The unbundled union: politics without collective bargaining.

• Author: Sachs, Benjamin I.
• Position: II. Unions and Representational Inequality C. Collective Bargaining and Union Decline through Conclusion, with footnotes, p. 176-207

3. Collective Bargaining and Union Decline

   In part due to unions' ability to take advantage of the workplace as a locus of organizational activity, unions historically have been an effective political voice for the poor and middle class. The problem, from the perspective of representational equality, is that unionization rates have been falling consistently across the last several decades and have now fallen to levels not seen since before the Wagner Act was passed in 1935. (128) Scholars have devoted significant attention recently to the consequences for American politics of this decline in unionization rates. (129) Nearly all--including Gilens, Bartels, Hacker and Pierson, and Schlozman et al.--point to the decline in union strength as a major explanation for the growth in representational inequality. (130) Hacker and Pierson summarize the consensus this way:

   No group better captures the mid-century influence of voluntary organizations representing middle-and working-class Americans than organized labor ... [But] as unions shifted from confident involvement in politics to embattled defense of their ever-smaller pocket of the workforce, they also ceased to be able, or always willing, to play the role as champions of the broad middle class they had carved out in their heyday. (131) There is a long-running debate over the specific causes of this decline in unionization. (132) The leading theories point to increasing competitiveness of product markets, (133) shifts in production methods and systems of work organization, (134) and managerial opposition to unionization. (135) Fortunately, we need not attempt to resolve this debate here because all of the leading theories place collective bargaining at the center of the story of union decline. It might be that collective bargaining raises wages and benefits above competitive levels and thereby puts unionized employers at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis non-union firms in newly competitive markets. (136) It might be that collective bargaining imposes a set of inflexible work rules that stand in the way of much-needed flexibility. (137) Or it might be that, given both of the above, collective bargaining inspires deep managerial hostility to the union project. (138) But, whatever the mechanism, the consensus view is that unions are in decline--largely, if not entirely--because of their collective bargaining function. (139)

   To see this, take the concern about increasingly competitive markets. The argument is a plausible one and asserts that unions were able to thrive at a moment in U.S. history when markets were nearly oligopolistic. (140) As markets globalized and became increasingly competitive, however, collective bargaining--which drove up labor costs at unionized firms--undermined the ability of union employers to compete with non-union ones. The result was significant loss of market share for unionized companies and dramatic declines in unionization rates. (141)

   Or take the concern about the changing nature of work. As Katherine Stone documents, the era of mass industrial production was one in which "[e]mployers sought uniformity in products and processes in order to achieve economies of scale." (142) These production processes lent themselves to narrow job definitions and long-term employment relationships. (143) In this setting, according to Stone's account, collective bargaining agreements that enforced rigid job rules and strict seniority rights made sense. But because our economy is no longer defined by mass production industries organized in this fashion, Stone argues, unions' insistence that collective bargaining agreements dictate work rules, seniority protections, and the like is out of place. (144)

   Finally, take managerial opposition to unionization. Although there is some debate about the specifics, the prevalence, ferocity, and effectiveness of managerial opposition to unionization is well established. In one prominent study, for example, employers engaged in anti-union efforts in 96% of the union organizing campaigns they faced; (145) in another study, the opposition rate was 98.4%. (146) In about half of all union campaigns, moreover, employers threaten to close the business should employees choose to unionize. (147) Employers also fire between 5% and 20% of active union supporters. (148) Not surprisingly, these tactics work: when management threatens to close the business or fires union supporters, union win rates decline significantly. (149) Even where there is a successful unionization campaign, moreover, management frequently engages in efforts to avoid concluding a collective bargaining agreement. These tactics, also often successful, have further contributed to the decline in unionization rates as initial union organizing victories fail to become institutionalized and lead instead to the decertification of the union as the employees' bargaining representative. (150)

   Managerial opposition to unionization has everything to do with collective bargaining. In fact, management opposes unions for two primary reasons: one, to secure competitive labor costs, and, two, to maintain control over the way work is organized and carried out. (151) Collective bargaining agreements can impede both of these managerial objectives. First, collective bargaining often requires unionized firms to pay more in labor costs than their non-union competitors. (152) Second, as Stone's work emphasizes, collective bargaining also often restricts managerial control over the workplace. Thus, for example, collective bargaining agreements generally include just-cause dismissal clauses that restrict management's ability to discharge employees and thereby to control how those employees behave. (153) The work rules contained in most collective bargaining agreements have a similar effect: rather than allowing management to determine how work at the firm is performed, these clauses specify which workers are to perform which tasks and set out with some precision how those tasks are to be performed. Seniority agreements, job-bidding systems, bumping rights, and analogous collective bargaining clauses likewise diminish managerial control over how the workplace is organized and thereby fuel managerial opposition. (154)

   Collective bargaining has significant merits. Over the last half century, the practice has been a key contributor to economic equality in the United States,155 and collective bargaining helps correct market failures that plague individual employment contracting?S6 But, as the above discussion makes dear, collective bargaining is also a central factor in each of the primary explanations for the decline of unions.

   3. THE UNBUNDLED UNION: LIBERATING POLITICS FROM COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

   The last Part argued that collective bargaining has, for a number of reasons, made it difficult for traditional unions to thrive under contemporary conditions. But because unions' political and collective bargaining functions are bundled, all of the collective-bargaining-related reasons for unions' decline--that is to say, essentially all of the reasons for union decline--are also impediments to workers' ability to use unions as a vehicle for political organizing. Bundling, in short, holds unions' political-organizational capabilities captive to the fortunes of collective bargaining.

   Because unions' political and collective bargaining functions are bundled, a resurgence of traditional unions would increase the political voice of lower-and middle-income groups. (157) But rehabilitating unions as a vehicle for political organizing does not require a resurgence of traditional unions. (158) To the contrary, political organizing can be advanced by unbundling the political and collective bargaining functions of the union.

   This is true for a reason that will now be obvious. In an unbundled regime, the fact that collective bargaining can be incompatible with contemporary forms of work organization, that it can create problems for firms operating in modern markets, and that it inspires fierce managerial opposition would be irrelevant to workers' political efforts because those efforts could now proceed independently of collective bargaining. Unbundling, that is to say, would immediately insulate political organizing efforts from the vulnerabilities of collective bargaining. Unbundling would also expand the range of employees for whom political organizing through the union form is a viable option. As we have seen, employees who wish to organize politically through a union can do so only if they also choose to organize for collective bargaining. But a substantial portion of the U.S. labor force does not desire to bargain collectively with their employers. (159) An unbundled regime would thus allow the half of the labor force that does not want collective bargaining to take advantage of the union as a political vehicle.

   The third reason to predict that unbundling will facilitate political organizing is the focus of this Part: namely, political unions would likely generate less managerial opposition than traditional collective bargaining unions generate. It is important to clarify at the outset, however, what this Part does and does not argue. The argument here is that unbundling the union would likely decrease--though not eliminate--managerial opposition to employee organizing efforts. There are groups other than firm management that oppose unions' political efforts. The Chamber of Commerce and the National Right to Work Committee are prominent examples. (160) More recently, individuals like the Koch brothers have played a similar role, sponsoring a 2012 ballot initiative in California that would have prohibited even voluntary dues deductions for political purposes. (161) Many elected officials also oppose unions' political efforts. Scott Walker, the Republican Governor of Wisconsin, is a leading contemporary example. (162)

   With respect to these groups and individuals, two points bear...