A Theory of Demographically Targeted Repression

• Date: 01 August 2020
• Author: Arturas Rozenas
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002720904768
• Published date: 01 August 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

A Theory of

Demographically

Targeted Repression

Arturas Rozenas

1

Abstract

People from specific ethnic, religious, or other externally identifiable groups are

often subjected to harsher repression than others. This phenomenon of demo-

graphically targeted repression is often viewed as a result of xenophobia. I provide a

rationalist explanation of demographic targeting to understand why this form of

repression is employed even without xenophobic motives. Building on the empirical

literature, I model an environment where a threat of repression may motivate

people to oppose the regime defensively. I show that, in such conditions, the regime

may use demographic targeting to undermine cross-group collective action. The

model explains when demographic targeting is used and how it shapes the behavior

and identity of citizens. I use the model to make sense of certain aspects of

repression policy in China.

Keywords

repression, collective action, opposition, discrimination, autocracy

States have invented numerous ways to repress their populations.

1

One such inven-

tion stands out as especially egregious—when people are subjected to heightened

coercion only because of their race, religion, class, or some other group-level char-

acteristics. Because of such demographic targeting, many individuals—even those

who act “loyally”—face arbitrary arrests, draconian surveillance, biased judiciary,

1

Department of Politics, New York University, NY, USA

Corresponding Author:

Arturas Rozenas, Department of Politics, New York University, 19 West 4th Street, New York, NY

10012, USA.

Email: arturas.rozenas@nyu.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(7-8) 1254-1278

ªThe Author(s) 2020

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002720904768

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

and other forms of discriminatory coercion. Demographically targeted repression

often victimizes populations that are already disadvantaged on other dimensions; in

extreme cases, it is manifested in ethnic cleansing campaigns, genocides, and other

forms of mass violence.

Despite the evident human costs of demographically targeted repression, its

political logic is not well understood. Many argue that the primary purpose of

repression is to deter opposition (Lichbach 1987; Pierskalla 2009). But any punish-

ment deters efficiently only when its threat depends solely on the individual actions

(Schelling 2008). Conditioning the punishment on ascriptive group-level character-

istics weakens deterrent incentives by obfuscating the link between individual beha-

vior and its consequences (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; Kalyvas 2006).

Since demographic targeting does exactly that, the question arises as to why some

regimes employ it deliberately.

This article presents a formal model to explain why some regimes use demo-

graphic targeting, whom they target, and how citizens act in face of such

repression. The model has the following features: the regime does not observe

citizens’ political preferences but only their external group-level characteristics

correlated with those preferences. Also, the regime only imperfectly observes

whether a citizen acted supportively or subversively. Consequently, e ven those

citizens who act supportively are uncertain whether the regime will perceive

them as “supporters” or “subversives.” Due to this mutual uncertainty, some

citizens who would otherwise support the regime start opposing it in order it to

precipitate its collapse and thereby avoid repression—they oppose the regime

defensively.

To underscore the structure of the argument, I first analyze the setting where

citizens do not have collective action considerations. In this case, demographically

targeted repression unambiguously weakens deterrence: even if members of a par-

ticular group are known to be predisposed to act subversively, a strategic regime

would not commit to repress them more than others. I then consider a case where

actions of citizens are strategically interdependent in the sense that the regime is

more likely to collapse if different groups oppose it collectively. In such case, the

regime may optimally commit to use demogra phic targeting. This suggests that

regimes could be using demographic targeting as a tool to undermine the strategic

coordination across the societal groups.

To see why collective action may play a key role in explaining demographic

targeting, consider how repression affects the calculus of citizens. Repression can

deter opposition by increasing its expected costs, but when the regime cannot accu-

rately identify who opposes it, repression can antagonize otherwise supportive cit-

izens. The optimally deterrent repression would balance between these two

competing forces. In the absence of collective action considerations, repression of

one individual does not affect the behavior of others. The regime’s problem, in this

case, is relatively simple: it must make the risk of punishment maximally contingent

on the individual’s actions. Repressing someone more just because he or she belongs

Rozenas 1255