The Value-Free Aristotle and the Behavioral Sciences
| Published date | 01 March 1970 |
| Author | Charles N.R. McCoy |
| Date | 01 March 1970 |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591297002300103 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
57
THE
VALUE-FREE
ARISTOTLE
AND
THE
BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES
CHARLES
N.
R.
McCOY
University
of
Santa
Clara
N
THE
CONTROVERSY
on
facts
versus
values
in
political
science
the
assumption
seems
generally
to
be
made
that
classical
political
philosophy
is
the
bastion
of
the
&dquo;value
approach&dquo;
and
that
modern
political
philosophy
has
freed
itself
for
a
&dquo;scientific&dquo;
study
of
&dquo;facts.&dquo;
I
would
like
to
suggest
that
there
is
a
very
real
and
profound
sense
in
which
classical
political
philosophy
-
and
that
of
Aristotle
in
particular
-
is
value-free
-
value-free
but
not
ethically
neutral;
and
that
modern
theory,
while
ethically
neutral,
is
distinguished
indeed
by
a
preoccupa-
tion
with
value
such
as
was
quite
absent
from
the
classical
treatment
of
politics.
My
suggestion
may
serve,
I
would
hope,
to
narrow
the
&dquo;unbridgeable
intellectual
gulf
[which
separates]
today
as
in
the
past ...
the
noumenalist
political
philosophers
and
the
exponents
of
naturalist
behavioral
political
science.&dquo;’-
1
I
A
preliminary
observation
will
serve
to
suggest
the
general
thesis
which
I
wish
to
develop.
After
Aristotle
had
delineated
his
absolutely
best
form
of
government
-
the
Royal
polity
-
he
noted
a
curious
defect
of
this
&dquo;best&dquo;
regime:
there
is
no
par-
ticipation
by
the
citizens
who
have
turned
the
care
of
the
polity
over
to
the
most
virtuous
man;
and
the
ruler
himself
&dquo;can
no
longer
be
regarded
as
part
of
a
state.&dquo;
2
This
paradoxical
outcome
led
Aristotle
to
conclude
that
&dquo;legislation
is
necessarily
concerned
only
with
those
who
are
equal
in
birth
and
capacity;
and
that
for
men
of
pre-eminent
virtue
there
is
no
law.&dquo;
3 In
his
Commentary
on
the
Politics
at
this
point,
St.
Thomas
Aquinas
observes
that
Aristotle’s
best
regime
is
supra-political
or
meta-political.
And
he
adds
that
the
assumption
that
no
one
but
a
citizen
should
rule
is
an
assumption
that
simply
does
not
hold
in
the
Royal
polity,
which
is
above
both
law
and
citizenship:
&dquo;Just
as
he
who
rules
by
the
excellence
of
his
virtue
is
not
a
citizen
but
above
citizenship,
so
in
the
same
way
members
of
the
best
polity
are
above
citizenship
by
reason
of
the
excellence
of
their
conduct.&dquo; ~
It
would
thus
appear
that
the
law
and
the
polity
do
not
concern
themselves
directly
and
by
their
proper
structure
with
the
excellence
of
virtue.
1
William
T.
Bluhm,
Theories
of
the
Political
System
(Englewood
Cliffs;
Prentice-Hall,
1965),
p.
483.
"The
division
can
be
seen,
in
fact,
throughout
the
history
of
political
ideas.
On
the
one
hand,
we
have
those
who
think
that
an
adequate
political
science
can
only
be
founded
on
insight
into
the
’true’
political
good,
understood
as
a
system
of
tran-
scendent
values
and
rules
of
action.
On
the
other,
there
are
those
who
either
deny
the
existence
of
such
an
order
or
cannot
see
its
relevance
to
political
inquiry.
They
take
ultimate
values
as
something
empirically
’given,’
psychologically
as
opposed
to
meta-
physically
’given.’
"
Ibid.
2
Politics
III.
1284a
5.
3
Ibid.,
5-12.
4
In
VIII
Libros
Politicorum
Exposito,
seu
de
Rebus
Civilibus.
Vol.
21
of
the
Parma
Opera
Omnia
(New
York:
Musurgia
Press
Publishers,
1949),
Book
III,
Lectio
XII,
pp.
364-
466.
