The Top Cases of 2020
| Publication year | 2021 |
| Author | By Ramit Mizrahi, Andrew H. Friedman, and Anthony J. Oncidi |
By Ramit Mizrahi, Andrew H. Friedman, and Anthony J. Oncidi
Ramit Mizrahi is the founder of Mizrahi Law, APC in Pasadena, where she represents employees exclusively. She is Chair of the Pasadena Bar Association Labor and Employment Law Section and Past Chair of the CLA Labor and Employment Law Section. She can be reached at ramit@mizrahilaw. com. Andrew H. Friedman is a partner with Helmer Friedman LLP in Beverly Hills, where he primarily represents employees in all areas of employment law. Mr. Friedman is the author of a leading employment law practice guide—Litigating Employment Discrimination Cases (James Publishing, 2005-2020). He can be reached at afriedman@helmerfriedman.com. Anthony J. Oncidi is a partner in and the Chair of the Labor and Employment Department of Proskauer Rose LLP in Los Angeles, where he exclusively represents employers and management in all areas of employment and labor law. His telephone number is (310) 284-5690 and his email address is aoncidi@proskauer.com.
2020 has been a year like no other. Despite the pandemic, and civil trials grinding to a halt, the appellate courts have continued to hand down significant new decisions. It has been a mixed bag for both employers and employees.
The Supreme Court offered one major victory to employees and one to employers, while also effectively providing a split-decision in a third. In Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,1 a historic 6-3 decision authored by Justice Gorsuch and released during Pride Month, the Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The court declared: "An employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids."2 In essence, it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being LGBT+without discriminating against that individual based on sex. Left unresolved for another day: (1) issues surrounding sex-segregated bathrooms, locker rooms, dress codes, and so on, and (2) circumstances in which Title VII's requirements may clash with some employers' religious convictions under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).
Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru,3 consolidated with Kristen Biel v. St. James Sch., explored the ministerial exception, a court-created doctrine that recognizes a First Amendment bar to employment discrimination claims by certain employees of religious entities. Kristen Biel was a Catholic elementary school teacher who sued for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act when her contract was not renewed after she informed the school of her breast cancer and need for time off. Agnes Morrissey-Berru was a Catholic elementary school teacher who sued her school for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), alleging that she was demoted and her contract was not renewed so that she could be replaced by a younger teacher. In both cases, the district court granted summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit reversed. In this 7-2 opinion, the Supreme Court held that the ministerial exemption applied in both cases, despite the fact that both teachers primarily taught secular subjects, did not have ministerial titles, and had no significant formal religious training. "When a school with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the school and the teacher threatens the school's independence in a way that the First Amendment does not allow."4 This decision gives religious institutions broad discretion to determine whom they deem to hold ministerial roles, and leaves many more employees of religious institutions without recourse for discrimination.
In Babb v. Wilkie,5 an 8-to-1 decision written by Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., the Supreme Court eased the burden for federal employees to prove age discrimination. The Court rejected a "but for" test and, instead, held that the federal government could be liable for age discrimination if it considered an employee's age when implementing an adverse employment action even if such consideration was merely a "motivating factor" in the decision. However, the Court also held that if the plaintiff is unable to prove that age was the but-for cause of the adverse employment decision, some forms of relief, including back pay, compensatory damages, and reinstatement are not available.
[Page 8]
Once again, this was a bumper year for new wage and hour opinions, with many victories for employees.
Kim v. Reins Int'l Cal., Inc.6 addressed the question of whether an employee who settles individual wage and hour claims can remain an "aggrieved employee" with standing to seek penalties for the state under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The California Supreme Court held that the employee could still pursue PAGA penalties even after settling their individual claims. The court reasoned that, under PAGA, the plaintiff is acting on behalf of the state, and is working to "'remediate present violations and deter future ones,' not to redress employees' injuries."7
This stands in contrast to class actions, in which a "representative plaintiff [who] voluntarily settles her claim [] no longer has an interest in the class action and may lose the ability to represent the class."8 Indeed, that was the conclusion of the Ninth Circuit in Brady v. AutoZone Stores.9 It held that a class representative who settled his individual claims could not continue to represent the class, even where his settlement agreement provided that it was "not intended to settle or resolve [his] Class Claims," because he did not explicitly retain a financial stake in the outcome of the class claims.10 "Absent such a stake, a class representative's voluntary settlement of individual claims renders class claims moot."11
Barriga v. 99 Cents Only Stores LLC12 addressed the trial court's duty to scrutinize employers' use of declarations by putative class members and other employees in class certification opposition efforts. The plaintiff in the case alleged that employees were locked into the store at closing time, were not paid for the time they waited to be let out, and were denied full meal breaks when waiting to be let out. The defendant submitted 174 declarations from current and former nonexempt employees to negate these contentions. Some of the declarants, when deposed, testified that they had no idea what the lawsuit was about or why they were called to testify; most were summoned during working hours into an office by human resources and presented with a declaration for signature. The plaintiff moved to strike all 174 declarations. The trial court denied the motion to strike, concluding that it lacked statutory authority to do so. In the alternative, the trial court reasoned that there was no coercion of putative class members and it lacked the authority to review for coercion of nonputative class members. It denied the class certification motion. On appeal, the court held that "the trial court had the duty and authority to exercise control over precertification communications between parties and putative class members," that it must "carefully scrutinize the declarations . . . for coercion and abuse," and that it "misunderstood the scope of its discretion to strike or discount the evidentiary weight to be given to those declarations if it found evidence of coercion and abuse."13 The court therefore reversed the orders denying the plaintiff's motion to strike the declarations and the class certification motion.
Several court decisions addressed whether certain types of time were compensable as "hours worked." In Frlekin v. Apple Inc.,14 the California Supreme Court answered in the affirmative a question certified to it by the Ninth Circuit: "Is time spent on the employer's premises waiting for, and undergoing, required exit searches of packages, bags, or personal technology devices voluntarily brought to work purely for personal convenience by employees compensable as 'hours worked' within the meaning of Wage Order 7?" The California Supreme Court determined that time spent during bag or security...
To continue reading
Request your trial