The Ties That Bind: Ethnicity, Pro-government Militia, and the Dynamics of Violence in Civil War

• Published date: 01 May 2020
• Date: 01 May 2020
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0022002719883684
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

The Ties That Bind:

Ethnicity, Pro-

government Militia,

and the Dynamics

of Violence in Civil War

Luke Abbs

1

, Govinda Clayton

2

,

and Andrew Thomson

3

Abstract

Existing research reveals many of the ways pro-government militia (PGM) shape civil

violence but overlooks how the ethno-political ties between the state and a PGM

might influence these effects. We argue that co-ethnic militia (i.e., groups composed

of the ruling elite’s ethnic kin) are relatively loyal irregular forces that multiply state

military capacity. The greater loyalty of co-ethnic groups mitigates principal–agent

problems but further polarizes ethnic communities, and as a result, co-ethnic PGMs

are likely to be associated with longer and more intense civil conflict. We test this

argument on a global sample of cases from 1989 to 2007 using new data capturing

the ethnic ties of all PGMs. The results support our claims that co-ethnic militia are

associated with more intense and longer civil conflict.

Keywords

ethnicity, pro-government militia, count erinsurgency, civil war, conflict intensity ,

conflict duration

1

ESRC Business and Local Government Data Research Centre, University of Essex, Colchester Campus,

United Kingdom

2

Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland

3

School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics, Queen’s University Belfast, United Kingdom

Corresponding Author:

Govinda Clayton, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, C 29.1, Haldeneggsteig 4, 8092 Zurich,

Switzerland.

Email: govinda.clayton@sipo.gess.ethz.ch

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(5) 903-932

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002719883684

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How do pro-government militia (PGM) influence the dynamics of violence during

civil conflict? We develop existing theoretical accounts of how and why PGMs

shape violent conflict by incorporating co-ethnic PGM—an armed force that is

clearly pro-government, not identified as a part of the regular security force, and

recruited specifically from the ruling elite’s ethnic kin to undertake tasks in support

of their ethnic group (or a coalition of groups). PGMs have recently been shown to

influence a range of conflict conditions including regime survival, coups d’´etat,

human rights violations, one-sided violence, civil war intensity, and insurgent frag-

mentation (e.g., Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2016; Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schu-

biger 2015; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015; Roessler 2011; Pilster and Bo¨hmelt

2011). Yet to date, research overlooks how the ethnocentric recruitment of many

PGMs might influence their effect.

We argue that the strength of ties between the state and PGMs shapes their

influence on civil violence. Civilians are more likely to join a militia and engage

in violence when they are strongly bound to the state and have a common interest in

the military outcome. Moreover, according to a principal–agent logic, PGMs (i.e.,

agents) that operate outside of the state’s (i.e., principal’s) control are often likely to

engage in actions to improve their position. This is particularly the case when the

PGM operates in a high-risk context in which compliance with the state’s orders

carries significant dangers for the agent. While previous research often highlights

the principal–agent problem facing states that use a PGM, far less work has dis-

cussed the strategies states use t o mitigate this problem, particula rly within the

context of ethnic politics, and the implications that this might have on civil violence.

We argue that co-ethnic recruitment is one method often used by the state to

strengthen ties to the PGM and reduce commitment concerns resulting from the

principal–agent problem.

Broadly speaking, ethnically motivated recruitmen t can lead to two forms of

ethnic militia: co-ethnic PGMs and defector PGMs. Co-ethnic PGMs are composed

of the ruling elite’s ethnic kin (e.g., Hutu Interahamwe in Rwanda and the Shiite

militias in Iraq). Defector PGMs also fight on behalf of the state but are composed

from the anti-government population, often ethnic groups that are excluded from

power (e.g., Kurdish Village Guard in Turkey, or Home Guard in Kenya) and/or

former members of an ethnic insurgent group (e.g., former Tamil rebel groups that

joined forces with the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan government).

Co-ethnic PGMs have strong ties to the ruling elite and offer a recruitment

advantage during armed conflict that makes them highly effective force multipliers.

We therefore expect co-ethnic PGMs to be associated with greater levels of violence

during civil conflict. Despite the challenges associated with high-intensity violence,

the loyalty of co-ethnic PGMs means that they suffer less from principal–agen t

problems. Yet, the ethnicized environment they create and their willingness to

continue fighting increase polarization between communities. We expect the obser-

vable implication to be that co-ethnic PGMs are more likely to be associated with

intense and longer periods of civil conflict, which is not necessarily the case for other

904 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(5)