The Tactical Use of Civil Resistance by Rebel Groups: Evidence from India’s Maoist Insurgency

• Published date: 01 August 2021
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002721995547
• Author: Roman Krtsch
• Date: 01 August 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

The Tactical Use of Civil

Resistance by Rebel

Groups: Evidence from

India’s Maoist Insurgency

Roman Krtsch

1

Abstract

Research on rebel behavior during conflicts has traditionally focused on the use of

violent tactics. However, evidence from several intrastate wars suggests that armed

groups also occasionally employ general strikes—a method of civil resistance that

has typically been associated with nonviolent groups. But when do rebels resort

to general strikes? I argue that these tactics have a particular function which can

offset potential risks for rebels after they have suffered losses in previous battles:

Through general strikes, rebels signal sustained authority to the local population.

The argument is tested for districts in Eastern India using newly compiled,

disaggregated data on contentious action during the Maoist conflict. The paper

contributes to a burgeoning literature on wartime civilian activism in two ways: First,

it shows that armed groups themselves rely situationally on civilian mobilization.

Second, it investigates the effect of conditions endogenous to the conflict on these

tactical choices.

Keywords

internal armed conflict, asymmetric conflict, capabilities, civil wars

1

Osnabru¨ck University, Germany

Corresponding Author:

Roman Krtsch, Osnabrueck University, Seminarstrasse 33, 49074 Osnabru¨ck, Germany.

Email: roman.krtsch@uni-osnabrueck.de

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2021, Vol. 65(7-8) 1251-1277

ªThe Author(s) 2021

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002721995547

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Introduction

We typically conceive of intrastate armed conflicts as exceptional political situations

in which nonstate actors challenge the authority of the government with organized

violence. However, rebel groups sometimes employ tactics beyond the mere use of

armed force, involving forms of popular mobilization that are usually characteristic

of nonviolent movements: Groups across diverse ideological and geographical con-

texts ranging from Nepal’s and India’s Maoist rebellions (Swain 2010; Mishra 2017)

over separatist conflicts in Aceh and Kashmir (Keller 2017) to ethnic and religious

conflicts in Iraq (Kamber and Glanz 2008) have repeatedly enforced general strikes

in the course of predominantly violent insurrections. In some instances, such as the

Nepalese civil war and the First Congo War, rebel-sponsored general strikes even

decisively marked the final episodes of the respective conflict, leading to either

concessions or regime change (Keller 2017; McGreal 1997). Despite their some-

times massive impact, though, general strikes are a hitherto unexplained variation of

rebel behavior that has received relatively little attention in the academic debate.

The use of general strikes or civil resistance methods more generally by armed

actors represents a puzzle. After all, the mobilization of civilians for contentious

performances in public spaces departs considerably from tactics of insurgent

warfare, which are usually characterized by clandestine and small-scale operations.

This paper aims to explore how conflict dynamics affect rebel groups’ propensity to

employ general strikes during an ongoing violent campaign. I assume that insurgents

operate in a strategic context in which tactical decisions are made based on their

costs and benefits in a given situation. The implementation of general strikes can

draw attention to an area, requires the diversion of resources, and runs the risk of

backfiring if insurgents fail to enforce compliance. I argue, however, that particu-

larly in cases where rebels experience battlefield losses in a certain locality, general

strikes can outweigh these drawbacks by signaling ongoing local control and opera-

tional capacity to the local population. I test this argument in a systematic, subna-

tional study using novel data on the implementation of general strikes during India’s

ongoing Maoist insurgency. While this conflict has predominantly been portrayed

against the backdrop of the surge in v iolence, the militant Communist Pa rty of

India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) has relied heavily on popular mobilization as a conten-

tious performance alongside the use of armed force since the very beginning of the

insurgency.

In particular, the Maoist rebels frequently rely on bandhs, a form of civil disobe-

dience in South Asian countries that falls into the broader category of general strikes

and implies thecomplete shutdown of all publicand economic life in a specific region

(Sinha, Sinha, and Sh ekhar 2006; McHenry 2006). The res ults from linear probability

and logistic regression models show that rebel casualties increase the probability of

rebel-initiated general strikes. These findings remain robust across different model

specifications, including the use of different estimation strategies, the omission of

influential cases, and alternative operationalizations of the independent variable.

1252 Journal of Conflict Resolution 65(7-8)