Theories of Statutory Interpretation

Pages185-217
AuthorWilliam N. Eskridge Jr.,James J. Brudney,Josh Chafetz
185
Chapter 6
THEORIES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
For most lawyers, the biggest payoff of the study of legislation is
what it teaches about the theory and practice of statutory
interpretation, which is the main topic in most courses. This chapter
will introduce the leading theories of statutory interpretation, and
the next three chapters will explore statutory interpretation
doctrines, including the (in)famous canons of statutory
interpretation. Working our way through history, this chapter will
focus on prescriptive theories that tell citizens, agencies, and judges
how they ought to interpret statutes, and we shall apply those
theories to analyze landmark cases that are widely taught.
Just as theories of representation rest on foundations of state
legitimacy, so might prescriptive theories of statutory interpretation.
Three different kinds of legitimating norms are potentially at work:
the rule of law, whereby statutory meaning should be relatively
predictable and accessible to the citizenry and should be neutrally
applied to everyone; democratic accountability whereby interpreters
defer to decisions made by the popularly elected legislators who enact
statutes; and good governance under which interpreters have an
obligation to contribute productively to the evolving statutory scheme
and, perhaps ultimately, to the common good. Different theories of
statutory interpretation might be tested against their ability to
contribute to the rule of law, to democratic legitimacy, and to
productive statutory schemes.
Some theorists set up a simple contrast between “textualist” and
“purposivist” theories of statutory interpretation.
1
We urge students
to resist that simple contrast. To begin with, text and purpose are
like two blades of a scissors, you cannot interpret statutes without
deploying both. Does a “vehicles in the park” law bar ‘bicycles’? You
cannot answer that question without thinking about the text and the
purpose in tandem. A law passed to reduce noise and fumes ought
not include bicycles, while one responding to old people being
knocked down by skateboarders surely would.
2
Moreover,
“intentionalist” theories remain robust among scholars and state
1
Ginsburg & Louk 267–86; Manning & Stephenson 35–114. See John
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70 (2006);
Jonathan Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2006).
2
William Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Law: A Primer on How to Read Statutes
and the Constitution 3–11 (2016).
186
THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Ch. 6
supreme courts. Finally, none of the three foundationalist theories—
textualism, intentionalism, purposivism—can pretend to be
complete, without a theory of statutory precedents, regulatory as well
as statutory history, and substantive canons or norms. Theorizing
about statutory interpretation is not a simple matter.
In this chapter we shall consider some of the landmark
decisions, starting with Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States.
3
The Alien Contract Labor Act of 1885 prohibited anyone from
contracting with an “alien” to prepay his trans portation so that he
could journey to the United States “to perform labor or service of any
kind.” The Supreme Court’s 1892 decision held the law inapplicable
to a church’s prepayment of a pastor’s travel from England. Holy
Trinity remains a popular teaching case, because the statute is easy
to master and the issue easy to understand, because it generates
engaging debate without dividing students ideologically, and because
its eclectic reasoning lends itself to analysis from almost any
theoretical perspective—from common law historicism to
intentionalism to purposivism to textualism to pragmatism to
original meaning. As this chapter will reveal, the teacher can take
Holy Trinity anywhere pedagogically. So let’s start.
I. Common Law Historicism
At the nation’s founding, the leading source of law was
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765, with
many subsequent American editions). The treatise’s eclectic
approach to statutory interpretation directed lawyers to consider the
ordinary meaning of the text, specialized meanings of technical
terms, legislative expectations, the “reason or spirit” of the law, the
consequences of different interpretations, and a few substantive
canons or maxims of interpretation.
4
Blackstone acknowledged the
important status of Heydon’s Case (1584),
5
where the Court had
interpreted the statute expansively, to respond to the “mischief” that
had called it forth. But Blackstone’s best-known precept, somewhat
at cross-purposes with Heydon’s Case, was that statutes in
3
143 U.S. 457 (1892), excerpted and discuss ed in Bressman, Rubin & Stack
147–58; Eskridge, Brudney, Chafetz, Frickey & Garrett 410–18; Esk ridge, Gluck &
Nourse, 304–12; Ginsburg & Louk 274–82 (including lower court opinion); Manning &
Stephenson 46–58; Mikva, Lane & Gerhardt 818–23. Our analysis of Holy Trinity
draws from Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter,
and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 901 (2000); Tammy Gales
& Lawrence Solan, Revisiting a Classic Problem in Statutory Interpretation: Is a
Minister a “Laborer”?, 36 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. (Supp. Issue) 491 (2020).
4
Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *59–61
(1765).
5
76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exchequer 1584), excerpted and discussed in Hart & Sacks
1111, as well as Eskridge, Brudney, Chafetz, Frickey & Garrett 408; Ginsburg & Louk
234.
Ch. 6
THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
187
derogation of the common law are to be narrowly construed, a precept
that inspired a great deal of dynamic interpretation in the early
republic.
6
The common law itself was both historicist and evolutive. Thus,
great American common law judges such as Chancellor Kent, Chief
Justice Shaw, and Justice Story deployed the methodology flexibly,
to enable great public projects at the same time they were strictly
enforcing judge-made rights of contract and property.
7
Rooted in the
traditions and history of the English and American people, judges in
the late nineteenth century updated the common law to address the
new problems posed by the swiftly evolving American society and
economy.
8
Examples of their critical historicism were the labor law
decisions of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. (of the Massachusetts
and then the U.S. Supreme Court) and the New York Court of
Appeals’ decision in Riggs v. Palmer,
9
which created an equitable
exception to the terms of a will whose text would have left the
decedent’s property to his murderer.
Justice David Brewer was an old-fashioned common law judge
from Kansas, who carried that philosophy into his Holy Trinity
opinion. Heydon’s Case and other equitable interpretation precedents
were critical background for understanding Brewer’s reference to the
“spirit” of the 1885 law over its “letter,” but one normative foundation
for the decision was the common law formalism that undergirded the
Court’s freedom-of-contract jurisprudence. Modern critics of Holy
Trinity properly take it to task for its dismissal of text -based
arguments and for the sectarian “Christian Nation” soliloquy that
closed the opinion, but the critics have been unmindful of the
opinion’s roots in Blackstone, Heydon’s Case, and even Lochner. In a
country where the borders had substantially been open, national
immigration rules were a novelty, and Brewer himself had dissented
from Congress’s exclusion of Chinese immigrants. In Holy Trinity, he
narrowly construed a law that did not exclude immigrants but homed
in on employer contracts with them—and the case itself abrogated
the sacred freedom of contract between a church and its British
pastor, a feature of the case which mobilized religious free exercise
6
William Eskridge Jr., All about Words: Early Understandings of the
“Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretatio n, 1776–1806, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 990
(2001) (detailed analysis of Marshall’s interpretation of admiralty laws).
7
Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the
Collaborative Era of American Statutory Interpretation, 77 Md. L. Rev. 712 (2018).
8
David Rabban, Law’s History: American Legal Thought and the
Transatlantic Turn to History (2013); Robert G ordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst
and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography , 10 Law & Soc’y
Rev. 9 (1975).
9
22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889), excerpted and discussed in Hart & Sacks 80–85;
Manning & Stephenson 38–46.

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