There May or May Not Be Blood: Why the Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Executing the Insane Requires a Definitive Standard

Publication year2022

41 Creighton L. Rev. 763. THERE MAY OR MAY NOT BE BLOOD: WHY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST EXECUTING THE INSANE REQUIRES A DEFINITIVE STANDARD

Creighton Law Review


Vol. 41


INTRODUCTION

The finality of the death penalty engenders a unique sense of urgency to determine when the death penalty should actually be carried out.(fn1) As such, the groups of prisoners of whom the Eighth Amendment forbids execution are generally well-defined.(fn2) The United States Supreme Court, in Ford v. Wainwight,(fn3) determined that the Eighth Amendment precludes states from executing insane prisoners.(fn4) However, the Supreme Court avoided defining insanity or setting the specific parameters of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against execution of the insane.(fn5) This refusal has increased the likelihood of arbitrary administration of the death penalty because it prevents predictability.(fn6) The lack of a uniform definition of insanity turns sentencing into a deadly game of chance.(fn7)

In Panetti v. Quarterman,(fn8) the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to define the standard for determining competency under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of the execution of the insane.(fn9) In Panetti, the 216th Judicial District Court in Gillespie County, Texas, sentenced Scott Louis Panetti ("Panetti") to death for murdering his estranged wife's parents.(fn10) During the appeals process following the trial and his conviction, Panetti claimed that he was not competent to be executed due to mental illness.(fn11) Panetti appealed his sentence to the Supreme Court.(fn12) There, he asked the Court to determine whether a prisoner was competent to be executed when the prisoner had a factual awareness of the reasons for execution but did not understand those reasons because of a mental illness.(fn13) The Court determined that a court erred when it failed to consider a prisoner's mental delusions when determining whether a prisoner was sufficiently competent to be executed.(fn14) The Court explained that the "awareness-only" requirement was too restrictive to afford Eighth Amendment protection.(fn15) The Court also stated that its decision in Ford indicated that such delusions may be relevant to determining whether they affected a prisoner's rational understanding.(fn16) However, the Court did not attempt to establish a definitive standard for determining competency.(fn17)

This Note argues that Panetti presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to establish a well-defined standard for determining competency to be executed.(fn18) However, the Court failed to establish a definitive standard, leaving lower courts with additional requirements in determining competency, but no framework in which to apply them.(fn19) The Court introduced the idea of rational understanding without providing any direction on its meaning.(fn20) Furthermore, this Note will show that contemporary values and Eighth Amendment analysis favor adoption of a definitive standard.(fn21) Additionally, this Note will argue that based on that analysis, the Court in Panetti should have narrowed existing but unclear standards to create a definitive competency standard that comports with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against execution of the insane.(fn22)

BACKGROUND

A. THE SUPREME COURT REFUSED TO CREATE A DEFINITIVE STANDARD FOR COMPETENCY TO BE EXECUTED IN PANETTI V. QUARTERMAN

In Panetti v. Quarterman,(fn23) the United States Supreme Court stated the prohibition of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution against executing the insane required more than awareness alone, and that a court erred when the court failed to consider delusions when determining competency.(fn24) In Panetti, Scott Louis Panetti's ("Panetti") wife, Sonja Panetti ("Sonja"), obtained a protective order against Panetti in response to threats he made against her parents.(fn25) Shortly thereafter, Panetti awoke one morning before dawn and drove to Sonja's parents' home where Sonja and their daughter were staying.(fn26) Panetti toted a rifle, a sawed-off shotgun, and several knives.(fn27) After arriving at the house and confronting Sonja, Panetti cornered Sonja's parents into the kitchen, asking Sonja who he should kill first.(fn28) In full view of Sonja and their daughter, Panetti killed both her parents with his rifle despite Sonja's pleas to spare them.(fn29) Later that day, Panetti surrendered to police and confessed to the murders.(fn30)

Panetti sought to represent himself at his 1995 trial for capital murder in the 216th Judicial District Court in Gillespie County, Texas.(fn31) Before the court would grant this request, the judge ordered a pre-trial psychiatric evaluation, which revealed Panetti's mental history.(fn32) The evaluation also showed that Panetti engaged in bizarre behavior and had ceased taking his prescribed medication, a rejection of medical advice.(fn33) Expert testimony later revealed that Panetti's failure to take this medication tended to make his mental problems more severe.(fn34) Nevertheless, the trial court found that Panetti was competent to both waive counsel and to be tried.(fn35) Panetti stated that he was completely aware of the charges filed against him, the penalty those charges carried, and that he desired to represent himself.(fn36) Later at trial, Panetti claimed that he could not be found guilty because of insanity.(fn37)

The jury found Panetti guilty of capital murder and sentenced Panetti to death.(fn38) After unsuccessfully seeking appellate relief in Texas courts, Panetti sought habeas corpus relief in federal courts to appeal his competency to waive counsel and to stand trial.(fn39) Both the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Panetti's habeas corpus petition and denied him federal relief.(fn40) Panetti did not raise the issue of whether his mental illness prevented him from being executed in any of these proceedings.(fn41)

After his unsuccessful appeals, the 216th Judicial District Court in Gillespie County, Texas set February 5, 2004, as Panetti's execution date.(fn42) For the first time, Panetti motioned to stay his execution, claiming he was incompetent to be executed due to his mental illness.(fn43) After the judge denied this motion, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Panetti's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that it could only review such a case when a prisoner was found incompetent by a trial court.(fn44) Panetti returned to federal court to file another habeas corpus petition and a motion to stay execution.(fn45) The day before Panetti's scheduled execution, the district court stayed the execution to allow a state court reasonable time to consider Panetti's mental state pursuant to federal law.(fn46) Court-appointed mental health experts returned their evaluation of Panetti, which stated that Panetti knew that he was going to be executed, knew that the execution would mean death, and had the ability to understand the reason he was going to be executed.(fn47) Furthermore, the experts alleged that Panetti intentionally engaged in bizarre and uncooperative behavior.(fn48)

Rather than appeal the state court decision, Panetti returned to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas to resolve the habeas corpus petition.(fn49) The district court found that Panetti was competent to be executed under precedent from the Fifth Circuit.(fn50) The district court articulated the Fifth Circuit test as requiring that a death-row prisoner need only be aware of the impending execution and the reason he is being executed.(fn51) The district court explained that Panetti was competent to be executed because he knew he committed the murders, knew he was about to be executed, and knew the reason given for his execution.(fn52) On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Panetti claimed that the district court used the wrong standard, claiming that the Eighth Amendment required that a prisoner have a rational understanding of the reason for the execution.(fn53) The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Eighth Amendment did not require rational understanding.(fn54)

Panetti appealed the Fifth Circuit decision to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.(fn55) The Court discussed whether the Fifth Circuit used the correct standard to determine whether Panetti was sufficiently competent.(fn56) The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's competency standard as too restrictive.(fn57) The Court reasoned that the Ford decision suggested that delusions were relevant to awareness and comprehension if the delusions prevented a prisoner from attaining a rational understanding of the reasons for the pending execution.(fn58) The Court cited its decision in Ford, which determined that executing insane prisoners served no retributive purpose.(fn59) The Court stated that the context of Panetti's crime and punishment may be so displaced from reality because of his delusions that execution as a punishment would not serve the community's interest in vindication.(fn60) Therefore, the Court stated the Fifth Circuit test for determining competency to be executed would not alleviate these concerns.(fn61)

The Court noted that incompetent prisoners and prisoners that for other reasons do not understand why they will be executed are...

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