The test for seaman status: the Supreme Court muddies the waters again.

• Author: Graham, Anne Norris
• Position: Case Note

On June 14, 1995, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,(1) revising for the second time in four years the much-contested standard for Jones Act(2) seaman status. A worker seeking Jones Act coverage now must show that, in addition to doing the ship's work,(3) he has a connection to a vessel or fleet that is substantial, both in nature and in duration.(4) By leaving some traditional seamen vulnerable to the perils of the sea, the Latsis test is inconsistent with the policy of the Jones Act.

The Jones Act provides remedies for injured seamen, allowing them to sue their employers for negligence.(5) Seamen are not covered by state compensation systems; instead, activities on the water are covered by admiralty.(6) Traditionally, maritime law has sought to foster commerce by protecting investors and shipowners, often at the expense of seamen.(7) Until this century, maritime law had precluded seamen's recovery beyond maintenance and cure.(8)

The Jones Act, enacted in 1920, was an attempt to help seamen by providing them with legal remedies for injuries caused by the negligence of their employers.(9) Debate over who should receive those remedies, however, has created nearly as many problems as the Jones Act has served.(10) Although some workers clearly qualify as seamen, the courts have had difficulty distinguishing other seamen from land-based workers.(11) The Jones Act's generous remedies(12) have made seaman status a hotly contested and frequently litigated issue for injured workers and their employers.(13)

The Supreme Court, in 1991, attempted to define seaman status in McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander.(14) Wilander resolved the conflict between two popular approaches to the issue,(15) one from the Fifth Circuit(16) and the other from the Seventh.(17) The Court left many questions unanswered and confusion continued in the lower courts.(18) In Latsis, the Court amended the Wilander definition of seaman status, further restricting the scope of the Jones Act.(19) By shifting the boundaries of seaman status, the Court has reduced potential liability for maritime employers and closed remedies to injured seamen. The Latsis opinion will have far-reaching effect.

In applying the Jones Act, Justice Cardozo wrote in Warner v. Goltra(20) that "the purpose of [the] statute must be read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained."(21) In Latsis, the Court has purported to do just that. This Note assesses the judiciary's success in explaining the purpose of the Jones Act and in correcting the mischief that it was designed to remedy. By reviewing the background of the Jones Act and the case law leading up to the Wilander decision, this Note analyzes judicial interpretation of the Act's purpose. Through a critical discussion and comparison of Wilander and Latsis, this Note demonstrates the Court's mistakes in crafting its new definition of seaman. Finally, drawing on the history of Jones Act jurisprudence, this Note suggests a more appropriate approach to seaman status.

The Supreme Court needs to enunciate a more complete test for seaman status rooted firmly in the policy considerations of the Jones Act. This test should distinguish between land-based and sea-based employees by granting seaman status to those attached to a vessel at sea, without further consideration. The test should direct application of the factors identified in Latsis and Wilander to more ambiguous situations.

Background of the Jones Act

In 1896, Patrick Shea, a crew member aboard the propeller Osceola, was struck and injured by a falling derrick.(23) This accident began nearly a century of litigation over legal remedies for seamen and the eligibility of workers to receive these remedies. Shea sued the Osceola's owners for the master's negligence in ordering the use of the derrick at open sea.(24) In denying Shea's claims, the Supreme Court severely limited a seaman's ability to recover for his injuries.(25)

The Court determined in The Osceola that general maritime law limited the rights of Shea and other seamen to four propositions.(26) First, when a seaman became ill or was wounded in the ship's service, the vessel and its owners were liable for his maintenance and cure(27) and for his wages, "at least so long as the voyage [was] continued."(28) Second, the vessel and its owners were liable for injuries to a seaman caused by the unseaworthiness of the vessel.(29) Third, except for the ship's master, all the crew members were fellow servants of each other.(30) The vessel and its owners thus were not liable to a seaman for injuries caused by another seaman's negligence, beyond the remedies of maintenance and cure.(31) Fourth, a seaman could not recover in an indemnity action for the negligence of the ship's master.(32) Again, he was entitled only to maintenance and cure.(33)

