The Tibet factor in India-China relations.

• Author: Sikri, Rajiv
• Position: Sino-Indian Relations

Tibet is a key factor in India-China relations. It is only after the 1950 Chinese occupation of Tibet that India and China came to share the now disputed common border. In recent years, China's military buildup and infrastructure development in Tibet, as well as reported plans to divert or dam rivers that rise in Tibet and flow into India, have raised India's anxieties. Conversely, China's insecurity about Tibet is an important driver of its approach toward India. India has been unable to assuage China's fears about its possible use of the presence of the Dalai Lama in India and its large Tibetan refugee population of about 120,000 to create trouble for China in Tibet. The presence of the Dalai Lama and a large community of Tibetan refugees in India has kept the "Tibetan question" alive. Given India's open democratic system and long tradition of giving refuge to persecuted peoples, India will find it politically impossible to meet China's expectations on the Tibet question without a significant quid pro quo. The breakdown of talks between the Chinese government and representatives of the Dalai Lama does not augur well for the future, and a post-Dalai Lama situation could become much more complicated. Of late, China's aggressive territorial claims on India, the deepening of the China-Pakistan alliance and a shift in China's position on Kashmir has led to a hardening of India's position on Tibet. India is now seeking satisfaction on what it considers to be the core issues relating to India's sovereignty and territorial integrity. India-China relations are unlikely to be on an even keel until this tangled knot is unraveled.

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For thousands of years, Tibet was the buffer that kept India and China geographically apart and therefore at peace. It has only been for the last six decades or so, after China invaded and occupied Tibet in 1950, that India and China have come to share a common border, and with it the inherent issues of border security, such as the delineation and demarcation of the border and the movement of people and flow of trade across it. However, in the absence of any extensive historical experience of relations with each other, each country has a poor understanding of the psyche and system of the other. This was a critical lacuna when the two countries began to interact after India's independence in 1947 and the Communist Revolution in China in 1949. Both were then governed by proud nationalist leaders who were imbued with an exalted sense of the greatness, destiny and mission of their respective nations, but who also had deeply ingrained grievances arising out of the humiliations they suffered under colonial rule. Given the vanities, egos and different ways of thinking of the leaders of India and China, the likelihood of misperceptions and misunderstandings was built into the situation. (1)

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS AND TIBET PRE-1950

Before the mid-20th century, India-China relations were minimal. There was some overland and seaborne trade, as well as occasional exchanges of pilgrims and scholars. (2) The experience of the Indians and the Chinese of the outside world was completely different. India did not--indeed could not--keep out foreign influences and ideas. Macedonians, Turks, Afghans, Persians, Mongols and assorted tribes from the Eurasian heartland who invaded India over the centuries made a profound and lasting impact on the country. The old order was not swept away. Rather, a new composite culture and society emerged as, over time, the invaders settled down in the hospitable climes of the plains of India. Here they lived in peace and prospered, eventually becoming indistinguishable from, indeed a part of, the local population. (3) That was not the experience of the Chinese, who remained self-assured that they were the "Middle Kingdom" and all others barbarians. This patronizing approach persisted when India and China became independent in the mid-20th century. China's attitude toward India was one of an elder brother or uncle who was well established in the world, giving advice to a younger relative struggling to make his way. Independence of India was welcome, but China, as the recognized great power in Asia after the Second World War, expected India to know its place. (4)

However, the Chinese also had a complex about India. Instinctively, many Chinese people, including the communist leaders, understood that India was a very advanced civilization from which China had borrowed much, including Buddhism. India's spiritual and philosophical traditions were admired. Mao Zedong himself admitted to the Indian ambassador that, in China, there was "an old belief that if a man lived a good life he would be reborn in India." (5) Former Chinese premier Zhou Enlai also acknowledged that China had learned much from India. (6) Yet, the Chinese people were quite ignorant about mid-20th century India, an ideological perspective that led the Chinese communists to view India with wariness and suspicion as a capitalist and reactionary country whose leaders were too much under British influence,r Even Indian leaders understood that the Chinese regarded them as "tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy" and that China did not regard India as a friend. (8)

The thinking of independent India's leaders about China was somewhat different. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister who almost single-handedly guided India's foreign policy both before and after India's Independence, harbored a generally benign view of China and its intentions in Tibet, despite being aware of the inimical attitude of China's communist leaders toward India and toward him personally. (9) As a well-educated, widely traveled politician and intellectual, Nehru had great understanding, sympathy and admiration for China. (10) He harbored romantic, idealistic and somewhat naive notions of India and China as two great Asian civilizations who, as independent nations, would learn from each other's experience, forging a common destiny and promoting world peace in the 20th century. (11) However, during the Chinese civil war, the liberal-minded Nehru's sympathies were clearly with the nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek rather than with the communists, something that would have hardly endeared him to China's new communist leaders. There was mutual admiration, as well as close contacts and correspondence between the two men. (12) Although Chiang Kai-shek, during his visit to India in 1942, could not get the leaders of the Indian Congress Party to support the Allied war effort, the position changed as soon as Britain decided to give India its independence. In July 1947, just six weeks before India gained its independence, the United States and India signed a secret agreement that permitted the United States to continue, even expand, its aerial missions in Tibet in support of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) forces against Mao's Red Army. This India-U.S. agreement, initially valid for two years, was extended for an indefinite period in 1949. (13)

Nehru's views on Tibet contributed to the deepening of Chinese mistrust, as Nehru believed Tibet should be an independent country. (14) A separate invitation was extended by India to Tibet for the Asian Relations Conference convened by India in New Delhi in March 1947. Nevertheless, Nehru rejected any suggestion that India should consider establishing an independent Tibet. He realized that if the communists were to come to power, they would establish control over Tibet. (15) Although this would bring China's borders right up to India, Nehru did not convey any concerns. (16) Other Indian leaders, however, held a somewhat darker view of China's intentions. (17) Unlike them, Nehru was prudently hedging his bets. While rejecting Anglo-American overtures to be more active in supporting the Tibetans, Nehru cautiously approved giving a modest quantity of arms and ammunition to the Tibetans.'s Preoccupied with internal troubles and tensions with Pakistan, India could not really afford to do more. India was being only pragmatic in not wanting to assume all British rights and responsibilities in regard to Tibet arising out of the 1904 Lhasa Convention. Under the agreement, the British secured rights to establish trade marts at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok, and virtually established a British protectorate on Tibet. (19) Nehru therefore accepted China's suzerainty over Tibet. At the same time, he thought that Tibet should remain autonomous and that any communist liberation of Tibet should be peaceful. Clearly, Nehru did not want the issue of Tibet to poison relations between India and China. (20)

THE CHANGING TIDE

Historically, Tibet and China had fought with each other. One of the first priorities of China's communist leaders was to bring Tibet under their control. From China's perspective, Tibet was vitally important for strategic and security considerations. (21) Tibet is China's backdoor, one that has never been totally secure. In the early 20th century, at a time when China was weak and the Manchu empire in decline, the British established their presence in Tibet. It seemed to China that independent India under Nehru was continuing Britain's policies toward Tibet. The Chinese communists imagined that there was a sinister Anglo-American-Indian plot to control Tibet. (22)

China was acutely aware that if Tibet remained outside China's control it would inevitably drift closer to India, with which it had geographical proximity, a deep religious and cultural affinity, and no history of hostility. (23) Indeed there has always been a two-way intensive religious and cultural interaction between India and Tibet. Tibetans regard India, from where Buddhism originated, as their spiritual...