The Unintended Consequences of Democracy Promotion: International Organizations and Democratic Backsliding

• DOI: 10.1177/0010414019897689
• Author: Anna M. Meyerrose
• Published date: 01 September 2020
• Date: 01 September 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414019897689

Comparative Political Studies

2020, Vol. 53(10-11) 1547 –1581

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0010414019897689

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Article

The Unintended

Consequences of

Democracy Promotion:

International

Organizations and

Democratic Backsliding

Anna M. Meyerrose1

Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, international organizations (IOs) have engaged

in unprecedented levels of democracy promotion, and research overwhelmingly

links them to positive democratic outcomes. However, this increased emphasis

on democracy has more recently been accompanied by rampant illiberalism

and a sharp rise in cases of democratic backsliding in new democracies.

What explains democratic backsliding in an age of unparalleled international

support for democracy? Backsliding occurs when democratic institutions are

weakened or eroded by elected officials, resulting in an illiberal or diminished

form of democracy. I argue that IOs that support democracy unintentionally

make backsliding more likely by neglecting to promote democratic institutions

other than executives and elections, increasing executive power, and limiting

states’ domestic policy options, which stunts institutional development. I find

membership in IOs associated with democracy promotion makes backsliding

more likely, decreases checks on executive power, and limits domestic policy

options and party development in new democracies.

Keywords

democratization and regime change, globalization, intergovernmental relations,

political parties

1Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA

Corresponding Author:

Anna M. Meyerrose, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, 1501 Neil Ave., Columbus,

OH 43201, USA.

Email: meyerrose.2@osu.edu

897689CPSXXX10.1177/0010414019897689Comparative Political StudiesMeyerrose

research-article2020

1548 Comparative Political Studies 53(10-11)

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, international democracy promotion has been on

the rise, the percent of democracy supporting international organizations (IOs)

has risen significantly, and research overwhelmingly finds IOs are positive

forces for democracy (Donno, 2013; Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2008; Nygard,

2017; Pevehouse, 2005; Poast & Urpelainen, 2018). However, this increased

emphasis on democracy has been accompanied by democratic backsliding in

states where democratization was heavily influenced by the international com-

munity. For example, in 2004 Hungary joined the European Union (EU), an

IO strongly associated with democracy promotion. However, beginning in

2011, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, eliminated constitutional

checks on executive power, diminished judicial independence, limited media

pluralism, and modified the electoral system—all by legal means—to consoli-

date his power. Orbán proclaimed liberal democracy has failed in Hungary,

advocating instead illiberal democracy. Similar and more extreme trends have

emerged in Bolivia, Malawi, Turkey, and other new democracies, despite their

membership in IOs associated with democracy, such as the Organization of

American States (OAS), the African Union, and the Council of Europe.

What explains democratic backsliding in an age of unparalleled interna-

tional support for democracy? Democratic backsliding occurs when elected

officials weaken or erode democratic institutions and results in an illiberal or

diminished form of democracy, rather than autocracy. Although research has

identified case-specific causes of backsliding (Berman, 2016; Hanley & Sikk,

2016; Hernandez & Kriesi, 2016; Krastev, 2016; Rupnik, 2016), no systematic

theories of this phenomenon exist (Waldner & Lust, 2018). On the interna-

tional side, authors have critiqued foreign aid and democracy assistance, sug-

gesting they have limited and even deleterious effects (Bush, 2015; Carnegie

& Marniov, 2017; Henderson, 2003; Knack, 2004; Savage, 2017; Wedel,

2001), while others have shown how regional powers engage in autocracy

promotion (Finkel & Brudny, 2012). However, few have investigated the role

of IOs in particular, and how they might contribute to backsliding.

Drawing on institutional theories of democracy, I argue that although IOs

often serve as a critical impetus for democratic transitions, they also uninten-

tionally sow the seeds for future democratic erosion and backsliding. They do

this by both failing to support and even stunting democratic institutional

development. Democratic success is contingent on the strength of institutions

that organize mass participation in politics, aggregate societal interests, and

enable the state to both govern effectively and, critically, limit itself

(Huntington, 1968). These institutions include developed political parties,

strong legislatures, independent judiciaries, and general state capacity. IOs

Meyerrose 1549

commonly associated with democratic outcomes focus predominantly on

elites and elections, but neglect other democratic institutions. This narrow

focus makes states more susceptible to backsliding.

IOs also more directly contribute to democratic backsliding in new democ-

racies, in two ways. First, due to how they interact with states, IOs increase

relative executive power. IOs’ democracy support focuses in particular on

elite incentives and resources, and executives serve as the primary intermedi-

aries between their states and IOs. This shifts the domestic balance of power

in favor of executives. As states join additional organizations, executives

have further opportunities to increase their power.

Second, IO membership requirements constrain states’ domestic policy

options; this impedes institutional development. Political parties and legisla-

tures in new democracies develop by advocating and debating meaningful

policy alternatives. However, when options are limited by external policy

requirements, these institutions remain underdeveloped. Diminished policy

options also constrain leaders’ ability to govern effectively and provide pub-

lic goods. Unable to appeal to voters based on records of effective gover-

nance or policy alternatives, executives instead erode institutional checks on

their power. This is easier when horizontal institutions of accountability, such

as parties and legislatures, are weak. In short, IO membership simultaneously

increases relative executive power, while membership requirements con-

strain domestic institutional development. In these ways, increased IO mem-

bership makes backsliding more likely in new democracies.

IOs are associated with overall higher levels of democracy when compared

with autocracy (Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2006; Pevehouse, 2005; Poast &

Urpelainen, 2018). Extending this existing research, I show that although

these organizations promote transitions to minimalist democracy, they are

more limited in their ability to promote ongoing democratic progress or con-

solidation among new democracies, and can even unintentionally contribute

to backsliding, or negative changes in a state’s level of democracy. I find that

increased membership in three groups of IOs associated with democratic

success—democratically committed, political or economic, and structured or

interventionist IOs—corresponds with subsequent backsliding. I also test and

find support for the proposed mechanisms linking IOs and backsliding:

increased relative executive power and domestic policy constraints.

International Democracy Promotion and

Backsliding on the Rise

IOs are prominent in studies of international democracy promotion with

research finding they can support democratic transitions and consolidation