The Year in Review 2000: Cases from Alaska Supreme Court, Alaska Court of Appeals, U.s. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and U.s. District Court for the District of Alaska

• Publication year: 2001

§ 18 Alaska L. Rev. 71. THE YEAR IN REVIEW 2000: CASES FROM ALASKA SUPREME COURT, ALASKA COURT OF APPEALS, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, AND U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

Alaska Law Review
Volume 18
Cited: 18 Alaska L. Rev. 71

THE YEAR IN REVIEW 2000: CASES FROM ALASKA SUPREME COURT, ALASKA COURT OF APPEALS, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, AND U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

Jonathan M. Werner ^[*]

I. INTRODUCTION

II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

III. BUSINESS LAW

IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Costs and Attorney's Fees

B. Damages

C. Miscellaneous

V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Due Process

B. Miscellaneous

VI. CRIMINAL LAW

A. Constitutional Protections

B. General Criminal Law

VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW

A. Discrimination

B. Labor Law

C. Workers' Compensation

D. Miscellaneous

VIII. FAMILY LAW

A. Child Support

B. Child Custody

C. Dissolution of Marriage and Distribution of Marital Property

IX. INSURANCE LAW

X. PROPERTY LAW

XI. TORT LAW

APPENDIX CASES OMITTED FROM THE 2000 YEAR IN REVIEW

FOOTNOTES

[*pg 72]

I. INTRODUCTION

The Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions handed down in 2000 by the Alaska Supreme Court, the Alaska Court of Appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska. The summaries focus on the substantive areas of the law addressed, the statutes or common law principles interpreted, and the essence of each of the holdings. Attorneys are advised not to rely upon the information contained in this review without further reference to the cases cited. Please note that memorandum decisions and unpublished opinions are not included in The Year in Review.

The opinions have been grouped according to general subject matter rather than the nature of the underlying claims. The summaries are presented alphabetically in the following ten areas of the law: administrative, business, civil procedure, constitutional, criminal, employment, family, insurance, property, and tort.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

In Akiak Native Community v. United States Postal Service, ^[1] the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Postal Service. ^[2] The plaintiffs, several Alaska Native communities, sued the U.S. Postal Service, arguing that the latter's plan to serve the communities by hovercraft rather than by aircraft violated both the Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZMA") and the National Environmental [*pg 73] Policy Act ("NEPA"). ^[3] Under CZMA, any development projects in a coastal zone must be consistent "to the maximum extent practicable" with approved state management programs. ^[4] The U.S. Postal Service provided a "consistency determination" to the State, which granted its approval. ^[5] The court found that plaintiffs' reasons to enjoin the hovercraft project were not compelling. ^[6] The plaintiffs also argued that the U.S. Postal Service's Environmental Assessment, required under NEPA, failed to assess adequately the risks of, or the alternatives to, the hovercraft plan. ^[7] The court found these claims unwarranted, holding that the Environmental Assessment met all of the criteria required by NEPA, and thus affirmed the district court's summary judgment. ^[8]

In State v. Kalve, ^[9] the court of appeals held that the Federal Submerged Lands Act works as a concurrent regulation with state regulations and does not grant exclusive federal control. ^[10] The court reversed the superior court's decision to dismiss claims against the defendant, Kalve, a fisherman charged with illegally fishing in closed state waters. ^[11] Kalve was provided a federal license that enabled him to fish in certain state waters. ^[12] By emergency regulation, the State of Alaska prohibited certain types of fishing in state waters and Kalve subsequently was cited for fishing in these waters. ^[13] The district court granted Kalve's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the "paramountcy doctrine" grants federal supremacy in state waters. ^[14] The court of appeals reversed, holding that the paramountcy doctrine does not apply since the Federal Submerged Lands Act gives states control over certain territorial waters and "the authority to regulate natural resources within those waters." ^[15] Additionally, the federal regulations were "not intended to supplant applicable state regulations." ^[16]

[*pg 74]

