The Tax Advantage of Big Business: How the Structure of Corporate Taxation Fuels Concentration and Inequality

AuthorSandy Brian Hager,Joseph Baines
Published date01 June 2020
DOI10.1177/0032329220911778
Date01 June 2020
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220911778
Politics & Society
2020, Vol. 48(2) 275 –305
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/0032329220911778
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Article
The Tax Advantage of
Big Business: How the
Structure of Corporate
Taxation Fuels
Concentration and
Inequality
Sandy Brian Hager
City, University of London
Joseph Baines
King’s College London
Abstract
Corporate concentration in the United States has been on the rise in recent years,
sparking a heated debate about its causes, consequences, and potential remedies.
This article examines a facet of public policy that has been neglected in the debate:
corporate taxation. Developing the first empirical mapping of the effective tax rates
of nonfinancial corporations disaggregated by size and broken down by jurisdiction,
the article reveals a striking tax advantage for big business at home and abroad. The
analysis goes on to show how persistent regressivity in the tax structure is bound
up with the increasing relative power of large corporations within the corporate
universe, as well as a shift in firm-level power relations. As large corporations
become less disposed to investments that may indirectly benefit ordinary workers,
they become more disposed to shareholder value enhancement that directly benefits
the asset-rich. What this means is that the corporate tax structure is connected not
only to rising corporate concentration but also to widening household inequality.
Keywords
corporate taxation, concentration, inequality, capital as power, financialization
Corresponding Author:
Sandy Brian Hager, City, University of London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB, UK.
Email: Sandy.Hager@city.ac.uk
911778PASXXX10.1177/0032329220911778Politics & SocietyHager and Baines
research-article2020
276 Politics & Society 48(2)
Over the past few decades the largest corporations in the United States have taken
greater shares of net income, revenues, assets, and market capitalization.1 The studies
that have unearthed increasing concentration have also shown that big business charges
higher prices while lowering wages, providing lower quality goods and services, and
restricting output.2 In the aggregate, corporate concentration has been blamed for the
slowdown in productivity growth and a sluggish economy.3 A recent paper by Germán
Gutiérrez and Thomas Philippon even argues that the United States, once the poster
child of economic dynamism, has lost its competitive edge relative to Europe because
of its failures to combat concentration.4 In addition to stifling competition, concentra-
tion has also been linked to rising inequality and the increasing political clout of big
business.5 With a growing number of people feeling the system is rigged in favor of
elites, the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few giant corporations
adds more fuel to the already seething flames of populist discontent.6
How did we get into a situation where a few “superstar” companies dominate?
Market processes of globalization and technological change are identified as two of
the main drivers.7 The former allows multinationals to expand the scope of their opera-
tions and to lower costs, while the latter entails network effects that may encourage
“winner take all” dynamics.8 Digital platforms tend toward monopoly. Social media
users derive no clear benefit from having their contacts spread across various sites; the
whole point is to connect everyone together in one network. Yet in the United States
growing concentration has been pervasive in domestically oriented, brick-and-mortar
sectors as well as globalized, high technology ones.9 The ubiquity of oligopolistic
giants throughout the US corporate landscape suggests that something more than just
market processes is at play. That something is politics and, in particular, public policy.
As large corporations command ever-greater shares of resources, regulatory bodies
such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have come under
fire for enabling concentration through lax antitrust policies and lenient merger
enforcement.10
Not long ago it was common for mainstream economists and policymakers to fol-
low the Chicago School and downplay the consequences of corporate concentration.
Growing size, they argued, simply reflects the growing efficiencies of large corpora-
tions relative to their smaller competitors.11 In large part because of their abilities to
exploit economies of scale, corporate behemoths are credited with boosting competi-
tion and improving consumer welfare.12 But that view has come under fire, even
within the Chicago School itself. In 2017 and 2018 the University of Chicago’s Booth
School of Business held two events on the threats posed by corporate concentration.
As the Economist magazine quipped, “Until recently, convening a conference support-
ing antitrust concerns in the Windy City was like holding a symposium on sobriety in
New Orleans.”13
The political aspects of corporate concentration have not been lost on politicians.
Still reeling from the presidential election defeat in 2016, the Democratic Party
announced a “Better Deal” strategy for the 2018 midterms. A throwback to New Deal
progressivism, Democrats vowed to tackle oligopolistic market structures through
antitrust reforms that would empower regulators to break up monopolies and make it

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