Theories of vertical integration and their application to the electric utility industry

AuthorJohn H. Landon
Published date01 March 1983
Date01 March 1983
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X8302800104
Subject MatterArticle
The Antitrust Bulletin/Spring
1983
Theories
of
vertical integration
and their application
to the electric utility industry
BY
JOHN
H. LANDON*
I.
Introduction
101
Anumber of recent articles in the economics literature call for the
vertical disintegration
of
the electric utility industry. IThe authors
Vice President, National Economic Research Associates, Inc.,
Washington, D.C.
AUTHOR'S
NOTE: The author has served as a consultant to numerous
electric utilities and has testified on topics related to this article.
1See, for example, Edward Berlin, Charles J. Cicchetti, and
William J. Gillen, "Restructuring the Electric Power Industry," in
Electric Power Reform: The Alternatives
for
Michigan, ed. William H.
Shaker and Wilbert Steffy (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Science and
Technology, University of Michigan, 1976), pp. 233-35; James F. Fair-
man
and
John C. Scott, "Transmission, Power Pools, and Competition
in the Electric Utility Industry," The Hastings Law Journal, May 1977,
p. 1204; Philip Fanara, Jr., James E. Suelflow, and Roman A. Draba,
"Energy and Competition: The Saga of Electric Power," The Antitrust
Bulletin 25 (Spring 1980): 137; John H. Landon and David A. Huettner,
"Restructuring the Electric Utility Industry: A Modest Proposal," in
©1983 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
102 The antitrust bulletin
of
these studies urge areplacement
of
regulation by
competitive
forces as
the
primary
source
of
industry
stimulus
and
discipline
where
that
is possible
without
sacrifice
of
scale
economies.
Focusing
on
the
differences in scale economies
between
the
vertical levels
of
the
industry,
they
conclude
that
competition
among
independent
generation
companies
is a desirable
and
obtainable
objective.
The
vertically disintegrated electric utility
industry
envisioned
by
the
literature
would
replace
common
ownership
of
generation,
transmission,
and
distribution
facilities with
contracts
between
independent
generating,
transmitting,
and
distributing
compa-
nies.
Competitive
bidding
among
generators
would
substitute
for
their
regulation.
Distributors
and
transmitters,
unless
they
were
government
owned,
would
remain
subject
to
rate
regulation.
A
common-carrier
transmission
network
would
be available to
con-
nect
the
generators
to
the
distributors
and,
as well, to serve
the
function
of
tying generators
together
to
ensure
reliability
of
service.
The
case
presented
in
the
literature
for
vertical
disintegration
of
the
electric utility
industry
is
based
on five
major
premises: (1)
that
regulation
does
not
function
effectively to
stimulate
electric
utilities to
economic
efficiency
and
innovation;'
(2)
that
econo-
Electric Power Reform: The Alternatives
for
Michigan, ed. William H.
Shaker and Wilbert Steffy (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Science and
Technology, University of Michigan, 1976), pp. 219-20; and Leonard
W.
Weiss,
"Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry," in Promoting Com-
petition in Regulated Markets, ed. Almarin Phillips (Washington, D.C.:
The Brookings Institution,
1975),
pp. 138, 156,
169-70.
2The regulatory process is viewed by the authors as incapable of
providing sufficient inducement to innovation and efficiency. Regula-
tion is regarded as a generally mechanistic process which allows utilities
to recover their costs, but has proved incapable of providing the
stimulus to minimize those costs and to promote the development and
diffusion of new technologies and organizational forms. Competition
among bulk power suppliers is seen as a way to eliminate the need for
regulators at that level and, at the same time, provide an incentive to
develop, design, build, and operate the most economically efficient

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