The Virtues of Everyday Talk: The Enduring Significance of John Milton’s Theory of Expressive Liberties

• Date: 01 August 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/0090591720966267
• Published date: 01 August 2021
• Author: Chloé Bakalar
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591720966267

Political Theory

2021, Vol. 49(4) 584 –612

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0090591720966267

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Article

The Virtues of Everyday

Talk: The Enduring

Significance of John

Milton’s Theory of

Expressive Liberties

Chloé Bakalar

Abstract

The system of free expression John Milton defends in Areopagitica, a pamphlet

against prior restraint in publishing, is often characterized as merely a

proto-liberal, truth-based marketplace of ideas theory. But this represents a

misunderstanding of Milton’s views on the freedoms of conscience, speech,

and the press. The tendency in political theory, philosophy, and law to reduce

the “free speech Milton” to Areopagitica, and the reduction of that essay to

several soundbites, has meant sidelining both the significant exceptions to

expressive liberties that Milton calls for and also the role of the social in

his theory. This incomplete characterization has enabled Milton’s misuse in

First Amendment discourse and jurisprudence, where he is made to support

hierarchical approaches to free speech that privilege public political speech

and are therefore ill-equipped to address the full range of communicative

experiences. More comprehensive readings of Milton, however, reveal both

certain limits to free expression, and also deep consideration for a wide

range of speech acts. By reading Milton’s theory of expressive liberties in

light of the justifications he provides for those freedoms—i.e., virtue-building

and Truth-seeking—this essay provides a fuller account of his views. What

emerges is a distinctly Miltonian, virtue-driven “political theory of everyday

1Political Science, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Chloé Bakalar, Assistant Professor, Political Science, Temple University, 1115 Polett Walk,

#455, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA.

Email: chloe.bakalar@temple.edu

966267PTXXXX10.1177/0090591720966267Political TheoryBakalar

research-article2020

Bakalar 585

talk” that locates value in even the most ordinary communicative acts.

This theory—embracing both verbal and nonverbal expression—not only

complements existing political theories of the everyday but can also help

illuminate contemporary free speech concerns, many of which stem from

the libertarian approach to expressive liberties that Milton (inadvertently)

helped inspire.

Keywords

freedom of speech, John Milton, everyday talk, censorship, virtue, expressive

liberties

And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so

Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt

her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the

wors, in a free and open encounter?

John Milton, Areopagitica1

Freedom to “think as you will and speak as you think” enjoys unparalleled

esteem in liberal democracies.2 Expressive liberties feature at the center of

debates on political legitimacy, and lawmakers consistently conceptualize

these freedoms as fundamental rights, often placing them first and foremost

on lists of legal and human rights. But while there is broad consensus that

expressive liberties form the bedrock of liberal democracy, the variation in

how these freedoms are imagined and enacted suggests that the ideal con-

tours of freedom of conscience, speech, and the press are less clear. In the

United States, debates wage on over what expression has merit, what does

not, and the bases upon which these determinations are made. As much of

this discussion is framed in terms of legal rights, it is often bounded by that

speech deemed to be “at the heart of the First Amendment’s protections”—

namely, speech in the public sphere and/or addressing issues of clear public

importance.3 Speech concerning “matters of purely private concern,” by con-

trast, has been judged to be “of less First Amendment concern.”4 Seemingly

apolitical speech in (semi-)private spaces thus receives less consideration,

(often) less protection, and less consistent treatment.5

The lack of clarity regarding private speech—Elena Kagan once summa-

rized this jurisprudence as “largely a mess, resisting any coherent under-

standing”6—is increasingly problematic. As information technologies have

evolved alongside norms and practices that challenge the distinction between