The Supreme Court "sells" Charles Singleton Short: Why the Court Should Have Granted Certiorari to Singleton v. Norris After Reversing United States v. Sell

• Publication year: 2010

The Supreme Court "Sells" Charles Singleton Short: Why the Court Should Have Granted Certiorari to Singleton v. Norris After Reversing United States v. Sell

Jeremy P. Burnette

Introduction

The State of Arkansas executed Charles Singleton by lethal injection on January 6, 2004.[1] The Ashley County, Arkansas Circuit Court sentenced him to death following his 1979 conviction for the capital murder of Mary Lou York.[2] Mr. Singleton's guilt was not at issue because he murdered Ms. York in the neighborhood grocery store where she lived and worked and she lived long enough to identify Mr. Singleton as her attacker.[3]

Mr. Singleton's competence for execution, however, was considerably more ambiguous.[4] His mental health began to decline noticeably after eight years on death row.[5] He suffered from a psychiatric illness—most likely schizophrenia, a pervasive mental disorder characterized by psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions—and had a poor prognosis for full recovery.[6] Although forcibly medicated and relatively stable on appeal, Mr. Singleton continued to exhibit psychotic symptoms that called his competency into question.[7] He referred to himself as "God" or "Holy Spirit" and believed that Sylvester Stallone and Arnold Schwarzenegger were trying to "save him."[8]

In 1986, the United States Supreme Court validated the common law rule that the state should not execute an insane offender in Ford v. Wainwright.[9] However, Mr. Singleton's death sentence remained intact despite the perseverance of his psychotic symptoms.[10] In reviewing Singleton's claim that the State of Arkansas could not force him to take psychiatric medication to render him competent for execution, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied primarily on its reasoning from United States v. Sell.[11] There, the Eighth Circuit examined a defendant's right to be free from this type of medication when it results in his competency to stand trial.[12] However, the United States Supreme Court overturned United States v. Sell and modified the test for this determination, effectively removing the underpinnings of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Singleton v. Norris.[13] This change in precedent necessitates addressing the fate of mentally ill death row inmates after the Sell decision.[14]

Despite the significance of the Supreme Court's ruling in Sell v. United States[15] and its potentially dramatic implications for Mr. Singleton's position, the Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari on October 6, 2003 without comment.[16] This denial eradicated any anticipation that Mr. Singleton's case might result in further legal developments regarding the status of mentally ill inmates, particularly those on death row.[17] The Court's refusal to hear the appeal also placed Mr. Singleton's fate in the hands of Arkansas's Governor, the only remaining safeguard between Singleton and lethal injection.[18] However, the Governor refused the clemency petition that Mr. Singleton's attorney filed.[19]

Part I of this Comment provides the background regarding the issue of forcibly medicating mentally ill inmates, including the primary cases and legal doctrines regarding the forcible use of psychiatric treatment in the inmate population. Part II discusses the application of the United States v. Sell test to Charles Singleton's case. Part III presents the concerns raised by Sell v. United States, the new Sell test, and the Supreme Court's refusal to apply the new test to Mr. Singleton and others in his position. Finally, Part IV examines the codes of professional ethics that necessitate further consideration of forcing inmates to take psychiatric medication to render them competent for execution.

I. Background Cases

A. Ford v. Wainwright[20]

In Ford v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court validated a long-standing common law rule that the state should not execute insane defendants.[21] The State of Florida convicted Ford of murder and sentenced him to death.[22] An examining psychiatrist diagnosed the defendant with symptoms consistent with paranoid schizophrenia, including delusions of friends and family being held hostage and calling himself "Pope John Paul, III."[23] Ford further believed the State could not execute him because he "owned the prisons and could control the Governor through mind waves."[24]

A second examining psychiatrist concluded that Ford truly believed that the State could not execute him and that he did not comprehend the relationship between his crime and his pending execution.[25] Following state law, Florida's Governor appointed three psychiatrists who interviewed Ford simultaneously for thirty minutes.[26] Each psychiatrist determined that Ford had a different diagnosis, but all agreed that he was competent for execution.[27] The Governor signed Ford's death warrant without further comment.[28]

Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall recognized that multiple policies warn against executing the insane.[29] First, these executions fail to serve the punishment goals of deterrence and retribution.[30] Second, the state likely offends its citizens when it executes an incompetent defendant who cannot prepare for his death religiously.[31] Third, the insanity serves as a punishment in itself, and the execution of an insane defendant is purely offensive.[32] In concluding that the execution of insane inmates runs counter to the Constitution's cruel and unusual punishment prohibition, Justice Marshall wrote for the Court, "Whether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment."[33]

In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell presented the test for determining if an insane defendant is ineligible for execution.[34] The state should not execute defendants if they are not aware of either (1) the impending punishment or (2) the reason for the punishment.[35]

B. Washington v. Harper[36]

In Washington v. Harper, the United States Supreme Court considered whether a penal institution may forcibly treat a psychologically unstable inmate with psychotropic medication.[37] The Court considered the inmate's interest in being free from unwanted psychopharmacological agents and the state's interest in its prisoners' safety.[38] Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment allows a state to forcibly medicate a seriously mentally ill inmate with psychiatric medication "if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest."[39]

C. Riggins v. Nevada[40]

The U.S. Supreme Court also addressed forced psychiatric medication in Riggins v. Nevada.[41] In Riggins, the question was whether involuntary administration of psychotropic medications to a criminal defendant and the associated side effects would impair the defendant's right to a fair trial.[42] The Court acknowledged that the defendant had a liberty interest in being free from involuntary psychotropic treatment and that the state could only overpower this liberty interest with an essential interest of its own.[43] Applying the Harper standard, the Court ruled that state-mandated psychiatric medication could satisfy due process requirements if "treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of others."[44] The Court further noted that the side effects of this forced treatment could affect a defendant's appearance, testimony, and ability to assist in his or her defense, potentially undermining the defendant's right to a fair trial.[45] The Court also said that the state may effectively defend forced psychiatric medication against a due process challenge if the treatment is medically appropriate and less invasive procedures would be ineffective in helping to determine the defendant's innocence or guilt.[46]

II. The Original Sell Test Applied in Singleton

A. United States v. Sell Develops a Test for Forced Medication

United States v. Sell brought before the Eighth Circuit the issue of using forced psychotropic medication to achieve an inmate's competence to stand trial.[47] The federal government indicted Sell for 56 counts of mail fraud associated with false Medicaid and private insurance claims for fictitious dental services.[48] Although the district court initially found him competent to stand trial, Sell allegedly tried to harass a witness while released on bond.[49] When subsequently brought before a magistrate judge, he exhibited unruly behavior and spit in the judge's face.[50] Mental health professionals who examined Sell diagnosed him with delusional disorder, persecutory type.[51]

In a competency hearing, the district court ruled that Sell was not competent to stand trial and mandated hospitalization.[52] His treating psychiatrists recommended psychotropic medication, and Sell countered that he did not want to receive the medicine and presented witnesses who testified that antipsychotic medication was not the best treatment for his diagnosis.[53] A magistrate court ruled that Sell could be dangerous to himself or others and permitted the government to treat him involuntarily with the psychotropic medicine under a Harper order.[54] The district court overturned the magistrate court's finding of dangerousness but maintained the forced medication order because the government's need to restore competency was enough to justify the forced treatment.[55]

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit outlined a test to determine whether the government may forcibly medicate defendants with antipsychotic drugs to render them competent to stand trial without violating their due process rights.[56] To treat a defendant involuntarily with...