In American International Group v. Uallen Carriere, ^[17] the supreme court held that Alaska Statutes section23.30.155(f) "imposes a continuing duty to satisfy the fourteen-day requirement with tender of a negotiable instrument." ^[18] Carriere had requested a stop payment on a workers' compensation check underwritten by American International Group ("AIG"). ^[19] When AIG failed to send a replacement check within fourteen days, Carriere filed a claim for a twenty-five percent late payment penalty under Alaska Statutes section 23.30.155(f). ^[20] The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied his claim because the initial check had been mailed on time. ^[21] The superior court reversed the agency's decision. ^[22] On appeal, the supreme court upheld the superior court's decision, holding that, by requesting a stop payment on the initial check, Carriere had reinstated the fourteen-day obligation. ^[23] Further, the statute does not allow discretion for mailing the payment within a "commercially reasonable" time. ^[24]

In City of St. Mary's v. St. Mary's Native Corp., ^[25] the supreme court held that a city council could repeal an exemption to a voter-approved sales tax without resubmitting the repeal to public vote. ^[26] Voters in the City of St. Mary's passed a ballot measure in 1986 to levy a three percent sales tax. ^[27] St. Mary's city council implemented the voter-approved sales tax, but limited application of the three percent tax to the first $1000 of each sales transaction. ^[28] In 1994, the council moved to repeal the exemption and held public hearings after posting notice in various local establishments. ^[29] The repeal ordinance passed over the objections of the defendants, Alaska Commercial Company ("ACC") and St. Mary's Native Corporation ("SMNC"), who later refused to pay the excess tax. ^[30] The supreme court, overturning summary judgment to ACC and SMNC, held that the repeal did not require submission for public vote because the ordinance neither increased "the rate of levy" of a [*pg 75] sales tax nor created a "new" sales tax under Alaska Statutes section 29.45.670. ^[31] The court held that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether giving notice of the council meeting in the Tundra Drums newspaper would have satisfied Alaska Statutes section 29.45.670's mandatory requirement that local governments publish notice in a newspaper of general circulation if such a newspaper exists in a community. ^[32]

In Department of Commerce and Economic Development v. Schnell, ^[33] the supreme court reversed the superior court's ruling that estopped the Division of Insurance (the "Division") from suspending or conditioning Schnell's insurance agent license, and ordered the Division to reconsider its sanctions decision on remand. ^[34] In 1992, Schnell was convicted of felony false declaration in connection with his 1987 petition for personal bankruptcy. ^[35] In an attempt to revoke Schnell's insurance agent license, the Division conducted a hearing in 1993 on the matter, but rejected the hearing officer's proposed sanctions. ^[36] Schnell's license was renewed until 1995, when a new Division director issued a final decision on the matter and suspended Schnell's license for six months. ^[37] On appeal, the superior court held that the State was estopped from sanctioning Schnell. ^[38] The supreme court reversed the superior court, because the Division never asserted, by its conduct or words, that the matter was resolved; therefore, the Division was not estopped from sanctioning Schnell. ^[39] In addition, the doctrine of laches did not bar the State's action because laches does not bar claims caused by adjudicatory delay. ^[40] However, because Schnell did not have an opportunity to present evidence of his post-1992 conduct, the court remanded and instructed the Division to consider current evidence in sanctioning Schnell. ^[41]

In Department of Public Safety v. Shakespeare, ^[42] the supreme court held that the Department of Public Safety could not revoke an arrestee's driver's license for her initial refusal to take a breath [*pg 76] test when she subsequently changed her mind and the test was administered. ^[43] Shakespeare was arrested for driving while intoxicated ("DWI") and was taken to the local state trooper detachment for a breath test. ^[44] She refused to take the breath test and was notified that the Department of Public Safety, under Alaska's implied consent statutes, ^[45] would revoke her license administratively as a consequence. ^[46] Shortly after surrendering her license, Shakespeare changed her mind. ^[47] Although the police permitted Shakespeare to take a breath test and obtained potentially probative results, the Department of Public Safety revoked Shakespeare's license administratively based on her initial refusal to take a breath test. ^[48] The supreme court held that it would be "unfair and inconsistent" to revoke...