A theory of global public goods and their provisions

• Author: S. Niggol Seo
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1002/pa.1601
• Published date: 01 November 2016
• Date: 01 November 2016

■Academic Paper

A theory of global public goods and their

provisions

S. Niggol Seo*

Muaebak Institue of Global Warming Studies, Gwanak-gu, Seoul, Korea

This paper develops a general theory of a global public good and its optimal provision. In a national public good

problem that researchers have long been acquainted with, government taxation and public expenditure are an

inevitable tool for an optimal provision. This paper shows that an eff‌icient provision of a truly global public good

through public taxation and expenditure becomes unattainable because of nationally disparate incentives, especially

given large uncertainties about the future. This paper describes two alternative approaches. One is a technological

solution, which is a high promise but has unresolved issues of uncertainties with regard to developments of necessary

technologies. The other is an adaptation framework. This paper shows that the provision of a truly global public good

becomes manageable through a framework of adaptation strategies as it overcomes both divergent national interests

and uncertainties with regard to needed technologies. Adaptation strategies would unfold triggered by changes in

private incentives over a long-term time horizon in a private–public partnership. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley &

Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

Global communities are scrambling to establish an

international cooperative legal framework, which

can be effective in limiting greenhouse gas (GHG)

emissions globally below a dangerous threshold

level for the climate system (UNFCCC, 1998, 2009,

2011a, 2011b; US EPA, 2014). A quarter-century’s

efforts by global communities since the launch of

the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

and the United Nations Framework Convention on

Climate Change have failed to contain global car-

bon dioxide emissions and atmospheric concentra-

tion, despite positive regional stories occasionally

(UNFCCC, 1992; Keeling et al., 2005; Global Carbon

Project, 2014). Recurring discords among participat-

ing nations at annual international negotiating con-

ventions speak volumes for the lack of consensus

knowledge among international communities on the

problem of global warming itself and how it should

be addressed (UNFCCC, 2009; Nordhaus, 2010b).

This paper develops a general theory of global

public goods, drawing from the classical theory of

a national public good, and its eff‌icient provision

in an endeavor to help international efforts to ad-

dress the problem of global warming (Samuelson,

1954, 1955). The objective of the paper is to write a

general theory on global public goods, although

explanations of an eff‌icient provision will be made

within the context of global warming and the

lessons learned from the past experiences of global

warming dialogues and scientif‌ic studies will be

fully exploited (Nordhaus, 2011a, 2011b; Seo,

2015a, 2015b).

The paper is composed of the following sec-

tions. The next section describes various types of

global public goods with different production

technologies that provisions of them call for. In

section on Provision of a Public Good, the present

author describes the theory of a public good

based on the classical works by Paul Samuelson.

The section on A Samuelson–Nordhaus Solution

for Provision of a Global Public Good describes

*Correspondence to: S. Niggol Seo, Muaebak Institue of Global

Warming Studies, Gwanak-gu, Seoul 08840, Korea.

E-mail: niggol.seo@aya.yale.edu

Journal of Public Affairs

Volume 16 Number 4 pp 394–405 (2016)

Published online 29 January 2016 in Wiley Online Library

(www.wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/pa.1601

Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.