recommendations of Peruvian officials. He sought another confrontation with Communist demonstrators, again in the hopes of triumphing over them in a public, highly visible venue. (14)

Nixon walked right into the crowd that had gathered in anticipation of his arrival, bringing only two followers. He describes the crowd as shocked by his boldness, and allowing him to begin speaking. Nixon reported that he began to win them over, imposing reason on the mob and getting them to calmly listen to what he had to say. The ringleaders, seeing that they...

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