58
This
brief
consideration
reveals
two
underlying
principles
of
classical
political
philosophy:
First,
that
the
quality
of
human
life
is
the
ultimate
concern
of
politics;
second,
that
this
concern
goes
hand
and
hand
with
freedom
for
the
spirit
-
a
free-
dom
so
essential
to
the
very
notion
of
&dquo;polity&dquo;
that
it
prohibits
the
state
from
directly
regulating
by
law
the
quality
of
human
life.
With
great
precision
Aristotle
withdrew
from
the
determination
of
the
politician
all
matters
of
speculative
truth:
neither
in
what
precisely
&dquo;the
good&dquo;
consists,
nor
the
interior
truth
of
theoretic
science
is
a
matter
for
human
determination.
&dquo;Political&dquo;
rule
is
defined
indeed
pre-
cisely
in
terms
of
the
free
man’s
immunity
from
compulsion
to
the
true
&dquo;good&dquo;:
if
this
immunity
did
not
mark
the
rule,
then
the
rule
would
be
the
opposite
of
&dquo;political,&dquo;
namely,
&dquo;despotic.&dquo;
Following
Aristotle’s
teaching
on
this
matter,
St.
Thomas
writes
that
although
virtue
is
the
end
at
which
every
lawmaker
aims,
it
does
not
itself
come
under
the
precept
of
law.
&dquo;Political&dquo;
refers
to
the
man
who
is
&dquo;causa
sui,&dquo;
cause
of
himself,
and
as
such
he
enjoys
the
liberty
of
contrariety
with
respect
to
good
and
evil.
The
state
is
absolutely
required
to
protect
those
who,
without
being
good
men,
obey
the
penal
laws.
If,
to
be
sure,
the
true
good
is
the
motivating
principle
of
all
human
conduct,
it
does
not
constitute
the
structure
itself
of
political
life
but
is
a
meta-political
principle
that
sustains
the
structure
as
a
hidden
dynamic
force.
In
Aristotle’s
teaching
the
dynamic
role
played
by
the
idea
of
the
good
is
set
forth
in
the
Ethics
and
the
Metaphysics.
Inquiring
into
the
worthwhileness
of
political
life,
Aristotle
offers
two
different
lines
of
consideration:
The
first
is
proper
to
what
I
have
called
the
structure
of
politics
and
consists
in
analyzing
the
nature
of
the
political
community
as
one
of
free
men
having
the
freedom
of
&dquo;moral
action,&dquo;
that
is,
action
which
depends
not
on
a
natural
power
determined
to
its
act,
but
on
a
power
that
is
indifferently
disposed
to
many
different
things
contained
under
the
notion
of
the
good,
whether
true
good
or
having
the
appearance
of
good.
The
second
approach
to
the
ground
of
the
goodness
of
political
life
is
meta-political;
it
is
to
be
found
in
considerations
that
lie
beyond
the
directly
pertinent
ones
of
struc-
ture.
In
the
opening
chapters
of
the Ethics
Aristotle
maintains
that
the
ultimate
end
of
all
the
things
we
do
is
the
first
principle
or
first
reason
for
doing
all
the
lesser
things:
whether
building
a
ship
or
curing
the
body
or
engaging
in
politics;
and
in
the
Tenth
Book
this
ultimate
end
of
all
the
things
we
do
turns
out
to
be
contemplation
of
the
order
of
the
universe
and
of
that
principle
upon
which
the
order
depends.5
For
man
is
&dquo;a
little
world,&dquo;
Aristotle
points
out,
not
only
in
the
sense
that
he
contains
all
the
degrees
of
natural
being
within
himself,
but
more
profoundly
in
that
he
uses
the
resources
of
art
to
draw
to
himself
all
the
richness
of
the
world
diffused
in
space
and
time.
The
goodness
of
political
life
is
said
to
consist
ultimately
in
the
political
order
being
an
imitation
of
the
order
of
the
universe
in
which
-
together
with
God
upon
whom
the
order
depends
-
consists
the
highest
good.
This
is
why
Aristotle
says
in
the
Ethics
that
if
the
good
is
the
same
for
a
single
man
and
for
a
whole
community,
that
of
the
whole
community
of
men
is
&dquo;more
divine&dquo;;
he
calls
it
more
divine
because
it
is
a
more
perfect
likeness
of
the
good
of
the
universe
and
of
the
ultimate
essential
goodness
which
draws
all
things
to
itself.
5
Ethics
X.
1178b-25;
see
Metaph.
XII.
1075a
12.
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