Under The Osceola, a seaman injured by negligence, whether that of the ship's master or of a fellow servant, had no right to damages beyond maintenance and cure.(34) The Osceola's holding incorporated the fellow servant defense(35) and the doctrine of assumption of the risk,(36) theories that originated in cases involving land-based workers, denying seamen the ability to sue their employers in a negligence cause of action.(37) In 1908, Congress restricted the application of the fellow servant defense and the doctrine of assumption of the risk in railway workers' suits by enacting the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).(38) This legislation was a breakthrough for railway workers, granting them a negligence cause of action against their employers.(39)

Congress attempted similar reform for seamen in the Seaman's Act of 1915.(40) Intended as a legislative veto of The Osceola's holding, the 1915 Act provided that a seaman in command of other seamen is not a fellow servant with those under his authority.(41) The Osceola had provided that seamen were fellow servants with everyone on board except the ship's master.(42) Under The Osceola, the fellow servant defense restricted a seaman injured by the negligence of his superior officer to maintenance and cure.(43) By declaring that a seaman was not a fellow servant of his superior officer, Congress apparently intended that the Seaman's Act of 1915 would allow seamen to sue the vessel and its owners for the negligence of their superior officers, thereby softening The Osceola's harsh ruling.

Congress, however, overlooked The Osceola's provision that barred suits to recover for the negligence of any crew member beyond the remedies of maintenance and cure.(44) Thus, even though the Seaman's Act of 1915 declared that a seaman was no longer a fellow servant of his superior officer, he still could not recover for the superior officer's negligence. The Supreme Court highlighted this error in Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S., pointing out that the 1915 Act did not affect The Osceola's prohibition of a seaman's recovery for the negligence of a crew member.(45)

Congress went back to the drawing board, emerging in 1920 with the Jones Act,(46) modeled after FELA.(47) The Jones Act granted a negligence cause of action to seamen injured in the course of employment and extended to them the rights that FELA provided to railway workers. Under the Jones Act, the injured seaman may elect to sue in admiralty or at law with the right to trial by jury in either federal or state court.(48) The jury may also decide general maritime law claims.(49) Although judges craft the standard for seaman status, the jury usually decides whether a given plaintiff qualifies.(50) If a seaman sues in state court, the defendant does not have the right of removal.(51) The locality test, which defines admiralty jurisdiction,(52) does not apply in Jones Act cases; therefore, seamen injured on land may be covered.(53) The Jones Act allows the personal representative of a deceased seaman to maintain an action.(54) Under the Act, an injured seaman may recover generous benefits.(55)

Congress failed to define the term "seaman" in the Jones Act. Ironically, the most complete statutory definition of the term appears in another act, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).(56) Prior to the enactment of the LHWCA, longshoremen and harbor workers had recovered as seamen under the Jones Act.(57) In excluding seamen from its coverage, the LHWCA employs the most complete statutory definition of a seaman: "a master or member of a crew of any vessel."(58) Since the passage of the LHWCA, this language has formed the basis for most seaman status analyses.(59)

EARLY JONES ACT JURISPRUDENCE: THE ACTIVITIES-BASED TEST

In its early Jones Act cases, the Supreme Court determined seaman status based on the worker's activities, comparing the worker's duties to traditional seaman activities.(60) The Court rejected the locality test as a method of determining seaman status(61) and found that seaman status is fact-specific,(62) turning on the worker's duties, both those immediately at hand(63) and those within the general scope of his employment.(64) For Jones Act coverage, the worker must be a seaman, meaning that he is engaged in activities customarily performed by seamen, and must be injured in the course of his employment.(65) The Court used the LHWCA, interpreting it as exclusive of the Jones Act, to gauge seaman status under the Jones Act.(66)

In one of its earliest considerations of seaman status, Warner v. Goltra,(67) the Court spoke of the purpose of the Jones Act in terms of protecting seamen, who were "ward[s] of the admiralty,' often ignorant and helpless, and so in need of protection. . . ."(68) In holding that the Jones Act applied to the ship's master as well as to the crew, the Court found that master and crew were equally vulnerable to injury.(69) The Court stated that "a seaman is a mariner of any degree, one who lives his life upon the sea."(70) The decisive factor in applying the Jones Act to the...